Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Apr 30 22 tweets 7 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
Undoubtedly, H-Hour (the time set for a planned attack) for the forthcoming Ukrainian offensives is drawing near. For months, Ukrainian planners and strategic leaders preparing. How might we assess the success of the offensives to come? 1/22 🧵 Image
2/ In my previous post on this topic, I described the rationale for measures of success & failure. I also listed five principles for their development and application. Success in the coming offensives can be measured at different levels and over different timescales.
3/ Progress will be assessed by multitudes of analysts, journalists, politicians and citizens. At the same time, some will quickly jump on short term tactical setbacks instead of waiting a few days to assess the full implications of such incidents.
4/ I propose a set of measures of success for the forthcoming offensives. Some of the measures are tactical, some more strategic or political. Together, they are a linked set of measures that can be used to assess whether the degree to which Ukrainian offensives are successful. Image
5/ In this thread, I have only covered measures of success. The full set of measures of success and failure are in my latest Futura Doctrina post here: mickryan.substack.com/p/the-ukrainia…
6/ Measure 1: #Ukraine achieves surprise (tactical and operational levels, some political impact – short term). Generating surprise leads to shock. Shock should lead to slower Russian decision making and responses to Ukrainian operations.
7/ While relatively easy to assess on the ground, limitations on sharing information with news organisations may make this harder to assess in the short term. It is, however, a key component for the success of the Ukrainian offensives.
8/ Measure 2: #Ukraine is able to destroy or degrade Russian tactical and operational reserves, C2 and logistics before the offensive (tactical, operational and strategic impacts – short term). The Ukrainians will want to limit the Russian’s ability to respond to their attacks.
9/ Finding and neutralising mobile Russian reserves, HQ and logistics before - and at the beginning of - the offensives will be important. Achieving this is reliant on excellent intelligence, various long range strike mechanisms, as well as air, missile and drone defences.
10/ Measure 3: Ukraine takes back its territory (tactical and operational, but with political ramifications). This might seem obvious, but this needs to be an explicit measure of success. I don’t propose a certain percentage of territory that should be recaptured.
11/ But if most of Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are recaptured, this would be a very successful outcome. And it would be good foundation for subsequent operations against Crimea and Donetsk in the future. Image
12/ Measure 4: Ukraine is postured to retake Crimea at the end of the offensives (Operational, strategic and political – medium term). As I have written previously, the last campaign of the war may be the campaign Ukraine conducts to take back Crimea. mickryan.substack.com/p/all-roads-le…
13/ Therefore, the coming offensives will be successful if the Ukrainian armed forces are well placed for follow on operations to take back Crimea – either through making it untenable for the Russians to stay, or an actual military operation to seize it.
14/ Measure 5: Ukraine captures / destroys Russian forces (tactical and operational, but with political and strategic ramifications). Related to the recapture of its territory is the capture or destruction of Russian forces. The Russians have to be beaten and be seen to be beat. Image
15/ A successful Ukrainian offensive will also ensure sufficient Russian combat power is destroyed to prevent Russia conducting any follow-on offensives for the remainder of 2023.
16/ Measure 6: Ukraine preserves sufficient forces to continue defending some areas and conduct subsequent offensives in others (Operational and strategic – medium term). The Ukrainians will invest a significant part of their combat power in this offensive.
17/ But, they will want to do so in a way where they don’t sustain massive casualties. The degree to which Ukraine can inflict disproportionate casualties and destruction on the Russians in the coming offensives will be a an important measure of success.
18/ Measure 7: Ukraine’s supporters believe the offensives have been a success (political and strategic). For Ukraine to achieve success in its operations, and the Ukrainian people, foreign leaders and populations will need to think they have succeeded.
19/ It will not be long until we can put these measures into action. The Ukrainian military has been preparing for its offensives for some time, and they are clearly ready to force the Russians out of as much of Ukraine as possible. Image
20/ The aim of my two articles on measuring success and failure has been to provide some sense of ‘what victory looks’ like for #Ukraine in the coming months. It is not an exclusive list. And none of the measures are designed to predict specific outcomes.
21/ And not all of them have to be met. But on the whole, these measures of success should provide a useful yardstick for those observing – and measuring success – in the Ukrainian offensives to come. End. Image
22/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @combined2forces @War_Mapper @TDF_UA @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @DefenceU @UAWeapons

