The Kremlin’s extensive, unattributed social media networks across MENA are exploiting the #IsraelHamasWar to portray Russia as the defender of Palestinians and Arabs from western aggression. Are audiences buying it? Let's take a look 1/ Valent has identified and tracked 10 pro-Russian and inauthentic networks with a total of 25 million followers, focused on African and Arab nations. These networks don’t advertise their Russian connection – but their constant sharing of Russian state output is a giveaway 2/

A recent Valent investigation found large sums of money have been spent on an online effort to undermine support for #ULEZ before the #Uxbridge by-election, which observers say @UKLabour lost due to the clear air policy championed by @mayorofLondon #sadiqkhan check it out 👇 1/27 @UKLabour @MayorofLondon The study intended to establish whether the ULEZ policy was being targeted by online manipulation (SPOILER: It is). We did not seek to identify the actors behind the manipulation, or definitely establish impact on voting intention. This would require a deeper dive 2/27

After fighting broke out in #Sudan, we started assessing the Twitter manipulation techniques of both sides. The Sudanese military's approach was in keeping with its established practice. The RSF militia deployed a new methodology. Check out this 🧵 to find out more 1/25 Some context: in Sudan, as elsewhere, most online engagement happens on Facebook not Twitter. However, Twitter activity provides insight into an actors’ capabilities, resources and overall approach. This insight is helpful in assessing strategy, capabilities etc #EyesonSudan 2/25

We examined 12,545 tweets using a pro #Sudan army hashtag. We found large-scale manipulation promoting escalation, whilst authentic Sudanese voices called for an end to the violence. The findings show how one of the most common deceptive practices on Twitter works #thread 🧵 1/13 Since fighting broke out between #Sudan army and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) on April 15, the hashtag جيش_واحد_شعب_واحد# (One Army, One Nation) has been used 12,545 times by pro-army accounts. All sides are running digital influence operations with much #disinformation 2/13

What does #ChatGPT mean for #disinformation? Others have explored the application’s ability to replace/supercharge all sorts of professional roles. We looked at its potential impact on our information environment What we found was that on one hand, if you used ChatGPT to find out about how disinformation - or even specific techniques like CIB - work, it would be pretty good at getting you up to speed quickly