Thread by @JJSchroden

I’ve gotten a lot of questions recently about how the #ANDSF might fare after the US withdraws from #Afghanistan. I’m going to put some thoughts on that in this THREAD. 1/n

First, a recap, as I’ve written about this before. In JAN, I published this net assessment of the #ANDSF vs the #Taliban, in which I concluded the latter would have a slight military advantage after US advisors left. 2/n ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…

That conclusion was largely due to the #Taliban’s advantages of cohesion & financial self-sustainability, & not being as numerically outnumbered as most people think. But I acknowledged some key #ANDSF advantages, the most notable of which is air power. 3/n

That assessment, combined w/#Afghanistan’s current govt starting the post-withdrawal period in a better mil pos’n than Najibullah had + considerations of what it would take for the #Taliban to militarily overthrow the govt, led me to conclude in this @Diplomat_APAC article... 4/n

...that if @ashrafghani’s govt failed, that failure would come politically, not militarily.

But as I’ve told those who have asked, my conclusion that the #ANDSF could likely prevent a full #Taliban takeover by force is predicated on three caveats. 5/n

First, that US $ keeps flowing to the #ANDSF. @POTUS’s FY22 budget request included slightly more $ for the #Afghanistan Security Forces Fund than FY21, which means Congress will prob fund about the same amount. That $ is good through FY24. So, I’m not worried about this one. 6/n

2nd, that the #ANDSF (esp the ANP) don’t just melt away. We’ve seen this happen before, w/reasons cited as lack of pay, corrupt leaders, lack of food/ammo, etc. We’ve seen recent notable instances of this around Kandahar, in Helmand + other areas. I worry about this somewhat. 7/n

3rd, that the #ANDSF won’t be able to get adequate contractor support for logistics, maintenance & asset management. The US did #Afghanistan no favors by building a security force wholly reliant on contractors, but so it is. 8/n

It’s been pretty clear from @PentagonPresSec’s twice-weekly grilling on #Afghanistan that #DOD hasn’t had a good plan to deal w/this. But then came this revelation by AMB (ret.) Neumann yesterday 👇 9/n

That’s not particularly surprising, given the US-#Taliban Agreement requires all US non-diplomatic contractors to leave the country. But what’s distressing is this + the speed of the US withdrawal (~40% completed in 1 month according to @CENTCOM) + no clear plan to backfill. 10/n

The implications of a failure to sufficiently backfill those contractors is well described by @dandeluce in @NBCNews today: effectively, an Afghan Air Force w/rapidly degrading capabilities & an Afghan Army w/rapidly degrading mobility & log support. 11/n nbcnews.com/politics/natio…

To those who disagree w/this, the AAF assessment comes straight from @ResoluteSupport advisors (via @SIGARHQ) & that for the ANA is empirically grounded in the plummeting vehicle readiness rates that accompanied the few times the US tried to cut back contract support. 12/n

All of which is to say, while I still assess that the #ANDSF could stave off the military overthrow of #Afghanistan’s govt in the immediate term, I am getting increasingly worried about the veracity of that assessment based on concerns about the 3rd caveat above. 13/n

(And this is before even taking into account other concerning reports such as this @NPR article by @diaahadid suggesting the #Taliban are purchasing Russian-made SAMs now) 14/n npr.org/2021/06/05/100…

All of which is to say, the US & Afghan govts need to get this contract support issue figured out & *quickly*. Failure to do so will not only negate my 3rd caveat but likely my 2nd as well (via domino effects). Systemic collapse of the #ANDSF then becomes a real possibility. 15/n

Here’s hoping this was at the top of the list of agenda items for the US interagency team that was led by @US4AfghanPeace in Kabul today—it’s not an understatement to call this a topic of crisis at the moment. 16/16