ExTrac Profile picture
Jul 7, 2022 12 tweets 12 min read Read on X
1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.

The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.

First, there’s denial.

That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.

Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
3. Here’s how it panned out in #Kremenchuk.

News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.

Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.
4. A few key pro-#Kremlin feeds were quick to suggest that the target had been an oil refinery and, pre-empting “NATO" criticism, noted that this would make the strike “legitimate” from a military-legal perspective.

This speculation was quickly amplified across the community.
5. When images emerged showing it was a shopping centre, not a refinery, that had been hit, #Kremlin-aligned influencers adjusted their approach and went on the offensive.

This is when conspiracy theories began proliferating at scale.
6. Some immediately suggested that the whole thing was a staged psyop (like #Bucha purportedly was).

“First footage from the impact site in #Kremenchuk is published by #Zelensky an hour later,” one user wrote, “Should there be further explanation? #Bucha and #Kramatorsk 2.0.”
7. This “#Bucha 2.0” narrative took off quickly.

Within 90 minutes of the strike, the idea that it had been staged or somehow falsified was becoming conventional wisdom.

Like with #Bucha, these theories were pinned to just a handful of pieces of “evidence.”
8. Pro-#Kremlin feeds searched for possible “clues” to support their theories.

One of the main claims was that there were too many military-aged men at the site for it to be a real shopping mall.

Instead, they held, it had actually been a secret government facility all along.
9. These theories metastasised with time.

So, when #Russia, at the #UN later that evening, suggested that #Kremenchuk was “a new, #Bucha-style provocation,” it was merely lending official weight to a narrative that had already emerged, propagated, and matured informally online.
10. When denying what had happened, #Russia|n officials could point to the countless reports that had emerged on pro-#Kremlin social media, even though these were all weakly evidenced.

Here, it's quantity that matters most, not quality or reliability.
11. Thus, the #Kremlin can rely on strategically primed and ideologically aligned audiences to propagate defensive disinformation in its favour.

It did so in the context of #Bucha, #Mariupol, and #Kramatorsk - and now #Kremenchuk too.

12. Whenever #Russia|n forces overreach, the war narrative remains coherent, even if that means relying on outlandish, disprovable claims.

It’s happened lots before and it’s something we’ll be sure to see more of.

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More from @Ex_Trac

Nov 17, 2022
1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.

Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).

1: #SMG; 2: #AQ; 3: #IS
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.

There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
Read 5 tweets
Oct 10, 2022
1. Time for a status update on #IS.

We’ve been collecting and analysing #IS comms and chatter continuously for the last few years.

This is what the short- (50-day) and long-term (200-day) rolling averages look like for #IS attacks as of 10 October 2022.
2. In #Syria, after a three-fold decline across 2020/21, #IS’s reported activities have been hovering at roughly the same level since last summer.

Note that there was a fleeting surge after the #Ghwayran prison-break, but nothing sustained.

See tweet #12 for caveat.
3. In #Iraq, #IS’s network is seemingly in a similar place.

These days, less than half as many attacks are being reported on average compared with this time in 2020 and 2021.

See tweet #12 for caveat.
Read 13 tweets
Sep 20, 2022
1. In his latest statement, #IS spokesman Abu ‘Umar al-Muhajir spoke at length about #IS’s targeting of Christian communities in #Africa.

This continent-wide campaign is likely to intensify across #Mozambique, #DRC, and #Nigeria in the next few months, peaking in December.
2. As part of this, Muhajir spoke about recent developments in #Mozambique.

September has seen #IS’s cells penetrating further south there than ever before, razing "Christian villages" to the ground as they go.

L: #IS-related violence in 2021
R: #IS-related violence in 2022
3. At the beginning of this month, about 20 #IS fighters from #CaboDelgado crossed the #Lurio river and entered #Nampula province.

Up until that point, #Nampula state had seen just one attack claimed by #IS. As of today, that number is at eight and counting.
Read 7 tweets
Aug 11, 2022
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.

Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.

There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).

L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
Read 9 tweets
Jul 29, 2022
1. The attack on #Kabul Cricket Stadium is as yet unclaimed, but it’s worth noting that, as of today, #ISKP has been inactive for 13 days in a row.

That’s the longest period since September 2021, when it was gearing up to launch the most intensive campaign in its recent history.
2. This summer’s slump has seen #ISKP become somewhat sidelined as an issue in #Afghanistan.

This graph shows mentions of the keyword “Daesh” on #Taliban social media since mid-2020.

Note how things peaked in Q4 2021 when #ISKP was at its most virulent.
3. We’ve also seen a slump in official #ISKP media releases (as in, those published through #IS’s Central Media Diwan).

Importantly, this lull hasn’t been reflected in the activities of #ISKP’s less globally prominent Pashtu and Dari media offices.
Read 7 tweets
Jul 25, 2022
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.

On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.

In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.
3. Responding to this, the #Taliban launched its own campaign, #AfghansSupportTaliban, on 22 July.

Within three days, it was shared more than twice as many times as the initial anti-#Taliban hashtag (200k+).

Here’s where it all started.
Read 10 tweets

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