Dr. Jonathan Schroden Profile picture
Jun 7, 2021 16 tweets 13 min read Read on X
I’ve gotten a lot of questions recently about how the #ANDSF might fare after the US withdraws from #Afghanistan. I’m going to put some thoughts on that in this THREAD. 1/n
First, a recap, as I’ve written about this before. In JAN, I published this net assessment of the #ANDSF vs the #Taliban, in which I concluded the latter would have a slight military advantage after US advisors left. 2/n ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…
That conclusion was largely due to the #Taliban’s advantages of cohesion & financial self-sustainability, & not being as numerically outnumbered as most people think. But I acknowledged some key #ANDSF advantages, the most notable of which is air power. 3/n
That assessment, combined w/#Afghanistan’s current govt starting the post-withdrawal period in a better mil pos’n than Najibullah had + considerations of what it would take for the #Taliban to militarily overthrow the govt, led me to conclude in this @Diplomat_APAC article... 4/n
...that if @ashrafghani’s govt failed, that failure would come politically, not militarily.

But as I’ve told those who have asked, my conclusion that the #ANDSF could likely prevent a full #Taliban takeover by force is predicated on three caveats. 5/n
First, that US $ keeps flowing to the #ANDSF. @POTUS’s FY22 budget request included slightly more $ for the #Afghanistan Security Forces Fund than FY21, which means Congress will prob fund about the same amount. That $ is good through FY24. So, I’m not worried about this one. 6/n
2nd, that the #ANDSF (esp the ANP) don’t just melt away. We’ve seen this happen before, w/reasons cited as lack of pay, corrupt leaders, lack of food/ammo, etc. We’ve seen recent notable instances of this around Kandahar, in Helmand + other areas. I worry about this somewhat. 7/n
3rd, that the #ANDSF won’t be able to get adequate contractor support for logistics, maintenance & asset management. The US did #Afghanistan no favors by building a security force wholly reliant on contractors, but so it is. 8/n
It’s been pretty clear from @PentagonPresSec’s twice-weekly grilling on #Afghanistan that #DOD hasn’t had a good plan to deal w/this. But then came this revelation by AMB (ret.) Neumann yesterday 👇 9/n
That’s not particularly surprising, given the US-#Taliban Agreement requires all US non-diplomatic contractors to leave the country. But what’s distressing is this + the speed of the US withdrawal (~40% completed in 1 month according to @CENTCOM) + no clear plan to backfill. 10/n
The implications of a failure to sufficiently backfill those contractors is well described by @dandeluce in @NBCNews today: effectively, an Afghan Air Force w/rapidly degrading capabilities & an Afghan Army w/rapidly degrading mobility & log support. 11/n nbcnews.com/politics/natio…
To those who disagree w/this, the AAF assessment comes straight from @ResoluteSupport advisors (via @SIGARHQ) & that for the ANA is empirically grounded in the plummeting vehicle readiness rates that accompanied the few times the US tried to cut back contract support. 12/n
All of which is to say, while I still assess that the #ANDSF could stave off the military overthrow of #Afghanistan’s govt in the immediate term, I am getting increasingly worried about the veracity of that assessment based on concerns about the 3rd caveat above. 13/n
(And this is before even taking into account other concerning reports such as this @NPR article by @diaahadid suggesting the #Taliban are purchasing Russian-made SAMs now) 14/n npr.org/2021/06/05/100…
All of which is to say, the US & Afghan govts need to get this contract support issue figured out & *quickly*. Failure to do so will not only negate my 3rd caveat but likely my 2nd as well (via domino effects). Systemic collapse of the #ANDSF then becomes a real possibility. 15/n
Here’s hoping this was at the top of the list of agenda items for the US interagency team that was led by @US4AfghanPeace in Kabul today—it’s not an understatement to call this a topic of crisis at the moment. 16/16

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More from @JJSchroden

Sep 26
Today, @USGAO released a report that describes the efforts of @StateDept, @DHSgov & @DeptofDefense to counter foreign disinformation. 1/n
@USGAO @StateDept @DHSgov @DeptofDefense GAO cited the following as examples:
- @StateDept's Global Engagement Center helps federal agencies, embassies & int'l partners develop analytic skills, policy responses & technical capacity to counter foreign disinformation overseas. 2/n
@USGAO @StateDept @DHSgov @DeptofDefense - @DHSgov's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency educates the public on the risks of disinformation and partners with state and local election officials to disseminate educational materials to help them identify disinformation. 3/n
Read 7 tweets
Aug 1
Fascinating account here of how #alQaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri reportedly ended up in a Siraj Haqqani safehouse in downtown Kabul (& the #Taliban's request for AQ to not acknowledge the event). Will put some key points in this thread. 1/n

akhbaralaan.net/news/exclusive…
According to the article, a young #Taliban intel (GDI) officer brought Zawahiri to Kabul in 2022 b/c the latter was suffering from "heart, kidney and skin problems" & needed treatment in the capital. They traveled over the course of 3 weeks from Helmand province. 2/n
Al-Zawahiri was initially posted in a #Taliban intel (GDI) safehouse, but after a drone was sighted flying overhead, he was moved to a second safehouse (near the Sai Rahi Aludin roundabout) in the capital. 3/n
Read 10 tweets
Feb 2
As with its last report, this latest report on the #Taliban’s relationship with #alQaeda in #Afghanistan is 180 degrees out from the current US assessment. 1/n cbsnews.com/news/afghanist…
“According to the report presented to the UNSC [#alQaeda] has established ‘up to 8 new training camps in #Afghanistan, including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan & Uruzgan Provinces, w\a new base to stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley….’ 2/n
“…The terrorist organization also operates 5 madrasas - religious schools where it trains and indoctrinates children to become fighters - in the east & northeast of #Afghanistan, the reports said…” 3/n
Read 6 tweets
Nov 20, 2023
I was recently passed a pre-publication copy of Feridun Sinirlioğlu's independent assessment of the situation in #Afghanistan, conducted for the @UN

I'll put some thoughts about it in this THREAD. 1/n
@UN (Since the report isn't out yet, I can't link to it, but you can find various news articles about it via Google, such as this one by @VOANews: ) 2/nvoanews.com/a/un-mandated-…
@UN @VOANews Overall, the assessment is clearly written & admirably forthright, especially given that its audiences are wide-ranging, from the #Taliban to those who hate the Taliban.

Its primary conclusion: "the status quo of int'l engagement is not working." 3/n
Read 21 tweets
May 18, 2023
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*

I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n Image
(You can find the full report and an executive summary here: english.iob-evaluatie.nl/results/public…) 2/N
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"

Wish the US had a similar requirement. 3/n
Read 22 tweets
Oct 12, 2022
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden (You can find the full text of the document here: whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…) 2/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.

Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n
Read 29 tweets

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