Thread by @ReassessHistory

#OTD in 1944

Hour by Hour: Showdown in Normandy
After 5 DAYS of intense action as Second Army attempted to envelop Panzergruppe West... tanks stop rolling, lines are refortified & both sides lick their wounds.

Battle of manoeuvre by attrition rolls on. /1
#WW2 #SWW #History

Our story will focus on the kink of the line at the BOTTOM, by Èvrecy.

This spur was hard won during Operation Greenline, as 15th Scottish & 53rd Welsh Divisions attempted to through through the blasted market town & reach the Orne.

II SS-Panzerkorps put paid to that plan. /2

The minuscule crossroads of Le Bon Repos sat near the bottom of Hill 113, allowing British FOOs to peer over the flank of Hill 112 & direct observation accordingly into II SS-Panzerkorps rear areas.

It MUST be removed. /3

At 1500 the SS guns opened up to pummel Hill 113 & Le Bon Repos.

This narrative will run as close to HOUR BY HOUR as possible.

For 1/5th Welch on Hill 113's forward slope there is no hope of reinforcement or relief.

The SS enjoy every advantage.

There will be no escape. /4

So why does a crappy little piece of real estate, called 'The Good Rest' no less - matter?

It irritatingly kinks into II SS-Pzkps lines & is the one position that the British hold around Hill 112 that may yield real insight into German intentions. /5

Army Group B sees Hill 112 as PIVOTAL to their defence of Normandy, even as it's been slowly chewed away at. Thus this is a big deal.

Dempsey sees the Hill 112 - 113 ridgeline as key to victory thus... it's useful, but he still needs Hill 112.

Differing priorities. /6

1/5th Welch positions

The shittiest job, bar A Company holding Le Bon Repos crossroads falls to a platoon from B Company... who hold La Maison Blance with several Brens, two PIATs & No. 4s/Sten guns.

Dinky firepower really.

Bloody exposed.

They're canaries. /7

A Company held the crossroad itself, desirable to the Germans for MT & AFV movement..

Responsibility for holding against any counter-attack fell to Major Richard 'Bishop' Northcott & Captain Bill Picton.

The rest of 1/5th Welch could provide supporting fire if needed...*/8

Northcott was well regarded and Picton had repeatedly proved himself as a steady set of hands.

They just faced some pretty mega problems... as hinted at above.

*If the Bn responded to any attack, they'd give away their position to German FOOs/tanks & be blasted off Hill 113. /9

For the last few days II SS-Panzerkorps had tried to goad them into responding with deep patrols, shell/mortar fire, having Tigers from 102 Schwere SS-Panzer bombard them from Hill 112.

Some SS-Panzergrenadiere even washed themselves in plain sight to tempt the defenders... /10

They didn't really rise to it.

British training dictated to hold fire until the enemy were about 100 yards away.

Also they were all briefed that you should never, ever, ever deploy on a forward slope. That's where they were. It was shit - so they had to behave. /11

So here we have a pretty bog standard infantry battalion in a Territorial Army division, mostly made up of conscripts, volunteers and terriers with a smattering of regulars.

Completely shrugging off an oppo with pure big balls discipline. /12

An unexpected problem was that terrain forbade proper engagement by divisional arty in event of an attack, so real defensive firepower was mostly limited to their 3" mortars in the mortar platoon - or D Company 1 Manchester's 4.2" heavy mortars.

No materiel advantage today. /13

They do have 147 'Hampshire' Regiment RAC in support, but a small problem... anything that goes OVER Hill 113 will be targeted by EVERY BLOODY GUN that II SS-Panzerkorps can bear.

On paper backed by all of Second Army's dantean firepower, no way to use any of it. /14

Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Tremayne Gibson commanded 1/5th Welch, taking over when his predecessor - Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Ripley was shot dead by a Scottish sentry at the end of Operation Epsom.

His HQ was on the reverse slope of Hill 113, he relied on runners/radio for info./15

None of this is good.

His forward companies had six 6 pounders in support on the forward slope itself.

