1/ I think there may be something to learn by comparing @realDonaldTrump's current threat to attempt "snapback" under #JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 with his decision not to do so in May 2018, when he withdrew from the deal but did not snapback all previous UN sanctions.

A long thread. 2/ In 2018, the US was more clearly in a position to do so. Rather than announcing "withdrawal," Trump could have initiated the dispute resolution mechanism or skipped that step and gone straight to snapback.

So, the U.S. managed to get one country to vote for its Iran arms embargo resolution at the UN Security Council. That is one more than zero. And, to be fair, they successfully cast their own vote as well.

These guys are just very bad at their jobs.

What now? 2/ Presumably, the U.S. will test its ability to use "snapback" under the JCPOA, starting in the coming days. Today's devastating vote and suggestions from European diplomats point to the EU/E3 joining Russia and China in concluding that the U.S. does not have standing to do so.

Good on @jonathanvswan for pressing @realDonaldTrump on this story. Thread:

https://twitter.com/axios/status/1288421421694230528

2/ I have been publicly skeptical of the reported intelligence on Russian bounty offers in Afghanistan, which appears to be inconclusive but not, as Trump claims, "fake news."

That requires some reaction from the US.

1/ Thanks very much to @JJSchroden for organizing this panel. It’s a real pleasure to join @Afghan_Policy and @a_a_jackson. #AFGpanel 2/ I’ve been asked to comment on #COVID19 and the conflict, which I wrote about last week carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/14/afg… in a larger collection with @franceszbrown. #AFGPanel

This will be long:

About a year ago, as I was thinking about the remarkable field of Democratic candidates for President, @tihanablanc convinced me to give @ewarren a careful look. I read some of her books. Early academic stuff, popular finance stuff, and her campaign book. It was really, really good. So I asked @sashabaker if I could help out, and she was kind enough to let me along for the ride. I thought maybe I could be a kind of "traffic cop" for all the foreign policy geniuses who were certain to flock to the campaign.

The US can shape and influence the coming intra-Afghan negotiations. What are our tools:

a. Withdrawal. The agreed 2021 timeline takes us into a new President or a Trump not facing election. The Taliban have seen our schedules come and go; they know we can change our minds. 2/ b. Future military assistance. Basically, the Government of Afghanistan has a year to demonstrate that it can be a credible military force with US assistance but not troops. If they are, they are in a stronger position to deal.

1/ @jrezaian has both moral authority and on ground experience to speak to the effects or lack thereof of US sanctions on Iran. @MaloneySuzanne knows as much about Iran's economy as anyone in DC. But me, I've got me a twitter account, so here's my view:

https://twitter.com/maloneysuzanne/status/1057989855974776832

2/ Sanctions have & will not "fundamentally alter Iranian behavior" (wapo.st/2SzYo0q), but neither will any US policy tools. At least not in a controlled, positive direction. And, as desirable as a better govt in Iran is, it's not the only way to secure core US interests.

1/ @SecPompeo -- the hardest thing in government is often setting priorities realisticly given limited resources. That's what the #JCPOA did -- identified Iran's nuclear program as the main international concern and painstakingly developed leverage to address it. 2/ Your speech does not describe a realistic set of goals or a way to develop leverage to achieve them. It's a lightly camouflaged call for regime change that is likely to scare off potential international partners and get Iranians to rally round the flag.