OK, so it seems @TimmermansEU could become the next Commission president. Here are a couple of thoughts if he indeed makes it (nothing certain yet, as #EUCO is 😴)
1/N
@TimmermansEU as president would be quite a coup. Despite opposition from the victorious EPP, the S&D would claim the top job.
Though he has strong S&D support, much of Timmermans' rise (and his broader appeal) is due to his nationality and his personality.
2/N
Why his nationality?
The Dutch version of social-democracy seems quite palatable to Europe’s mainstream centre and centre-right: Timmermans doesn’t scare off the Christian-democrats and liberals in ways other S&D politicians do.
3/N
Also, the Dutch are known for their “strict but fair” approach to democratic values & rule of law. Timmermans personifies this.
It enamored him in parts of Western-Europe…
4/N
..but made him deeply unpopular further east.
A key question he would face: can this antagonism be overcome? Will he be interested in building support among CEE governments + Italy, or will he steamroll CEE gov'ts by using QMV to the Commission’s advantage?
Cd be ugly.
5/N
Timmermans ran a strong, charismatic and unabashedly pro-European campaign.
He single-handedly delivered victory for the Dutch social-democrats (@PvdA) in the EP elex.
He is staunchly anti-Populist and a deeply committed European.
6/N
His response to euroscepticism is not to flirt with it, but to hit back hard.
This will, however, raise the question whether his Commission would simply ignore eurosceptic arguments, and whether he will make the Commission less or possibly more political than Juncker’s?
7/N
Timmermans became 1st VP through a set of policy ideas: e.g. EU should be big on big, small on small. (Though it’s an open question, whether he has delivered).
This helped curry favours with the North, and they will expect more in the future.
8/N
In short, he is a candidate of the North, with support among key Southern states (esp. ESP).
He is a mainstream social-democrat but from a liberal market economy.
He is a good communicator, multilingual and has the advantage of being acceptable enough in enough capitals.
9/N
And of course, his pick would show that the #EUCO “respects” the Spitzen process.
Many of his policies will depend on his team of commissioners, but Timmermans will also seek the limelight himself. So here are just a few questions he would face:...
10/N
Wd he adopt a softer line on Rule of Law? How will he put his mark on EU trade policy (he was tough on #TTIP/#CETA)? More than Juncker, he has ideas on foreign policy: What does that mean for relations with Trump & Putin? Would he argue for a #Brexit extension on 31/10?
11/n
On #Brexit, don’t expect Timmermans and Boris Johnson to develop a bromance.
Timmermans is principled about Britain’s departure, and is known to have limited patience with Brexiter antics.
12/N
Finally, some say his pick would be a win for Macron over Merkel.
I disagree. Both wd get something: Merkel keeps her coalition happy, Macron gets a centre-left pro-EU devotee.
If anything, it would be a win for the Netherlands and, of course, for Frans himself.
13/13
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We have a new Dutch 🇳🇱 coalition agreement!
Here are some highlights with an international/ EU dimension:
Defence
- Continued military, political & financial support for #Ukraine
- Legally enshrine 2% defence spending
- Support for NL & European defence industry
/1
Migration
- NL will seek opt-out for (parts of) European asylum/migration policy, and will discuss setting up mini-Schengen’s in times of crisis
- NL will work with EU members to externalise migration policy to 3rd countries
/2
Migration (cont'd)
- NL will seek limits to freedom of movement for new EU members (i.e. same thing that happened in 2004)
- Various measures to dissuade migration, including fewer international students in Bachelors programmes, except technical studies
/3
1) EU's timing was totally off, at least if it wanted a positive response frm London. Perhaps BXL's timing had more to do w VDL extending a hand to the UK at the end of her term. In any case it had little to do with political realities in London
/1
This suggests either VDL came up with the idea herself, or she was poorly advised by @PedroSerranoEU's team in London (which I don’t believe as they are highly competent)
Is there another option?
/2
@PedroSerranoEU .@anandMenon1 suggests here that the Commission wanted to pre-empt bilateral efforts by individual member-states
Plausible. Tho I haven’t heard many Europeans talk about bilateral deals with the UK on visas and youth mobility (aside from the French)
/3 theguardian.com/politics/2024/…
"As a result of the staggering implementation failures of the past six years, we have so far borne the costs of leaving the EU - the majority of which were the result of a choice by vindictive European protectionists...
/2
"...rather than the necessary outcome of leaving - while only enjoying a small fraction of the possible benefits."
Interesting perspective: trade barriers r blamed on 'European protectionists' instead of the logical outcome of leaving an internal market. But OK.
Or rather, I read @stephenfry’s highly enjoyable version “Troy”
Here are a couple of points with some relevance to today’s war in #Ukraine
A short 🧵(with some classical art)
/1
Who is to blame for the war, and at what point did it become inevitable?
Was it the Trojan abduction of Helen, the judgement of Paris, the lottery Odysseus organised, Paris’ and Antimachus' undermining of the Greek ultimatum?...
/2
Or was it the challenge Troy presented to Agamemnon’s hegemony as “king of men”....
... or the Greek pursuit of Troy’s spoils?
In the case of Russia vs Ukraine, we also see multiple reasons being debated, some more realistic than others.
If the West doesn’t want to get directly involved in Ukraine, it has two options:
-Arm Ukraine
-Use economic tools of coercion (sanctions)
We are doing the first. But the second remains tricky.
Some thoughts on economic sanctions.
A thread. 🧵
/1
If you are serious about using sanctions as a tool, you also accept harming your own economy.
Imposing sanctions ALWAYS means striking a balance between the amount of economic pain you are willing to absorb versus the amount of economic pain you can inflict on the other.
/2
Examples.
Personal sanctions are relatively painless; their impact is also limited.
Prohibiting sales of luxury goods is bad for oligarchs and bad for LVMH, but probably won’t lead to a change in behaviour either.