These crews knew the Germans desperately wanted to knock them out: targets of the highest priority.

The minute they fired a clock would start ticking. /16

If II SS-Panzerkorps could knocked out 1/5th Welch's paltry anti-tank screen, the defenders would be down to grenades & PIAT to take out tanks.

10th SS-Panzer would be EASILY able to methodologically roll up the entire battalion. /17

So this is it.

Four companies in 370m x 370m, and D Company is about 50 men strong at that, positioned on a forward slope in direct sight of enemy observers... unable to respond.

Resistance means death.

I can't put it any starker than that. /18

Cousins Alfred Monoghan and William Mazzei are with A Company around the crossroads.

On 17 July, before taking over LBR - A Company attended a small mass by padre Captain O.J. Rees held a quiet service.

It was well known to be the worst assignment around the Odon Valley. /19

There was no love lost between 1/5th Welch and their Waffen-SS opponents.

Arthur Pattison recalled, “It was then that we learned we were facing part of an SS Division and we were told that this Division was not taking prisoners and our response was nor were we.” /20

Surely all soldiers hate their enemies right?

Umm... indoctrination was BANNED in the British Army. It was viewed as making the Army political.

This was a sensitive topic... /21

The Army had to be apolitical.

There were attempts to get Hate Training going, but this was banned.

Propaganda really was piss weak, the Why We Fight series of films is pretty much as extreme as it gets. /22

Some in 53rd Welsh Division were deeply unsettled by officers telling them to "Hate the Hun".

Hatred was learned.

They heard of the murder of Canadian soldiers.

Met abused French civilians.

Saw British bodies booby trapped to kill medical personnel. /23

So each man in A Company knew, he knew, that if they enemy came there would be no quarter.

Not that they had anywhere to fall back to, the tall crops rustling over the Hill 113's forward slope offered minimal cover.

An ideal killing field. /24

For the past few days they'd been bloody silent but the Germans had scoped out that La Maison Blanche was a weak spot.

L/Cpl Mostyn Thomas was with D Coy ^ recalled, ‘as little sound as possible, Lieut. Trudeau had warned us of the consequences, which were heeded.' /25

*FOR CANADIAN FOLLOWERS "Lieut. Trudeau" is CANLOAN Lieutenant Maurice Trudeau who is now stuck in the spiciest position with his fellow soldiers in 1/5th Welch. /26

The challenge of a forward slope in a nutshell, Ran Williams said...

“We were then given a job that in training we were told we should never do… of all the crazy things, we were on a forward slope which is where you should never be” /27

So, why does the showdown come on 21st July?

Well this position was lost on the night of 15 - 16 July, and this sector had quietened down a bit on 18 July...

That's a fair ol' lag between action, altho' 9th and 10th SS-Panzer had taken a beating. /28

It was recently put to me by @BloodPhilip that the action is... perhaps less about sorting the line, but about 10th SS-Panzer Division proving their LOYALTY to Hitler in the wake of the July plot.

This seems, a likely catalyst as some BOLD decisions are made. /20

Bittrich (comd II SS-Panzerkorps) & Himmler enjoying a stroll around Mauthausen-Gusen concentration camp in 1941. /30

In stark contrast 9th and 10th SS-Panzer Divisions did embrace deeply ingrained indoctrination about the 'criminal intent' of the enemy etc, with highly screened officers and plenty of veteran personnel.

Who were, y'know very keen adherents to National Socialism. /31

Senior figures in 10th SS-Panzer and II SS-Panzerkorps viewed Le Bon Repos as a 'provocation & a nuisance', thus they could easily crack it with minimal effort.

Lazy assumptions are underpinned by seriously dire int. /32

A report from Panzer Lehr, who'd fought Brits and Americans, had done the rounds & gone VIRAL.

Seriously.

It said Brit inf were crap, Brit tanks were good.

So basically do not worry about crappy British inf, easy kerbstomp, GG. /33

So they look at this battalion trapped on a forward slope with no support.

Just like a shooting gallery.

