Thread by @WarintheFuture

This is a very good thread on Russian obstacle zone development in #Ukraine, from @Inkvisiit, for a number of reasons. 1/12

https://twitter.com/inkvisiit/status/1655584386601951238

2/ First this is a very extensively fortified region with multiple defensive zones in depth. It is impossible to create such a complex for the entire length of the front line being defended by the Russians.

3/ The assessment therefore is that defensive complexes such as this give us insights into what the Russians view as the key terrain in the coming Ukrainian offensives.

4/ Second, following on from this, it also provides insights into the Russian’s appreciation of the ‘most dangerous’ and ‘most likely’ courses of action for the Ukrainians in their offensives.

5/ Given the massive resources required to site and build obstacles, as well as lay mines and then cover them with observation and fire, the Russians would have done a detailed assessment of the theatre and prioritized key areas where they thought the Ukrainians would attack.

6/ This is obviously one of those areas. And it should be noted, the vast majority of obstacles are not about stopping an enemy. They are more about channeling them into ‘killing zones’, or breaking up their cohesion and their combined arms teams.

7/ Obstacles zones like this are also about slowing down such attacks, particularly in the event of surprise, to allow time for counter attack and counter penetration forces to deploy at the tactical and operational levels.

8/ As part of such an obstacle complex, the Russians will also have an ISR plan to seek out Ukrainian capabilities that are conducting recon of the obstacles. At least in competent Russian units, they will be engaging in a recon battle to deny close recon of these zones.

9/ And they will be looking for Ukrainian engineer equipment that has been pre-positioned for assaults. This will help the Russians confirm their appreciation of Ukraine’s objectives. The Ukrainians will be undertaking deception ops to prevent the Russians collecting this info.

10/ None of this is sensitive or secret info. It is basic doctrine that all professional armies train to. The Russians have similar doctrine. It is prudent that we assume they understand these basic principles. The Ukrainians will.

11/ But in reality, having good doctrine and being able to implement it are two different things. We will see very soon how it all plays out.

12/ Of course, tactical obstacles can have operational and strategic impacts if they are sited well, are appropriately covered with fire and observation and there are sufficient mobile reserves. A fine piece of OSINT analysis from @Inkvisiit. End.