Thread by @WarintheFuture

This week saw the failure of Russia’s President Putin to openly elicit military assistance from China for his special military operation. It could be a strategic turning point of the war, particularly as #Ukraine launches its offensives. 1/25

2/25 Ukraine, which has long telegraphed its 2023 offensives, is likely to launch these attacks soon. I would note there will not be just be one big push, but probably several different offensives. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-coming-u…

3/25 This is because both the south and the east present opportunities for offensive action. It is also because the Ukrainians will want to deceive Russia about their main effort. The south in particular has significant economic importance to Ukraine.

4/25 It has agriculture, mines, fertilizer and energy production that is vital to Ukraine’s economy. It also has the ports that, pre-war, exported about half of Ukraine’s foreign revenue. The south is much more than just a land bridge to #Crimea.

5/25 Timing will be everything. The weather is one determinant in the timing of Ukraine’s offensives. Cross country mobility is an important consideration, and the ‘mid season’ has an impact on wheeled and tracked vehicles, and well as dismounted mobility.

6/25 But, timing will also be determined by other factors.

7/25 First, the preparation of Ukrainian units that’s will take part. #Ukraine is forming three new Army Corps, and is also reinforcing other combat and support formations to take part. Their training, strength and posture will influence the timing of the offensive.

8/25 2nd, arrival of new equipment & munitions. The donation of new tanks, IFVs, artillery, drones and especially important - combat engineer and breaching equipment - is important, as is the Ukrainian army’s capacity to quickly absorb this new materiel.

9/25 3rd, political considerations will have an impact. President @ZelenskyyUa will have a say in not just the location but also the timing. This is because all military operations must achieve political outcomes.

10/25 At this level of war, there is no such thing as military autonomy - and nor should their be. Major military operations, especially those as important as the upcoming Ukrainian offensives, must align with and achieve political and strategic requirements.

11/25 Finally, an important determinant of timing to launch the offensives - or at least the initial phase - will be opportunity. Ukrainian intelligence will be closely monitoring Russian troop strength & morale, holdings of munitions, reserves etc.

12/25 The current Russian offensive will culminate. Ukraine will watch for the optimal time is to strike, taking this into consideration. It means a Ukrainian offensive could come sooner than we think given the Russians have failed to seize the initiative with the current ops.

13/25 As the Ukrainians have shown at Kyiv, Kherson and Kharkiv, they - unlike the Russians - know how to plan and conduct successful large scale offensives. But this one will be different from those that have preceded it.

14/25 This time, the Ukrainians will have to fight through more dense obstacle belts established by the Russians in the east and south. These are designed to both channel attackers into ‘killing zones’ as well as slow down and break up the cohesion of attacks.

15/25 The last few American aid packages have recognised this with large amounts of combat engineering equipment, as have recent European donations.

16/25 Mechanised obstacle breaching is dangerous and slow and requires armored engineer vehicles, explosive breaching capability’s and very tight, well-led combined arms integration and orchestration.

17/25 There are ways around obstacles in some areas, but it is unlikely the Ukrainians will be able to, avoid them entirely. But, if the Ukrainians can penetrate defensive zones, and break into Russian rear areas, they could capture both Russian forces & large swathes of ground.

https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1635725244852838400

18/25 The other difference in the coming offensives is the growing asymmetry in the quality of equipment. The Ukrainians, with the infusion of western aid, have improved the quality of their tanks and other vehicles.

19/25 The Russians, having lost much of their best kit in the first year of the war, are turning to older tanks and armoured vehicles. This will have an impact on the Ukrainian offensives.

20/25 Finally, in planning such activities, the Ukrainians will be pondering a key question: “are there things we are not seeing that the Russians might surprise us with?” This might include Russian reserve locations & undetected Russian operational maneuver groups

21/25 The Ukrainians know how important the coming offensives are. Considerations like deception & surprise, counter-intelligence and counter-recon, integration, rehearsals, prioritization and sequencing will have been considered and incorporated into the plans.

22/25 But, even with the best planning, the success or otherwise of the coming offensives will be determined on the ground. Good leadership, flexible execution, determined close combat and adapting to opportunity will be vital to tactical and operational success.

23/25 Fortunately, these are qualities we have seen from the Ukrainian Armed Forces throughout the war. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-coming-u…

24/25 As we hold our collective breath in anticipation of the Ukrainian offensives, hundreds of thousands of young (and not so young) Ukrainians are working, planing, training and preparing to land a succession of hammer blows against the Russians. God speed to them all.

25/25 Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @DefenceU @WGrzedzinski @TDF_UA @EuromaidanPress @front_ukrainian @Liberov @MaryanKushnir @KyivIndependent @washingtonpost @bradyafr