Thread by @Ex_Trac

1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.

The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.

2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.

First, there’s denial.

That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.

Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.

3. Here’s how it panned out in #Kremenchuk.

News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.

Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.

4. A few key pro-#Kremlin feeds were quick to suggest that the target had been an oil refinery and, pre-empting “NATO" criticism, noted that this would make the strike “legitimate” from a military-legal perspective.

This speculation was quickly amplified across the community.

5. When images emerged showing it was a shopping centre, not a refinery, that had been hit, #Kremlin-aligned influencers adjusted their approach and went on the offensive.

This is when conspiracy theories began proliferating at scale.

6. Some immediately suggested that the whole thing was a staged psyop (like #Bucha purportedly was).

“First footage from the impact site in #Kremenchuk is published by #Zelensky an hour later,” one user wrote, “Should there be further explanation? #Bucha and #Kramatorsk 2.0.”

7. This “#Bucha 2.0” narrative took off quickly.

Within 90 minutes of the strike, the idea that it had been staged or somehow falsified was becoming conventional wisdom.

Like with #Bucha, these theories were pinned to just a handful of pieces of “evidence.”

8. Pro-#Kremlin feeds searched for possible “clues” to support their theories.

One of the main claims was that there were too many military-aged men at the site for it to be a real shopping mall.

Instead, they held, it had actually been a secret government facility all along.

9. These theories metastasised with time.

So, when #Russia, at the #UN later that evening, suggested that #Kremenchuk was “a new, #Bucha-style provocation,” it was merely lending official weight to a narrative that had already emerged, propagated, and matured informally online.

10. When denying what had happened, #Russia|n officials could point to the countless reports that had emerged on pro-#Kremlin social media, even though these were all weakly evidenced.

Here, it's quantity that matters most, not quality or reliability.

11. Thus, the #Kremlin can rely on strategically primed and ideologically aligned audiences to propagate defensive disinformation in its favour.

It did so in the context of #Bucha, #Mariupol, and #Kramatorsk - and now #Kremenchuk too.

12. Whenever #Russia|n forces overreach, the war narrative remains coherent, even if that means relying on outlandish, disprovable claims.

It’s happened lots before and it’s something we’ll be sure to see more of.

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