Thread by @amenka

ltst newsletter: I focus on the #Russian labor market where there is a growing staff shortage. 🇷🇺 leaders talk proudly of record low unemployment. However, the headline figures mask despair of firms forced to increase wages as productivity falls
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en.thebell.io/russia-has-too…

2 waves of wartime emigration and mobilization cost the workforce about 600,000 men — 2% of all men aged 20-49. Same time, 390,000 men moved to posts in military, security and public administration, noticed @x1skv They have primarily moved from construction, processing and retail

There are several reasons for the shortages:
- Defense industry businesses are taking on workers from the civilian sector. This is a problem because the transition typically restricts the potential of the overall economy

- Two waves of emigration led to the departure of many qualified specialists, while foreign companies left Russia and local operations mothballed plans for expansion due to increased uncertainty

Almost 40 mln are working in the small business sector, or a self-employed or in casual employment. Usually, when workers are laid off or dismissed, they drift into this segment. There is far less movement in the opposite direction

Labor shortfall is a bottleneck for #Putin to switch Russia’s economy to a “war footing” to boost output or promote import substitution.

also is this issue: Russian's attitudes about the war with Ukraine are contradictory. But Rus would not easily accept the possibility of defeat, according to researchers at the Public Sociology Laboratory.

A “piecemeal” attitude toward the war, characterized by contradictions and built on narratives from both sides. Unhappiness about mobilization does not translate into unhappiness about the war. For Russians far removed from politics, mobilization and the war are distinct events.

Any talk of the need to end the war as quickly as possible means only victory. It is impossible to countenance defeat, even in a war started without good reason.