Bit of pew pew, few Iron Crosses & schnapps before bed. Job's a goodun. /34

Seriously. /35

So a plan is sketched up by 10th SS-Panzer on the back of some fag paper.

The Germans call Le Bon Repos, 'La Polka Farm' & feel it undermines their ability to hold Esquay. So best to now wipe out the defenders.

This job falls to SS-Standartenführer Dr Eduard Deisenhofer. /36

Deisenhofer is a real proper POS who signed on early with the Nazis whilst studying for his PhD in the 1930s, joined the SA & transferred to the SS in Oct 1930. Volunteered for the Liebstandarte in Feb '34. Sent as a guard to Dachau in '35, then ran Einsatzgruppen in Poland. /37

By now he'd served on both fronts and was a very experienced veteran... and thanks to 10th SS-Panzer's merger of 22 into 21 SS-Panzergrenadier, effectively had a full SS-PGR Regt under command. /38

So Deisenhofer chats to 10th SS-Panzer to get some support, who are a bit battered... operationally they have 18 Pz IV and 14 StuGs.

Ah.

Still a lot.

Active armour is at a premium. /39

Active armour is at a premium so he he chats to 102 Schwere SS-Panzer, who politely explain that their 17 operational Tigers' priority is to hold Hill 112 - not fuck about on Hill 113.

So they'll sit back and lend fire support.

O. K.

But not help breakthrough. /40

Deisenhofer's response is not recorded.

I'd seriously love to know what it was.

They also decide not to attempt to infiltrate Welsh lines in a cunning night attack for... umm... reasons? /41

So bare this in mind, we have a combat formation which has seen action on the eastern front facing down a pretty green battalion - and the Waffen-SS planning is seemingly based on a basis of pure success, minimal friction & the British inf will surrender.

Bold energy. /42

This shifted the emphasis back to II SS-Panzerkorps to generate a substantial arty fireplan to facilitate ops.

The entire enterprise is rapidly escalating & starts to suffer from mission creep, as this approach is liable to seriously irritate Second Army's gunners. /43

Deisenhofer assigned I Bn 21 SS-PGR's 1 & 3 Companies to surprise & take La Maison Blanche first, securing the flank & act as a diversion, so that II Bn could push through and seize the crossroads.

Additional fire support would come from SS-PGR on Hill 112 + Tigers etc. /44

So now....

45 TWEETS IN.

We reach 1500, 21 July.

Rain patters down as a torrent of shells cascade in, slamming in around 1/5th Welch, who are firmly dug in on Hill 113's forward slope. /45

More mortar bombs add to the mix, thrashing 6 RWF on the reverse slope. The core effort is to suppress B & D Companies on the ridgeline & limit their involvement.

It's terrifying but accuracy is poor. All Welsh soldiers are fairly safe in covered slit trenches. /46

Absolute pandemonium reigns for nearly six hours.

Six hours constant bombardment as II SS-Panzerkorps attempt to overwhelm the defenders.

Cacophony of sound. Acrid smoke. Constant blast. Tremor.

While Hill 112's stench of death from thousands of rotting corpses lingers. /47

Then comes more smoke shells, obfuscating the SS-Panzergrenadiere's advance.

Cries of "STAND TO!" echo.

Mates shake each other awake, grabbing their weapons, bandoliers etc, as shouted orders swiftly relay section to section.

It's pretty slick. /48

At Le Bon Repos crossroads, Northcott mans Cyril's WS No. 18 to personally maintain contact with Gibson, warning the enemy clearly intend to overrun A Company.

Urgent defensive fire tasks are lodged from Bn HQ with 133 Field Regiment. /49

For 15 minutes shells slam home & smoke billows across the forward slope as Fromme prepares to lead I Battalion against La Maison Blanche.

B Company's exposed platoon at La Maison Blanche are cut off, and to put it bluntly, utterly fucked. /50

That said La Maison Blanche was substantially built, with thick walls & effectively turned into a strong point. But this would not offset restricted fields of fire & complete lack of support.

