1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.
The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.
First, there’s denial.
That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.
Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.
Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.
4. A few key pro-#Kremlin feeds were quick to suggest that the target had been an oil refinery and, pre-empting “NATO" criticism, noted that this would make the strike “legitimate” from a military-legal perspective.
This speculation was quickly amplified across the community.
5. When images emerged showing it was a shopping centre, not a refinery, that had been hit, #Kremlin-aligned influencers adjusted their approach and went on the offensive.
This is when conspiracy theories began proliferating at scale.
6. Some immediately suggested that the whole thing was a staged psyop (like #Bucha purportedly was).
“First footage from the impact site in #Kremenchuk is published by #Zelensky an hour later,” one user wrote, “Should there be further explanation? #Bucha and #Kramatorsk 2.0.”
Within 90 minutes of the strike, the idea that it had been staged or somehow falsified was becoming conventional wisdom.
Like with #Bucha, these theories were pinned to just a handful of pieces of “evidence.”
8. Pro-#Kremlin feeds searched for possible “clues” to support their theories.
One of the main claims was that there were too many military-aged men at the site for it to be a real shopping mall.
Instead, they held, it had actually been a secret government facility all along.
9. These theories metastasised with time.
So, when #Russia, at the #UN later that evening, suggested that #Kremenchuk was “a new, #Bucha-style provocation,” it was merely lending official weight to a narrative that had already emerged, propagated, and matured informally online.
10. When denying what had happened, #Russia|n officials could point to the countless reports that had emerged on pro-#Kremlin social media, even though these were all weakly evidenced.
Here, it's quantity that matters most, not quality or reliability.
11. Thus, the #Kremlin can rely on strategically primed and ideologically aligned audiences to propagate defensive disinformation in its favour.
1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.