The Gabon debt swap has been getting a ton of good press. However, now that we have more (but not all!) information about it, this deal is as questionable as those that preceded it 🧵 First, transparency. Its not OK for bilateral lenders to fail to disclose contracts. Its not OK for commodity traders to do the same. So then why are we giving a free pass to recent debt for nature swaps when they fail to meet the most basic disclosure standards?

Debt challenges in developing countries remain contained in "pockets" according to the IMF WEO.

UNCTAD challenges this notion in its TDR update.

We are already in a debt and development crises which is about to worsen due to bad policy prescriptions (h/t Garcia Marquez) 🧵 Net debt resource transfers (i.e. a country pays more than it receives) are an increasingly serious problem. Middle-income countries without access to adequate multilateral support are the most vulnerable to a dynamic that is the herald of debt distress @Brad_Setser @MarinaZucker

Es sabado, el verano ha llegado y me quedo un poco de tiempo libre. Como contextualizar los movimientos de indicadores en Colombia 🇨🇴 en la ultima semana desde una perspectiva global? 🧵 1. Estamos en un contexto de aceleración de inflación a nivel global, la cual ha llegado a los niveles mas altos de ultima decada (shock de oferta + commodities). Esta dinamica esta poniendo presión sobre bancos centrales.

There is a LOT to cover in the IMF Ex-Post Evaluation of the Argentina program (it is a 135 pg document after all). Ill try to focus on a couple of key issues, including the decision making behind it and the EAL framework 🧵 The key issue raised by the EPE relates to the uniformity of treatment. The proper functioning of the multilateral system relies on adherence to rules. All countries and multilateral institutions should observe and respect the same rules. This is not what happened in 2018.

New @eurodad analysis of IMF Surcharges: What are they, which countries pay them and why they must be eliminated in the context of the Covid-19 crisis 🧵
eurodad.org/a_guide_to_imf… TL/DR: IMF surcharges are a system of fees on loans which place an unfair burden on vulnerable countries that are in need of financial support. 14 countries are set to pay US$ 7.9 billion in surcharges. This is 10 times more what rich countries have given for debt cancellation.

Belize is in the process of negotiating a so-called green debt restructuring of an outstanding US$ bond. While the deal is being heralded as "groundbreaking" and a "good solution" there are plenty of reasons to be skeptical about the benefits of the deal.

https://twitter.com/marcjonesrtrs/status/1436345134044663809

The deal involves the provision of financing by @nature_org to buyback a bond worth US$ 526 million (which has already been restructured 3 times) on 55 cents on the dollar. As part of the agreement, Belize commits to fund a marine conservation trust (US$ 23 million).

Its Saturday and have been out of action for most of the week = had time to do some doodling. One last thread to complete the trilogy on #ElSalvador and #bitcoin. Balance of Payment T accounts edition This is what SLV BoP currently looks like when a remittance from the US is done (1). If imports of SLV are higher than remittances (2&3), SLV must borrow to stabilize reserves (4).

Another 🧵 on El Salvador (SLV): #bitcoin as an international reserve asset, Balance of Payments (BoP), and the IMF edition.

Some thoughts on the risks posed by the introduction of BTC as legal tender in SLV for the country in the context of an IMF program. On the surface, it appears that BTC does not have an impact on the BoP position of the country. BTC is not going to increase remittances, change demand for SLV exports from Rest of the World (RoW), nor change SLV imports from RoW.

Va 🧵 en español sobre el Salvador 🇸🇻 y #Bitcoin . Visto desde una perspectiva sectorial, parece una apuesta desesperada para estabilizar finanzas públicas apoyandose en actores de carácter cuestionable. Hay tres cuestiones clave para recordar. 1. SLV tendrá un sistema de moneda dual con USD y BTC. 2. Debido a la alta volatilidad, BTC no es una reserva de valor particularmente buena. 3. Por esta razon, el USD seguirá siendo la moneda a efectos contables y fiscales.

Been thinking about El Salvador and #Bitcoin . Looking at it from a sectorial perspective, it looks like a desperate play to shore up public finances with the support of nefarious actors 🧵 There are three key issues to remember. 1. SLV will have a dual currency system with USD and BTC. 2. Due to high volatility, BTC is not a particularly good store of value. 3. Because of this, USD will remain as the currency for accounting and tax purposes.