Heavy rain began to really tear down, granting 1 and 3 Companies much better cover./51

D Company sheltered as best they could in covered slit trenches, copied from Canadians. These mitigated much of the effects of airburst & survive all but a direct hit.

These tended to be 6 ft long, 3 ft wide, about 4 ft deep, with 1 1/2 ft of earth on top. /52

Boredom saw many soldiers improve their slit trenches, shared by 2 - 3 men, carving out crannies for mess tins, occasionally a mini latrine - so you didn't surround your trench with shit literally slung out... or loop holes for small arms. /53

The last few nights gave 1/5th Welch plenty of time to bring up more ammunition, grenades, rifle bandoliers, Bren mags, ration packs, emergency ration chocolate (laced with either a high dose of caffeine or amphetamine, 50/50 flip)....

Some slits became mini-fortresses. /54

Driving rain lashed D Company's slits, shaking under the weight of bombardment, earth tumbled down - but it'd still take a direct hit to neutralise each position.

Mostyn Thomas sheltered next to his mate Eddie Burnell, patiently waiting for the bombardment & smoke to lift. /55

Smoke derived from white phosphorous created stinging phosphene gas, but provided 1/5th Welch's defending companies stayed put & didn't return fire... they were effectively invisible to the enemy.

A real battle of nerves. /56

Discipline was key. Soldiers' thoughts flicked back to basic training & recent orders.

Attacking inf would struggle to effectively engage entrenched position at more than 100 to 200 yards: leaving attackers exposed. /57

British training maxims advised, "Hold your fire until they are right up close and they should all be dead men. They are in the open you are under cover."

Many felt it best to hold & nail the enemy at about 100 yards.

1/5th Welch continued to hold their fire. /58

Suddenly a shout went up from one of A Company's keen eyed soldiers peering through the smoke.

Enemy approaching.

300 yards range. /59
*Generic smoke screen pic.

Concurrently a SS-Panzergrenadier company attempted to rapidly close with C Company, sprinting through the smoke aiming to get stuck into hand to hand fighting as quickly as possible.

In the space of 15 minutes, of A & C Companies' fate hung in the balance. /60

Back at 1/5th Welch battalion HQ, Gibson and his men began piecing together the disparate accounts relayed back over wireless...*

Just as news began arriving that four Panzer IV were entering the fray against A Company. /61

*WS 38 (Pl) to 18 (Coy) to 22 (Bn). /61

These four tanks were from 6 Company 10 SS-Panzer overseen by SS-Obersturmführer Hans Quandel from his own Panzer IV, 601. /62

II SS-Panzerkorps continued to follow a set pattern, rolling from D Company to the top of Hill 113, the crossroads, then right to wallop C Company.

Continual suppression of the rear companies effectively mitigated B & D Companies from providing any defensive small arms fire. /63

Suppression hindered kanoniere's ability to directly support the SS-Panzergrenadiere against identified targets.

21 SS-Panzergrenadier's own infantry guns should have been closely employed to shut down LMB but there's no evidence they were employed. /64

So it fell to Quandel's Panzer IVs to eliminate A Company with 75mm HE.

75mm HE seriously lacked killing power against dug in infantry. So they're spaffing rounds down range for minimal result - unless they achieved a direct hit.

Which is bloody hard. /65

1530 - 1600: C Company's situation was dire. Pinned by constant bursts of 7.92mm from SS-Panzergrenadiere on Hill 112, as mortar bombs constantly showered their 6 pounder crews with earth.

It was clear that 10th SS-Panzer sought to eliminate the critical anti-tank screen. /66

For all of Morgan's encouragement, bellowed or by wireless, the situation was out of his control. He was simply presenting the SS with living puzzles, to be violently solved.

Time was against him. /67

Captain Ran Williams: “We did not know what was happening, we tried to give covering fire but of course it was just blind firing...” /68

Cohesion broke down as waves of incoming ammunition constantly suppressed.

