#Map#Klishchiivka pushback
First reported somewhat significant ๐บ๐ฆ gain in a couple of months happens at the area where ๐ท๐บ was struggling since capture of Kurdumivka.
The area is estimated from 2 to 8 kmยฒ and makes no difference.
What matters is momentum and positions. 0/X
Bakhmut is more than just a city - it's a lowland area east of the Donbas canal and offense can't stop on any point until canal is reached.
So ๐ท๐บ should hold positions along the canal whatever the cost or start trading South and regroup.
1. ๐บ๐ฆ recaptured area West of the canal - the main ๐ท๐บ bridgehead, it also provides an access to the road, who controls it has a agility advantage over the enemy.
Control of the area cuts of the woods at the North, no more attacks over the canal.
2. Narrow high ground. Not used for the supply but is crucial for the defense of the ๐ท๐บ supply routes through Klishchiivka.
It's important for ๐บ๐ฆ to keep ๐ท๐บ away, not even entering there.
3. Canal gaps near Ozarianivka and Kurdumivka.
In order to move further ๐บ๐ฆ should control those gates.
It could be difficult to maintain a bridge crossing but it's impossible to destroy the natural crossing.
There were recent ๐บ๐ฆ activities near Ozarianivka.
4. T0513 - one of the important Horlivka - Bakhmut connections. With no secured connection over T1302 as well, ๐ท๐บ would be limited in supplies.
In order to reach the road ๐บ๐ฆ should pass the settlements that were heavily damaged in last months, so itโs hard to predict the outcome.
5. With the control of the South claw, Bakhmut can be isolated and bypassed.
The old "plans" gives some understanding what targets can be chased.
Summary.
The change is important but it makes no big difference so far. Only next steps will uncover the further development direction.
At least activity on the flanks can make the city attackers more nervous and force some tough decisions.
P.S. need to clarify "insignificant gain"
For ๐บ๐ฆ it's not that important, but that shuts the door for ๐ท๐บ.
Itโs more ๐ท๐บ lose than ๐บ๐ฆ win.
โข โข โข
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April was the month of Bakhmut, there were some sparse attacks at Avdiivka and continues leveling of Mariinka, but AFU still keeps the presence in the city despite all the odds.
Ukraine brought a new tactic to the table during the furious fights for the city. Controlled demolition of abandoned buildings that allows to slow the enemy and remove some important positions.
There were multiple examples but city administration was first
#Map#Bakhmut
One month of last days. Western tanks are still no where near the front, ๐ท๐บ has stuck on the outskirts of the city, but managed to capture 60kmยฒ around Bakhmut.
Let's take a look at quality of those kilometers.
The funnel of Bakhmut
In order to capture the city you must avoid city fights.
There are couple of ways how to force a surrender:
Erase from a distance or encircle it.
๐ท๐บ has no resources for any of that.
๐ท๐บ has managed to swing and break ๐บ๐ฆ defense, take over Soledar and capture Klishchiivka by Jan 23.
The South claw won't change since. All the push have happen at North.
But then ๐ท๐บ has hit the wall.
First time all the available missile titles were used in the combined strike.
Air-defence was not ready for that, or some missiles were guided around it.
There were
58 possible targets and only 34 were shot down.
Kh-47, Kh-22 and S300 missiles are out of reach still.
That would be the first massive strike in a month
Feb 16 attempt can be ignored but...
๐ท๐บ launched 12 Kh-101 then and in 3 weeks after that 28 Kh-101 missiles were launched.
Same for Kalibr missiles 8/20
that looks like it's a production ceiling.
Tactics has changed.
In order to overload the air-defense ๐ท๐บ used a wide variety of missiles:
28 - Kh101, 20 - Kalibr, 6 - Kh59, 2 - Kh31, 6 - Kh22, 6 - Kinjal, 13 - S300 as well as 8 Shahed drones.
They were launched along the whole front from Odessa to Sumy.
#TalkingPoint#Losses
Watch the strong trend on increased losses since December.
But the growth started back in September.
Kharkiv and Kherson operations added to the overall trend, but that half year trend is obvious.
Those increased losses arenโt believable on their own.
One of the best explanation of them is increased number of troops and @Kartinamaslom5 did a great description of it.
Increased losses are correlated with increased number of deployed forces.
@Kartinamaslom5 For a long time i was convinced that ๐ท๐บ is limited in front capacity based on the initial number of deployed BTGs. That was a mistake.
With a change of infantry ratio ๐ท๐บ were able gradually increase it's capacity.
So 300k is a planned increase.
There are 5 major directions
1 main objective to fully capture annexed territories๐คฏ
Ignoring Kherson front as impossible for a full-scale invasion over the Dnipro (1M is not enough for that)
Let's explore those directions.
1. Invasion from Belarus towards Lviv. Highly unlikely.
Long supply lines, swampy forested terrain.
The area would be a death trap for a big army 50K+, because of all the complexities.
Impossible to succeed for a smaller group.
This behavior is some sort of pattern, that is repeated by ๐ท๐บ army with different frequency on different directions.
Similar swings can be observed near Avdiivka, where both flanks arenโt attacked at the same time.
๐ท๐บ is faking the might.
The idea to swing the defense, overloading enemy flank and capturing the area is not recently invented. The main fail of ๐ท๐บ execution can be observed around Avdiivka. The northern flank is static since June, with a massive assault once in a month.