The European Council looks set to breach its treaty obligations. On 9 June @Europarl_EN made a formal proposal to revise Article 48(7) TEU so that the famous ‘passerelle’ clause will in future be triggered by QMV not unanimity. 1/ europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document… Everyone knows that the best way to have more voting and less vetoing in the Council is through use of the passerelle. Indeed, this is openly admitted by the Council in its reaction to the conclusions of the #CoFoE data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/S… 2/

Just suppose, for the moment, that we had a really, really stupid British government that wanted to trigger Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol. 1/ The Protocol allows for unilateral safeguard measures in the case of “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade”. 2/

There’s really nothing like a budgetary crisis to budge the Europe forward in the right direction. If HU and PO continue to block, the normal thing to do would be for the EU leaders to cave in – as they did to the British in 2016. #EUCO 1/ The much better thing would be to trigger enhanced cooperation (by QMV) and establish the grant element of the economic recovery programme by and on behalf of only those states which participate. 2/

As soon as the government moves the 2nd reading of the Internal Market Bill on Monday afternoon, one expects the EU Commission to launch an infringement action (Article 87 Withdrawal Agreement) on the grounds that the UK is *already* failing to fulfil its obligations. 1/ Specifically, the UK has breached Article 5 of the WA (good faith), Article 167 (cooperation in dispute settlement), and Article 168 (exclusivity in dispute settlement). @SuellaBraverman could then submit more of her lucid observations. 2/

Looks like #EUCO has reached the point of “last resort” where enhanced cooperation can kick in to “further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process” (Art. 20 TEU). Merkel & Macron can easily corral the minimum 9 member states. 1/ The group will represent the majority of EU population and the great bulk of its GNI. @vonderleyen needs to make the proposal based on the Commission’s original plan to issue eurobonds at scale to fund an economic recovery programme run by itself subject only to reverse QMV. 2/

Yesterday’s lacklustre Eurogroup passed the buck to the heads of government. The European Council tomorrow must shoulder its constitutional responsibility to secure the cohesion of the EU as a whole, and in particular take decisive action to consolidate the euro. 1/ Dealing with the pandemic will exacerbate the structural imbalance between richer and poorer states. The EU has for years evaded the issuance of a mutualised safe asset in the form of eurobonds. The eurozone survives courtesy of @ecb but still without a common fiscal policy. 2/

Funnily enough, although I can hardly recall what I was up to last week, I am beginning to remember very clearly what I was doing in January 1973. I was coming as a student from @stjohnscam to @IEE_Bruxelles 1/ Joining the European Community felt like sending reinforcements to aid the European cause. The British were adding their weight to the peaceful effort to unify the mainland, rather like our fathers had done in wartime. 2/

It was an honour to represent the European Parliament at the intergovernmental conference on the Treaty of Lisbon which came into force exactly 10 years ago. Brussels bigwigs will eulogise the Treaty at a ceremony at the House of History on Sunday. 1/ google.com/url?sa=i&sourc… The Treaty improved the way the EU is governed, especially by boosting the powers of the Parliament and, quid pro quo, of the European Council. It entrenched the rule of law and democratic practices. It clarified the competences of the Union and streamlined law making. 2/

Here’s a thing. #EUCO’s decision tomorrow about the #Brexit #extension will perforce be very political (and therefore controversial). First, an extension will be granted until 30 November for the sole purpose of ratifying the Withdrawal Agreement Bill. 1/ .@BorisJohnson will have to commit formally to using his best endeavours to achieve ratification. If however the WAB is still not ratified by 30 November a further extension will be made until 31 January for the sole purpose of holding a general election. 2/

Were I still an MEP or MP for a party that had promoted the referendum in the first place and had pledged to respect its outcome, I would vote for the Johnson deal now, without pleasure but with integrity. @LibDems @UKLabour @duponline Why? 1/ (a) The deal respects outcome of the referendum, resolving the most acute Brexit uncertainty for both Britain and Europe, restoring investor confidence. (b) It delivers the same deal on citizens’ rights and money negotiated by May to which nobody much objected. 2/