Wireless sets were only at platoon and company level... a gap opened up, leaving L/Cpl Leslie George's 6 pounder unsupported.

The majority of his crew were incapacitated. /69

An SS officer spied the lightly defended gun and pulled twenty SS-Panzergrenadiere together, suddenly charging the gun.

Despite being massively outnumbered, Leslie was unfazed, cooly grabbing a Sten or the detachment's Bren & unleashing against the enemy. /70

He cut down the officer and at least two others, immediately breaking the assault.

This moment proved decisive and almost at once the SS assault against C Company broke, seeing them withdraw as Leslie maintained streams of fire onto the remainder.

One man made a difference./71

Yet more difficulties were encountered around Le Bon Repos crossroads.

133 Field Regiment managed to put down Defensive Fire (DF) tasks at the attacking infantry's rear, preventing Fromme from reinforcing his lead company. /72

They were suddenly caught in an optimal killing ground, .303 & 9mm to the front, 25 Pdr HE to the rear.

In the face of steadfast resistance, hammered from the front & rear.... by 1650 the attack faltered & broke off, suffering heavy casualties on the retreat. /73

The initial assault failed.

Heinz Harmel, GOC 10th SS-Panzer, saw his SS-Panzergrenadiere come tantalisingly close to overrunning C Company but was met with bloody & abject failure.

That's before we talk about B Company's hapless platoon at La Maison Blanche. /74

God knows how they did it, but these plucky boys successfully spent over two hours holding off two of I Battalion's companies.

They just had a few Brens, No. 4s, Stens and two PIATs.

That is it.

One platoon vs... legit an army. /75

10th SS-Panzer needed to take a breather, reorganise then maybe go again - having reconsidered their options.

In the meantime II SS-Panzerkorps guns maintained the drumbeat barrage. /76

Panzergruppe West had ALL the specialist kit needed to do the job.

But... umm... none appear in this battle, nor do demolition vehicles.

A perfect environment - but specialist kit sat about elsewhere. /77

Sturmpanzer IV's 150mm gun would have resolved the engagement in a matter of hours.

This AFV would have made all the difference, but the Waffen-SS chose blood & flesh over metal.

Mettle over metal. /78

Meanwhile, 160 Brigade raced around orders warning that 10th SS-Panzer clearly wanted to roll up the brigade, seeing 133 Field Regiment's spare gunners fixing bayonets & manning Bren guns.

Others reading 25 pounder's AP shot in preparation to kinetically smash AFVs. /79

1 HLI on Hill 113's western slope and 1 East Lancs in Bougy stood ready to repel a full blooded assault.

Lieutenant G.C.R.L. Pender (1 HLI) recalled, "One could see little, because of the height of the corn. The smell was overpowering with bloated dead bodies all around." /80

In other developments...

II SS-Panzerkorps' bombardment had thoroughly irritated Second Army.

An irritated Second Army responded... with a metric fuckton of HE as ever more heavy arty began to join the engagement, kicking off counter battery (CB) fire etc. /81

More & more units stood to.

Perhaps it was the long feared counter-offensive?

Sergeant Trevor Greenwood was with 9 RTR near the arty parks, "for a couple of hours it was 'all hell let loose'."

Events were spiralling away from II SS-Panzerkorps' control. /82

Kanoniere tried to take advantage of this opportunity & hit communications centres such as Cheux, aiming to target columns bringing up ammunition.

They hit 53rd Divisional Prisoner of War Cage.

Killing seven lance corporals from 53rd Divisional Provost Company. /83

Their names were Philip John Benjafield, Jake Eric Hazzard, Norman Penson, John Harris, Ronald Frederick Hawkins, Frederick Ernest Greenstreet, and John Philip Harold Church.

This is the first time their deaths have ever been contextualised. /84

B Squadron 147 RAC trundled up Hill 112's reverse slope to encourage friendly infantry and deter any German sally over the top, but a mortar bomb hit Major Bob Warren's tank, blowing his hand off & 'making a pretty good mess of Sergeant Tito [peppered w shrapnel].' /85

1800

Without all the specialist gear that'd make their lives easier... Fromme resumes the attack against La Maison Blanche - this time with plenty of supporting fire from Hill 112. /86

Quandel's Panzer IVs returned to rock LMB with 75mm HE, raking windows with their MG 34s.

