Thread by @Oliver_Geden

1/n
Still a lot of confusion about European Council conclusions on #ClimateNeutralEU. It's a prime example of 'constructive ambiguity'
But clear indications Poland stood not in the way of agreeing on EU-wide target but simply says they're not going to be at net-zero by 2050
#EUCO

2/n
During negotiations, Poland explicitly demanded to reach net-zero only in 2070, much later than whole EU. Didn't get that far. But #EUCO conclusions allow POL government to sell result at home as not really applying to POL but only to rest of EU (they tried that 2014 as well)

3/n
POL position puts other countries under pressure since it would mean they have to do more by 2050 (i.e. going below zero). NL prime minister Rutte rejected that interpretation immediately.
So who's right? They all are, to some extent. That's how 'constructive ambiguity' works

4/n
It's important to recognize that #EUCO doesn't do legally binding 'decisions' on #climate, it just gives guidance for the coming process. So it is in fact unclear how this will all play out in 2020. Even EU insiders disagree
politico.eu/article/polish…
euractiv.com/section/climat…

5/n
It's indeed hard to grasp what the mention of June 2020 will result into. I guess that COM will now table its (much more important & contentious) proposal for a strengthened EU 2030 target by June, which will result in another heated EU #climate target debate at June #EUCO

6/n
Some commentators think that Poland's reluctance doesn't matter much since COM will now table its 'climate law' in March, setting #ClimateNeutralEU by 2050 target, with qualified majority voting. But this 'law' will be largely symbolic and only 'enshrine' the 2050 vision

7/n
#EUCO conclusions on #ClimateNeutralEU mention another related process, which could emerge as next battlegroud: submission of EU mid-term decarbonisation strategy to #UNFCCC, due in 2020. Usually, Environment Council decides unanimously on international climate policy issues

8/n
But back to distributional consequences of #ClimateNeutralEU #EUCO decision.
With ~half of EU emissions under harmonised trading scheme, it's impossible for Poland to set an exact later date for reaching net-zero, and it would certainly not be 20yrs later than EU average.

9/n
At the same time, Rutte's claim that NL & GER won't do more because POL wants to do less is misleading. With prolongation of current differentiation of national ESR targets, North-Western Member States would probably need to go net negative in 2050
swp-berlin.org/en/publication…

10/n
Much more important than 2050 target will be the battle on the new 2030 target, where there is much more opposition among Member States against a substantial increase.
If MS 'effort sharing' targets don't start to converge soon, we'll face an ongoing split in 2050 as well

11/n
Here comes post-#Brexit bonus piece:
if UK leaves EU2030 NDC then EU-27 numbers go down, which doesn't make a difference on the ground but matters symbolically
Add 3 percentage points to the bill when you strive for increased 2030 ambition of 50-55%
swp-berlin.org/en/publication…

12/end
In the future, claims will be made that a @ClimateNeutralEU by 2050 wouldn't be consistent with the #ParisAgreement. I think it would.
Most people confuse net-zero CO2 and net-zero GHG when talking about target years or fair budget shares for EU
swp-berlin.org/en/publication…

add. 1/
If there was any doubt left whether Poland accepts EU net zero target 2050, today's EU Environment Council clarified this europa.eu/!kX64Fd
For POL, the main issue is the 'collective' nature of 2050 target (see #EUClimateLaw), leaving more time for some countries