The scoop of @JGForsyth is very helpful in clarifying minds in Brussels about what the EU 27 should do at #EUCO next week. Unanimity on wanting to conclude the Brexit circus as soon as possible. The EU wants neither to trap the UK in the EU nor to expel it against its will.1/ Leaders are being advised to avoid pleasing either Johnson (who wants no extension) or the Commons (which wants January). So they will do their own thing and offer only a SHORT - and final - extension (November) in order to put no deal legislation in place. 2/

Boris Johnson is right to call his proposal a “broad landing zone in which … a deal can begin to take shape.” As such, it is politically astute. If you accept the premise that the UK is leaving the EU single market and customs union, the proposal is also logical. 1/ He confirms that the Political Declaration must pitch at a mere free trade agreement with minimal regulatory alignment. That is not perfect but can be acceptable to the EU. The big ask is to get the EU to derogate from its normal practices of defending the internal market. 2/

In which I rehearse the continuing argument for the Withdrawal Agreement as the only safe way out of the Brexit shambles, and urge the Brits to pay more attention to the jointness of the proposed post-Brexit governance arrangements. 1/

https://twitter.com/epc_eu/status/1149304433274171395

And instead of seeking a further extension of the Article 50 process (which #EUCO is unlikely to grant), the UK should seek to extend the transition period until the entry into force of the final association agreement. This requires the EU to amend the Withdrawal Agreement. 2/

THREAD. Brussels is less interested in process than in outcome. Any proposal from London for a bespoke UK deal must be clear, internally coherent & negotiable with the EU. It also needs to be capable of being wrapped up in a revised Political Declaration well before 12 April. 1/ While the options of no deal, May’s deal and revocation of Article 50 are easy to draft, other options less so. Use of shorthand ‘Canada’, ‘Norway’ etc is misleading. A minimalistic FTA creates more problems than it solves. Full customs union membership is very constraining. 2/

I've had a stab at rewriting the Political Declaration, going for more clarity, positive language and a higher scale of ambition. The full text is here documentcloud.org/documents/5694… courtesy of @ftbrussels 1/ Looking to widen the scope of the upcoming negotiations on the association agreement to include a possible customs union; more mobility of persons and free trade deal in services as well as goods. I've had to slaughter Liam Fox's unicorn of global free trade, of course. 2/

The letters give insight into the internal negotiation between British and EU officials. They confirm that the Withdrawal Agreement and the Irish backstop are designed to work in all weather conditions. They propel forward the negotiation of the final association agreement. 1/ They help cement the link between the WA and the Political Declaration, and to boost the PD status as the mandate for the final treaty talks. That link could yet be made stronger and the PD could be given greater purpose as I have proposed in epc.eu/pub_details.ph… 2/

In my latest piece bit.ly/2SIuuqD I argue that Mrs May cannot win the deal by talking about the Irish backstop to arch-Brexiteers but by persuading pro-European MPs of the merits of the package, including the Political Declaration. 1/ And the PD needs improving to give greater clarity and assurance to both sides as to the direction that will be taken in the negotiation of the final association agreement. This is partly a question of more positive and less tentative language, 2/

The EU is leaving the UK on 29/03 (at Britain's request) according to a reasonable Withdrawal Agreement which it now proceeds to ratify. Modifications to the Political Declaration apart (see January), the EU will make no other deal. 1/ It has always been possible for the UK to revoke Article 50. But Wightman means that any revocation must be final and unconditional and based on a genuine change of direction by the UK parliament on the same bipartisan basis that triggered Brexit in the first place. 2/

So, as we say nowadays, here's some connected thought about what May should be proposing before the #EUCO dinner today. (1) The UK agrees to stop trying to split the Withdrawal Agreement from the Political Declaration, recognising that both stand or fall together, and that ... (2) the Irish problem cannot be resolved without an agreement on a PD that paints a clear picture of where we're all going to end up in our future Association Agreement; (3) the UK thanks @MichelBarnier for the helpful suggestion that the transition period is extendable; but ...