B Company's platoon could only deal with armour at about 100 yards range... it'd take Quandel beign stupid enough charge his tanks into PIAT range.

He didn't. /87

The defenders scurried around trading fire as best they could, lured into exchanging with 3 Company.

This preoccupied most of them, allowing 1 Company to carefully infiltrate forward, bypass LMB.

Close.

Then charged. /88

1 Company took La Maison Blance without a single casualty, taking most of the defending platoon prisoner.

The defiant white house had fallen.

Now freeing Quandel's Panzer IVs to drive against the crossroads. /89

At 1/5th Welch battalion HQ, Gibson tried to piece things together as confused reports arrived from A Company - probably made messier due to the finicky wireless net.

Fearing friendly fire, they decided against more DF tasks & instead shifted over to 1 Manchesters support. /90

Charles Harrington ordered the entire battalion to engage.

Thirty two Vickers machine guns unleashed concentrated streams of .303 supplemented by D Company's twelve 4.2" heavy mortars.

XII Corps directed a massive retaliatory bombardment from Hill 112 to Maltot. /91

So... the attack resumes and it's already escalated to a Corps directing Army level artillery against II SS-Panzerkorps, in a duel which is starting to drag in more of Panzergruppe West.*

Things are getting seriously out of control. /92

*Which is an army in all but name.

So what started as a fairly simple endeavour to take out low quality British infantry has evolved into a colossal army-level artillery duel.

And still 10th SS-Panzer has no specialist kit in play... /93

It's absolutely fucking crazy.

But perhaps that is where Nazism get us?

For all claims of Waffen SS 'elitism', we see hate, indoctrination, genocide, inability to adapt, rage at the attempt on Hitler's life & that low quality infantrymen dare attempt to defy their will. /94

Disagreements raged between 1/5th Welch and 147 Hampshire RAC.

Shortly after 1800 a smoke screen was laid over the crest of Hill 113 and a lone troop tried to advance. They instantly silhouetted themselves and one was hit by 3 AP rounds & taken out. /95

Two stretcher bearers leapt into action, one of whom was possibly Howell Davis from the Battalion Band,

“[SBs]were galloping across our front, one with a huge Red Cross flag with a stretcher between them.”
/96

The two men scurried as fast as they could towards the stricken Churchill, lugging the heavy stretcher.

They put little faith in their diddly Red Cross arm bands signifying medical intent, electing to proudly bear a giant Red Cross flag as a modern humanitarian standard. /97

The stretcher bearers draped the flag on the hull, scrambled up the side to try and drag out an injured Hampshire tankie from the wreckage. /98

A deliberate burst of machine gun fire snapped in.

The lead stretcher bearer was killed, wounding the second - to the utter horror of those watching.

See Intelligence Sergeant Machin's reminiscence below.

The Welch were aghast at such pure murder. /99

The troop's swift withdrawal finally slammed home to Gibson the Brown & the Hampshires' reservations regarding the Churchill's vulnerability on such open slopes.

In truth no AFV in Normandy could have succeeded in such an environment.

Used by either side. /100

With stretcher bearers falling as they repeatedly ran the deadly gauntlet of mortar bombs, shells & small arms fire evacuating casualties, Gibson ordered the carrier platoon forward to act as light ambulances and provide rapid casevac. /101

SS-Panzergrenadiere continued to push towards Le Bon Repos.

Shells continued to hail down.

Mostyn watched "casualties mounted and were born away. Llew went down and others with him of Don Company. Rain fell in the late afternoon. It was bedlam." /102

D Company steadily suffered casualties, dribbling manpower away - slowly shrinking & losing combat effectiveness. /103

Gibson was determined not to lose A Company, but concerned that any DF task would obliterate the crossroads.

