@eliotchen97 1/ By reconstructing the sequence of events that led to the outcome on both the US & China sides, this media analysis attempts to quantify and explore the correlation between American elite perceptions & whether they affected China’s responses to MIC2025. macropolo.org/analysis/made-…
@eliotchen97 2/ This visualization captures both the blow-by-blow and the scale of US & Chinese media coverage of MIC2025 from 2014 to 2019.
Hover over each dot to see the specific headline & click on the icon on the right to see political events happening at the time:macropolo.org/analysis/made-…
@eliotchen97 3/ The visualization is complemented by sentiment analysis to determine whether the extent of negative/positive US media coverage may have also factored into Beijing’s response.
@eliotchen97@merics_eu 5/ A turning point for the US media’s attention on MIC2025 came at 2Q2018, w/ the issuance of the Section 301 report that referenced the policy *116* times.
Notably, the sentiment of the US media’s coverage began to tilt negative at the same time. macropolo.org/analysis/made-…
@eliotchen97@merics_eu 6/ Then, starting on May 17, 2018, coverage of MIC2025 in Chinese mainstream media abruptly came to a halt.
Why?
The week that MIC2025 coverage ceased was also the week when Trump announced ZTE’s amnesty. Could these two events be related? macropolo.org/analysis/made-…
@eliotchen97@merics_eu 7/ With/without the official “MIC2025” designation, the industrial policies around it live on.
Mentions of “core technology” saw an uptick, while “indigenous innovation” remained steady after mid-2018. Even MIC2025 may see a mini revival since May 2019: macropolo.org/analysis/made-…
@eliotchen97@merics_eu 8/ The purging of MIC2025 coverage in Chinese official media was likely a direct response to the escalation of US-China trade tensions after March 2018, and the ebb and flow of coverage seems to be deliberate & calculated.
1/China has a new “trinity” of econ/finance committees under the Party’s aegis. Two are old and one is new, but they all have the word “central” in their titles and sound kinda the same. So what’s the difference and which one really matters? We unpack all this in this thread.
2/First, the CFEC. Helmed by General Secretary Xi, it’s the OG commission that’s been around since 1980s. When it convenes, it sets the big picture and ideological direction on the economy. What happens here gets enshrined in Party documents, like Xi’s 2015 supply-side reforms.
3/Second, the newly established CFC. Sitting just below the CFEC, the CFC ostensibly controls the banking regulators and makes decisions on capital allocation. While Premier Li Qiang leads the CFC, we’re agnostic on whether that actually means he’s more empowered.
1/With #Shanghai out of lockdown & COVID cases far lower than the April peak, is the Chinese #economy out of the woods? Not really. Any rebound in 3Q will be illusory as the underlying economy remains weak. @hzsong makes the case in his macro outlook: macropolo.org/analysis/3q202…
2/For one, consumption remains weak. It is sensitive to even modest lockdowns like those in #Beijing, and these smaller-scale lockdowns will likely be repeated across the country.
3/Second, Beijing continues to resist using the bazooka when it comes to stimulus. The recent news on #infrastructure spending won’t do much for growth. If anything, it will likely do the opposite and withdraw stimulus in 3Q: macropolo.org/chinese-econom…
1/If China had a Camp David, it’d probably be Beidaihe, a summer retreat 3 hours from Beijing where political wheeling and dealing happens. Now that we’re officially into summer, it’s time for a thread on Beidaihe’s historical import and whether it still matters today.
2/Tons of attention is focused on Beidaihe, as it marks the final sprint of China’s quinquennial “election” cycle. Key personnel decisions and the timing of the 20th Party Congress will likely be made in a year where roughly 60% turnover of the Central Committee is expected.
3/A cottage industry has sprung up to divine political signals coming out of Beidaihe. Some argue that the conference no longer happens, nor does it matter much in the political process. For instance, Hu Jintao banned top leaders from vacationing there as early as 2003.
1/ From the team that brought you the #BRITastingMenu in 2018 and #USChinaat40 in 2019, we’re recounting Deng Xiaoping’s historic Southern Tour from exactly 30 years ago. COVID has thrown a wrench in our food outing, but we’ve still got our annual #ChineseNewYear thread.
2/ A bit of background: Deng spent the 80s liberalizing China’s economy and stabilizing relations with the United States. Here he is visiting a Texas rodeo in 1979.
3/ His influence was felt around the world, so much so that TIME Magazine named him Person of the Year not once, but twice.
1/ You've probably heard of "dual circulation." It has been widely interpreted as an inward shift, but we argue it's mainly about repackaging existing reforms to achieve organic growth - which will naturally make China’s economy more attractive & open. macropolo.org/beijing-formal…
2. Dual circulation is also simply an acknowledgement of reality.
China's economic rebalancing has not been sustainable, and policy advisors like Liu He has long argued for a more sustainable rebalancing based on domestic consumption & income growth. macropolo.org/beijing-formal…