Thread by @WarintheFuture

In warfare, an important target is often the enemy commander and the headquarters that assists them to plan and execute military operations. A thread on #Gerasimov, failure and the coming Ukrainian offensives. 1/25 🧵

2/ Killing a senior military leader can result in slower planning and decision making. This can lead to a break down in the cohesion of a large military force, allowing friendly forces to attack them or exploit tactical opportunities while they can’t respond effectively.

3/ The Chinese call this Systems Destruction Warfare. It is an extraordinarily effective approach if planned and coordinated well, particularly given the reliance on communications, sensors and AI-based decision support tools by modern militaries.

4/ But, for their coming offensive, the Ukrainians may avoid targeting one Russian commander in particular. This specific senior Russian officer has been ineffective since the beginning of the war. abc.net.au/news/2023-05-0…

5/ This individual is General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces & the commander of the Russian special military operation in #Ukraine. So far in this war, Gerasimov has been a 4-time loser.

6/ His 1st failure was the original plan for the invasion of Ukraine. Based on assumptions that the Ukrainians could not put up an effective defence, that the Ukrainian government would flee and that the West would intervene, it planned on taking over Ukraine in ten days or less.

7/ But #Ukraine had other ideas.Russian forces appeared uncoordinated & chaotic in their inability to achieve their original strategy. As Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Gerasimov would have played a key role in the planning and approval of this plan.

8/ Gerasimov’s 2nd failure was the shambolic initial weeks of the Russian mobilisation that was announced by President Putin in September 2022. Over time this effort became more streamlined however.

9/ But Gerasimov should have anticipated such a move once it was clear the war was not going well (that is his job). It appeared that the military commenced its mobilisation efforts from a standing start after Putin’s announcement.

10/ The old Soviet era Army had extensive mobilisation plans and processes for the rapid expansion of the ground forces. Gerasimov, a product of this era, appears to have forgotten the need for the infrastructure, training cadres & reserve equipment for such mobilisation.

11/ This is largely due to a 3rd failure. This third failure of Gerasimov, which had a major influence on mobilisation failures as well as the Russian Army’s operational challenges, was the decade-long program of transformation overseen by Gerasimov and Shoigu.

12/ Commenced in 2012, and designed to professionalise the Russian military, modernise its equipment and bring it to a higher state of readiness, this program removed much of the old Soviet architecture for mobilisation.

13/ This was no accident; it was a deliberate design choice by Gerasimov and Shoigu. And while this transformation was lauded by many in the West for its innovation, the reality is it removed the capacity for rapid expansion.

14/ And as Ukraine has shown, the Gerasimov reforms have failed to build the kind of modern, integrated and well-led military institution that is essential to success in contemporary war.

15/ To round out his abysmal recent record, General Gerasimov assumed command of the Russian forces in #Ukraine and rapidly launched a wide-scale offensive in January this year. A series of thrusts were conducted on five main axes of advance.

https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1653169425749508100?s=20

16/ The Russian military has experienced very limited success with these offensives, and even lost ground in the past month. According to US intelligence sources, the Russians have lost over 100,000 soldiers since December 2022, including 20,000 killed. He rushed to failure.

17/ Given this record of poor performance, one would think that Gerasimov’s days might be numbered. But the reality is Putin is likely to keep him in his position for the time being. Not only is Gerasimov adept at palace politics in the Kremlin, but he is very loyal to Putin.

18/ As @MassDara noted when Gerasimov replaced Surovikin in January this year, “they have taken someone who is competent and replaced him with someone who is incompetent, but who has been there a long time and who has shown that he is loyal.” nytimes.com/2023/01/11/wor…

19/ In authoritarian regimes, competent soldiers are less important than loyal ones. And, as Gerasimov may find out in the future, they also make excellent scapegoats for tyrants wishing to save their own skin.

20/ What does Gerasimov’s performance auger for the months ahead? The limp and ineffective offensives launched by Gerasimov this year have consumed large amounts of ammunition and equipment in addition to the number of soldiers killed and wounded.

21/ This will constrain Gerasimov’s ability to effectively respond to the coming Ukrainian offensives. Regardless of the number of obstacles that his forces construct to slow down the Ukrainians, the Russians have a massive front line to defend.

22/ It is a task that would challenge the very best of armies, and the Russians can hardly be described as that.

23/ There is an old saying that “when your enemy is making mistakes, don’t get in their way”. In this war so far, Gerasimov has demonstrated a great talent for strategic mistakes. abc.net.au/news/2023-05-0…

24/ Therefore, the Ukrainians may avoid targeting Gerasimov. Because given his track record, and the forthcoming Ukrainian offensives, Gerasimov is very likely in the coming months to transition from a four-time to a five-time loser. End

25/ Thank you to the following for the images and links in this thread: @abcnews @DefenceU @BernatArmangue @combined2forces @nytimes @War_Mapper @CNN