He conferred with Brown, who agreed that a counter-attack would go in at 2045 - seeing B and C Squadron's throw their full strength of about 30 tanks into the attack./104

2000

SS-Panzergrenadiere had worked a company of infantry into the orchard to A Company's right flank, supported by Quandel's Panzer IVs assuming hull down positions. /105

Word of 1/5th Welch's desperate battle spread with many units retuning their radio to listen in on the action.

Northcott's last transmission came in at 2000, almost on the dot, "There are Huns in the orchard about 50 yards away from me."

He was not heard from again./106

B and D Companies still stood, altho' the latter was near-paper strength.

They were concussed by dull detonations, half-deaf and dazed.

Stuck in slit trenches.

Mostyn Thomas, "We were submerged in German mortar and artillery fire... "/106

“when the German infantry advanced. Ianto Evans' voice came up over ‘GET YOUR HEADS UP’, repeatedly many times, loud and clear. Weapons came out, heads came up and a further deluge of artillery fire and then mortar bombs.”

They would not yield. /107

2045 - 2100

After a 15 min bombardment, now came 147 Hampshire RAC's time to shine.

B Squadron raced up and down the left flank, firing smoke and remaining mobile to create a big noisy distraction, whilst C Squadron would smoke the right flank and engage LBR & orchard. /108

Yet due to a delay in Brown reaching B & C Squadrons, the Hampshires sallied over 2 minutes late.

2102
Unfortunately this cost 147 RAC a good amount of the bombardment's impact.

Even so... 30 Churchills charged into battle.

Nearly 1,000 tons of British steel. /109

Streams of 7.92mm Besa were unleashed, 6 pounders, 75mm, 95mm, screaming HE and AP rounds at the enemy.

Even so, it was almost too late.

A Company's position was untenable.

Their company commander Northcott most likely dead. /110

The SS-Panzergrenadiere edged forward inch by inch.

Yard by costly yard.

Opposition surpassed ANYTHING they had been briefed about.

British infantry did not do this.

They did not resist.

How. Dare. They. /111

Four StuGs had been brought up & Quandel's Panzer IVs redeployed to face C Company.

Again... StuGs have 75mm guns. StuHs were more suited...

Ineffective blasting with 75mm HE continues. /112

Creativity was needed.

It fell to the StuGs to dislodge A Company in the most gory way possible. /113

Ran recalled, “The tanks came along, they slewed their tracks over our weapon slits and the infantry company behind were throwing grenades into the weapon slits, our chaps did not have a chance at all.” /114

C Squadron's unexpected intervention managed to catch out 10th SS-Panzer, as light slowly began to start fading.

Esquay's church was brassed up with 7.92mm Besa & walloped with HE.

For half an hour Panzer IVs, StuGs & Churchills slugged it out at 600 yds.

A knifefight. /115

Such an awesome sight buoyed A Company, who STILL refused to yield.

Picton was possibly in charge, but sketchy reports arrived at Gibson's HQ. /116

At 1/5th Welch HQ, Machin heard, "[A Company] reported that the enemy was milling about in their area, using the tracks of their tanks to grind in the tops of slit trenches in which our men were positioned." /117

Failing light forced 147 RAC's Churchills to withdraw at 2130.

The counterattack granted just A Company half an hour's relative respite.

With the Churchills gone, the assault resumed. /118

Karl Bastian led II Bn & now pulled together 6 Company into an ad-hoc assault group to renew the attack, frustrated that A Company still held the crossroads.

StuGs unleashed streams from MG 34 to suppress, as SS-Panzergrenadiere finally advanced.

Point blank. /119

2130

147 RAC leave. Bastian attacks.

A Company's positions that still held out were gradually reduced by 75mm HE, 7.92mm, grenades or the bayonet.

Those who still resisted were literally ground, pulped or buried alive by StuGs. /120

A report at 2130 stated that StuGs were within, "10 yards of their position & that enemy was in their immediate front."

Against impossible odds, A Company still held.
/121

Slowly but surely the defence was picked.