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More from @WarintheFuture

Apr 27
Recently, there has been discussion about the strategic and political importance of the Ukrainian offensives that are likely to be launched in the coming weeks or months. The focus of these articles has often been about the consequences of failure. 1/25 🧵 Image
2/ As a 24 April New York Times article argues, “without a decisive victory, Western support for #Ukraine could weaken, and #Kyiv could come under increasing pressure to enter serious negotiations to end or freeze the conflict.” nytimes.com/2023/04/24/us/…
3/ But what does victory look like? One of the weaknesses in the speculation about future Ukrainian offensives is that there is no definition of victory. There are no clear descriptions of how success or failure might be measured or perceived in Ukraine, Russia or in the West.
Read 25 tweets
Apr 17
Contrary to the many ‘Russian are stupid’ stereotypes that have developed throughout the war, they have demonstrated an ability in some areas to learn and adapt. This isn’t a statement of admiration. 1/25 🧵 Image
2/ It is however necessary to understand Russian #adaptation. In understanding it, we can ensure Ukrainian forces understand tactical and operational risks, and that they are best prepared for the offensives ahead. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-russians…
3/ Several areas of Russian adaptation during this war bear closer examination stand out: strategic adaptation; operational adaptation; and tactical adaptation. In this thread I will explore some areas of tactical adaptation.
Read 25 tweets
Apr 16
Lots of recent speculation on forthcoming offensives in Ukraine. As such, a short thread that refers to some of my recent articles on this topic. 1/10 🧵
2/ First, an examination of Russian goals for 2023. This provides context for Ukrainian decision making and how it might think about its offensives.
mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-rus…
3/ And here is another piece from late last month. abc.net.au/news/2023-03-2…
Read 10 tweets
Apr 12
Much attention at present is being paid to the Ukrainian offensives that are likely to be launched in the coming weeks (or even the coming days). But, what of the Russians? An exploration of potential Russian courses of action in the coming months. 1/25 🧵
2/ One of the fundamental elements of planning is not just understanding friendly purpose and capabilities, but also an estimate of the enemy’s most likely and dangerous courses of action.
3/ To conduct such an appreciation, an update of the strategic and military situation is important. Therefore, I will provide a short update on the situation in Ukraine as a prelude to exploring Russia’s options in the coming months.
Read 25 tweets
Apr 9
This week, there have been at least two purported intelligence leaks reported by the New York Times and other publications. While we are at an early point, I wanted to provide a short update on some of the likely impacts. 1/21 🧵
2/ The first leak was mainly focussed on the war in Ukraine and was composed of photographs of power point slides from a US military briefing. At least some of the images appeared to have been tampered with before they were posted online.
3/ A subsequent set of documents was uploaded onto social media sites. These documents apparently concern issues including information on allies and close US security partners. nytimes.com/2023/04/06/us/…
Read 21 tweets
Apr 4
For those who follow the provision of United States’ military assistance to Ukraine closely, over the past several months a new pattern in support has emerged. A key aspect of this new pattern is the provision of battlefield mobility capabilities. 1/25 🧵
2/ Reviewing the multiple US aid packages since 14 October 2022, there has been a large effort to equip combat engineers in their coming efforts to identify, reduce and move through the dense obstacle zones constructed by the Russian Army in eastern and southern Ukraine.
3/ Demolitions munitions, obstacle reduction & mine clearance equipment, mobile bridging capabilities as well as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles & artillery delivered anti-tank mines, have featured on the publicly released lists of American supplied military assistance.
Read 25 tweets

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