1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online. 2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.

Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).

1: #SMG; 2: #AQ; 3: #IS

1. Time for a status update on #IS.

We’ve been collecting and analysing #IS comms and chatter continuously for the last few years.

This is what the short- (50-day) and long-term (200-day) rolling averages look like for #IS attacks as of 10 October 2022. 2. In #Syria, after a three-fold decline across 2020/21, #IS’s reported activities have been hovering at roughly the same level since last summer.

Note that there was a fleeting surge after the #Ghwayran prison-break, but nothing sustained.

See tweet #12 for caveat.

1. In his latest statement, #IS spokesman Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir spoke at length about #IS’s targeting of Christian communities in #Africa.

This continent-wide campaign is likely to intensify across #Mozambique, #DRC, and #Nigeria in the next few months, peaking in December. 2. As part of this, Muhajir spoke about recent developments in #Mozambique.

September has seen #IS’s cells penetrating further south there than ever before, razing "Christian villages" to the ground as they go.

L: #IS-related violence in 2021
R: #IS-related violence in 2022

1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.

Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug 2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.

There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug

1. The attack on #Kabul Cricket Stadium is as yet unclaimed, but it’s worth noting that, as of today, #ISKP has been inactive for 13 days in a row.

That’s the longest period since September 2021, when it was gearing up to launch the most intensive campaign in its recent history. 2. This summer’s slump has seen #ISKP become somewhat sidelined as an issue in #Afghanistan.

This graph shows mentions of the keyword “Daesh” on #Taliban social media since mid-2020.

Note how things peaked in Q4 2021 when #ISKP was at its most virulent.

1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.

On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date. 2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.

In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.

1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.

The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk. 2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.

First, there’s denial.

That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.

Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.

1. Since #IS announced its new ‘province' in #Mozambique at the beginning of May, there's been a significant spike in its activity.

This is not accounted for by a new strategic offensive. Rather, it is down to a (major) change in tactics and areas of operation. 2. An important first thing to note is that the numbers we’ve been seeing of late are lower than the all-time high we saw back in 2021 -- but not by much.

1. #IS deployed 342 attacks globally during Ramadan, 219 of them since 17 April as part of its global revenge campaign.

This is ten attacks more than it reported during Ramadan last year.

Here’s what that surge looks like when charted out. 2. Most attacks (by far) were reported from #Iraq, followed by #Nigeria, #Syria and #Afghanistan.

These four states accounted for three quarters of all #IS’s attacks in Ramadan.

1. Since last week, there have been a number of signs that #Russia may be planning to invade #Moldova.

In the last few days, there have been several likely false flag attacks in #Transnistria, events that have been amplified massively by a simultaneous influence campaign. 2. To track this, we analysed 169,000 posts shared across pro-war, #Kremlin-aligned communities on Telegram last week.

We sifted through this data for any mentions of #Transnistria, #Moldova, and #Tiraspol.

Here’s what it looks like.

1. Here’s a new update on #IS’s global Ramadan campaign.

In the last week, #IS has deployed more attacks than at any other point since last Ramadan. 2. Since 17 April, #IS has carried out some 132 attacks as part of this campaign.

That's nearly three times more ops per day than usual.

1. Over the last 24 hours, we’ve been tracking pro-#Kremlin responses to #Bucha on #Telegram and #VK.

Pro-#Russia voices started by outright denying it, but by the end of the day, guided by strategic disinformation from the #Kremlin, they were blaming it on #Ukraine. 2. Initially, proponents of the invasion said it was all a lie, citing a clip of the mayor of #Bucha purportedly celebrating the liberation of the town days earlier but not mentioning any massacres.

1. This week’s issue of al-Naba’, which was published last night, took #IS's campaign to legitimise its new leader in a new, quite surprising direction.

https://twitter.com/Ex_Trac/status/1504502272587440131

2. It was very defensive in tone.

Directly comparing the legacy of #IS's 'caliphs' with that of the Rashidun caliphs, it pushed back on criticism—seemingly from within #IS's own circles—of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and played down the strategic significance of his loss.

1. Earlier this month, we reported that #IS comms activity had fallen off a cliff in recent weeks.

In the last few days, the reason for that has become clear: its media team was putting everything into prepping for a global campaign drumming up support for the new caliph. 2. The campaign started on 10 March, when #IS published a statement from new spox Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir declaring that Qurashi had died and been replaced by Qurashi 2.0.

This came after a week-on-week drop in comms that left #IS supporter activities at a historic low.

1. Recent pronouncements from #Moscow about its ‘concerns’ around the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (#CBRN) weapons systems in #Ukraine are having a direct and sustained impact on the pro-#Russia information landscape. 2. @Ex_Trac data shows that #Moscow’s comms re #CBRN have been normalising it as ‘reasonable’ justification for war among pro-#Kremlin communities.

To track this, we visualised the frequency with which #CBRN-related terms have been referenced by pro-#Kremlin voices over 2021/22.

1. Yesterday #IS confirmed that Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in February. He has been succeeded by Abul Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.

It also revealed that Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, his spox, has been killed.

#IS has warned of revenge attacks in weeks to come. 2. ExTrac data suggests that this warning of revenge attacks is not likely to be ‘just’ rhetoric.

Just over two weeks after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abul Hasan al-Muhajir were killed in November 2019, #IS launched a global revenge campaign.

1. #IS has started reporting attacks from #CaboDelgado again.

This follows a three-month pause in its comms from #Mozambique.

Specifically, in the last three days alone, it’s claimed 16 operations. 2. After the recapture of Mocimboa da Praia three months ago by #Mozambique, #Rwanda & #SouthAfrica (among others), #IS’s comms went dark.

However, its network there was far from inactive, as these latest data, combined with what @ACLEDINFO has been reporting, indicate.

1. The latest issue of #IS's newspaper contained another nine reports of attacks in #Syria.

This means that, across the last week alone, #IS has reported 17 ops in #Syria.

That’s more attacks in a single week than were reported across August, September and October combined.

https://twitter.com/Ex_Trac/status/1458882180852158466

2. #IS is framing the recent surge in attacks in #DeirEzzor governorate as 'a strong comeback.'

The question remains as to whether or not it will be sustained in the coming weeks.

1. A quick thread on official #Taliban comms.

When the #Taliban took control of #Kabul, it also took control of #Afghanistan’s decades-old state media apparatus (the red line).

Simultaneously, it abandoned its own decades-old “Voice of Jihad” network (the yellow line). 2. This graph shows output from “Voice of Jihad” over the last five years. Note how it peaked in the summer months before collapsing, and staying collapsed, in August.

That was the point at which the #Taliban’s “Voice of Jihad” finally went silent.

1. On 19 September, following weeks of inactivity, #ISKP once again started reporting attacks from #Afghanistan.

That day alone, it claimed seven operations—this is the largest number of attacks reported by #ISKP in a single day in years. 2. This spate of attacks has so far focused on what #IS is calling the ‘apostate #Taliban militia.’

It appears to signal the start of the new, reinvigorated #Afghanistan campaign that #IS first said was on the horizon back in August.

1. Here’s our detailed briefing note on #ISKP:

public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac… 2. Drawing on ExTrac analytics and on-the-ground sources inside #Afghanistan, it provides in-depth analysis on #ISKP’s:

i. Origins and relations with the #Taliban;
ii. Operational trajectory;
iii. Outreach strategy; and
iv. Significance within the broader global #IS movement.