A Company's last transmission, most likely sent by Cyril.

"They are two yards from my trench now."

It was over for A Company. /122

But it wasn't over for 1/5th Welch.

2145

Finally enjoying relative freedom to operate as they desired, two SS-Panzergrenadier companies now assaulted C Company's position with four Panzer IVs. /123

2200

Rounds continue to slam home suppressing the ridgeline.

Mostyn was blown out of his slit by a Nebelwerfer rocket, sitting limply until raced back to the RAP.

2200-0000 1 Manchester fired 80,000 rounds in defence. /123

2204

C Company is nearly overwhelmed by SS-Panzergrenadiere.

A very sodden Leslie George, soaked by lashing rain now mans his 6 pounder alone.

Jagged shards from mortar bombs & shells constantly whizz past, small arms fire peppering the ground around the gun. /124

A Panzer IV spied the gun and started rumbling forward.

Crush the gun, no more trouble.

Leslie calmly loaded a round into the breach & fired.

A dud. /125

Ejecting the round he tried again.

Dud.

And again.

Dud.

All three damaged by shell splinters. /126

It takes a full five man gun crew for a 6 pounder to achieve 10 - 12 RPM.

Time was firmly against him. /127

Leslie loaded a fourth round.

Slid over to the layer's position.

Fired.

The 6 pounder violently recoiled, the round smashing into the Panzer IV head first, immediately forcing it to reverse, limply backing off to try and find a hull down position.

The crew were likely horribly lacerated by internal spalling. /129

With the leading Panzer IV at least temporarily incapacitated, a second was suddenly knocked out by a Welchman manning a PIAT.

With two Panzer IVs knocked our or pretty trashed, the SS-Panzergrenadiere's confidence plummeted.

2330 - SS-Panzergrenadiere disengage. /130

The battle steadily wound down.

1/5th Welch prepared for their last stand.

After much deliberation & with remaining companies battered, low on ammunition. 1/5th Welch withdrew from the forward slope before daybreak.

10th SS-Panzer were victorious. /131

The news couldn't come fast enough for Ran,
"lo and behold, a message came through on a radio or telephone to Major Morgan to tell us they were putting down smoke screen and for us to get out as fast as we can. (Best news I ever had during the war).” /132

10th SS-Panzer counted 32 British dead with sixty eight prisoners.

Northcott, Picton, Monoghan, Mazzei & Wiltshire lay dead in Le Bon Repos.

Many bodies were not recovered. /133

German losses are disputed.

Waffen-SS prisoners later alleged that 50% of 21 SS-Panzergrenadier's reconstituted I Battalion became casualties on 21 July.

All that carnage.

For want of the right equipment. /134

The Battle of Le Bon Repos was a tactical German victory, but a strategic British one - as...

In the aftermath new reports were written.

Warning of underestimating British infantry.

II SS-Panzerkorps' victory was lukewarm. /135

At least four Panzer IV and six StuGs were knocked out or destroyed that day.

A 10% reduction of 10 SS-Panzer's armoured strength.

The Germans toasted five 'Shermans' destroyed... for.... one Churchill.

No Shermans were involved. /136

That is before we consider the frivolous six hour arty/mortar spaffing over Hill 113, use of precious smoke rounds, & risk of overburdening their precarious logistics chain.

Bittrich toasted it as a victory 'at only a fraction of this cost to ourselves'. /137

This that why, every 21 July, I think of these brave men.

Stuck on Hill 113's shitty forward slope, at the crossroads, or in La Maison Blanche.

The majority did not want to be there.

They wanted to be at home.

They did their duty.

Remember them. /End

The above thread took over a decade to research.

I first read a couple of lines in the regimental history when I was 19.

I'm now 33.

So I hope you've enjoyed this thread.

The Battle of Le Bon Repos is just one part of my forthcoming book, Jocks, Dragons and Sospans: Through Normandy with 53rd Welsh Division.

If you particularly want to, feel free to sling me a coffee.

ko-fi.com/reassesshistory