#Moldova_Russia: Yesterday's decision by the Moldovan authorities to ban the Sputnik web pages has provoked a harsh reaction from Moscow. Disinformation is the reason invoked by the Moldovan authorities. According to the Russian interpretation,⤵️
Moldova would follow the Western logic of discrediting Russia and generating anti-Russian sentiments. It is worth mentioning that Moscow did not have such an incendiary speech last Dec when the Moldovan side shut down 6 TV channels of which 3 broadcast Russian content. ⤵️
Russia is likely to try to mobilize Russian-speakers in Moldova. The Russian MFA said that there are 200,000 Russians in Moldova and up to 40% of them reside in Chisinau. The protest mood is growing as more categories of citizens have become more critical⤵️
against the govt (socially vulnerable people recruited by the Șor Party, transport associations, supporters of the pro-Moldovan identity of socialists and communists, most recently judges, etc.). In addition to falsely accusing the Moldovan authorities⤵️
of “assimilating the Russian population”, the Russian MFA has announced that economic sanctions could be used in retaliation. Pro-Russian forces could use the consequences of the sanctions could be combined with the cheap gas issues to intensify and expand the (now quite small)⤵️
protests. The impact of economic sanctions could be minimal due to the reorientation of trade from Moldova towards the EU. But the talk about sanctions could be used to portray the government as responsible for⤵️
closing down traditional markets in Moldova. This may support the goal of amplifying the protests more than the claim that the Moldovan govt is assimilating the Russian minority.
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#China_CentralAsia: Beijing is working on the regional segmentation of its foreign policy very much following the Russian example. After Russia brought the 5 Central Asian nations together in Moscow, China is looking to replicate a similar format. Some would say it means⤵️
that China is filling the void left by Russia, weakened (and with serious reputation issues) from its failed aggression against Ukraine. My answer would be “yes and no”: 1) Partly due to the geopolitical and economic consequences of the Russian war against Ukraine,⤵️
Moscow has objective limitations to use the same amount of resources (mainly in reference to legitimacy and respect) , while it is just as influential in Central Asia as before. At the same time, Moscow falls short of economic capabilities to⤵️
#EU_WesternBalkans: The defamation provision introduced into the penal code by the Republika Srpska legislature is jeopardizing the opening of BiH's accession negotiations with the EU. This decision would violate two of the 14 EU requirements that were preconditions for⤵️
obtaining EU candidate status, which was granted to BiH at the end of 2022. Although the EU cannot reverse the decision on candidate status, it can block the accession dialog until the pre-candidate status is implemented. The case of BiH serves as a reminder for⤵️
the govts of Moldova (9 conditions) and Ukraine (7 conditions), which must be attentive to the quality of compliance with EU requirements if they wish to open accession negotiations in the short term.⤵️
#China_Ukraine: Political signals from the US administration reveal concerns that Beijing could use ignoring China's proposal for a peace deal on Ukraine to discredit the West. The Chinese media are already hinting at the fact that the US would reject the Chinese peace deal⤵️
in order to continue supporting Ukraine in the war (fueling the Russian narrative of Western proxy war against Russia through the use of Ukraine). During 2022, West demanded that China get involved to stop the war. However, the initial expectation was that⤵️
Beijing would be neutral or side with Ukraine (victim) instead of trying to strike a balance that actually suits Russian strategic interests (aggressor). Such an outcome was unrealistic, given Russian strategic dialogue with China. The West has 2 options⤵️
#Sanctions: UN humanitarian diplomacy aims to convince the EU to exempt Belarusian fertilizer exports. Lithuania and Poland are against any easing of restrictions on the export of Belarusian potash to not help Lukashenko. The sanctions were applied after⤵️
the Ryanair hijacking in 2021. Lukashenko's facilitation of the Russian war against Ukraine has reduced exports to the West. Belarus currently transports potash from Russia's St Petersburg and Murmansk airports. The potash producer (Belaruskali) is a⤵️
major source of income for the Lukashenko regime. The US shares the concern that sanctions on Belarus could have aggravating effects on food security. Canada has already taken the top spot as a world share of exports, planning to expand production capacity.⤵️
#Armenia_Azerbaijan: There are two main conditions that Baku imposes to allow the Armenian community to live in Nagorno-Karabakh. They sound like an ultimatum and are articulated in the language of power:⤵️
1) the recognition by Armenia that Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) belongs to Azerbaijan (this would mean that Yerevan should give up any idea of demanding a special status for the NK populated mainly by the Armenian community, including the deployment of an int peace-keeping mission);⤵️
2) accepting the delimitation of the borders according to Azeri requests (in reality such exercise requires consensus and even mutual concessions if necessary). If they are not fulfilled, Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan will not recognize the territorial integrity of Armenia.⤵️
#China_Russia: Putin has invited Chinese companies to invest in Russia and replace Western companies that exited as a result of (self) sanction. Russia does not have the resources or time to create from scratch technological capabilities that compensate for those of the West.⤵️
Therefore, the only way to prevent the deindustrialization of the Russian economy is by importing Chinese technology. Instead, Putin is willing to take gas exports to China to another level to reach up to $100 billion a year by 2030. It is a tough decision for China⤵️
to start exporting its technology and FDI to Russia until the war is over and the risk of sanctions contagion don't be removed. First China wants to end the war in favor of Russia. The rest will depend on it.