🚨New @eurodad report🚨

Sleep now in the fire: Sovereign Bonds and the Covid-19 Debt Crisis

We take a look at 549 sovereign bonds issued by 62 middle and low-income countries. Main findings in a 🧵

TL/DR - Who profits from debt in the pandemic

eurodad.org/sovereign_bond… Investors are posting record profits collecting on sovereign bonds while hundreds of millions are suffering. They are being forced to "Sleep now in the fire" by a dysfunctional sovereign debt architecture.

@RATMofficial @tmorello

Como esta es mi situación actual, vamos con otro hilo para seguir analizando la reforma tributaria. La pregunta es cuál es el impacto distributivo de esta? 🧵 Para responder hay que tomar un desvío por el índice de Palma. ¿Qué es esto? Es un índice de desigualdad creado por el Prof. Gabriel Palma que ha venido reemplazando al índice de Gini y ha sido incluido en los ODS de la ONU.

Le he seguido dando vueltas a la exposición de motivos de la reforma tributaria. La conclusión a la que estoy llegando es que como dice el refrán "de eso tan bueno no dan tanto". Los supuestos beneficios de la RT son, en un su mayoría, resultado de mezclar 🍐con 🍎. Otro 🧵 La defensa de los méritos de la reforma se centra en este cuadro. Este muestra que el 10% más pobre del país aumenta sus ingresos un 68% mientras que el 10% mas rico reduce sus ingresos en un 4% en 2023. Redistribución!!!

Porque importan tanto los supuestos de crecimiento en la reforma tributaria? Porque una de las claves para reconstruir el cuadro central de la exposición de motivos depende de estos. Y hay un par de temas que parecen cuestionables 🧵 Antes de ir al detalle, hay que hacer dos aclaraciones.
1. La EM no especifica el año de la comparación. No es claro si es 2022 o 2025.
2. La EM no incluye los supuestos utilizados para hacer la comparación.
Por ende, puede que mi interpretación no sea del todo correcta.

Supuestos macroeconómicos sobre crecimiento y ajuste fiscal de la reforma tributaria parecen presentar varias inconsistencias substanciales. Esto no es un tema menor. Si modelo y supuestos están mal diseñados, la discusion sobre RT termina basada en deseos mas que realidades 🧵 El tema mas importante es el impulso fiscal. Como se estima el impacto de un cambio en el balance fiscal en el crecimiento económico? Pareciera que crecimiento económico se estima de manera independiente a balance fiscal en el modelo utilizado por el gobierno.

Mind the (PR) Gap - While we wait for the G20 announcement on the DSSI, thought it could be useful to pull together all the discrepancies pointed out by independent research on the statements and policies of the G20/IMF/WB - A thread 🧵 We are set to hear the wonderful achievements of the DSSI and the courageous efforts of the G20 to extend it for a full 6 months. @ifresnillo explains in her new @eurodad report the myriad of contradictions and problems with the DSSI approach #mindthePRgap

https://twitter.com/ifresnillo/status/1316352494423945220?s=20

🚨New @Eurodad report alert🚨 - Arrested development:
IMF and austerity post Covid-19. We review 80 IMF lending arrangements approved since March. Main findings in a "short" 🧵
TL/DR - IMF has learned nothing and forgotten nothing
eurodad.org/arrested_devel… #endausterity It may come as a shock, but there is quite a gap between IMF discourse and practice. Discourse is littered with calls for a strong, fair and green Covid-19 recovery. In practice, lending arrangements show a rather different IMF...

New @Eurodad report co-authored with @GPustovit develops, yet another, proposal for a sovereign debt standstill mechanism: eurodad.org/Entries/view/1… @MattHGoldmann @AGelpern @KatharinaPistor @KevinPGallagher @upanizza @GeneralTheorist @GrundSebastian @RobinWigg @alonsosotoj (1/n) The proposal for an IMF legally binding debt standstill is not new by any means. It has just lay dormant for a couple of decades since the last time the IMF Executive Board discussed it (first in the 80s and last time in 1996). (2/n)