THREAD 1/8 #Macron’s warm welcome of #Putin in southern France this week may have looked surprising to those who have been protesting against the Kremlin in Moscow in recent weeks. But Macron has his own agenda, explains @baunov. carnegie.ru/commentary/797…
2/8 The West has got used to protests in Moscow fizzling out, and so far, the protests are at a regional level. In any case, after 20 years at the helm, Putin and his government are the only authorities the international arena knows.
3/8 What Europe definitely doesn’t want to see in its giant neighbor is a loss of control. So its approach is to remind #Russia of its obligation to uphold civil rights by reminding it of its European identity & mission, hence Macron’s comments that Russia is a European country.
4/8 From a strategic standpoint, European governments don’t want to fully lose Russia to Asia. They don’t want a Finnish-Chinese border — once the subject of a Soviet-era joke — to become a political and economic reality.
5/8 Trying to exclude Russia from the game altogether will make it start playing its own game, the rules of which will be unpredictable. So it’s better to include it in the game wherever possible, and this is what Europe is trying to do on Iran, climate change and other issues.
6/8 Sarkozy brokered an end to the Russia-Georgia war, Hollande was key to the Minsk agreements. Macron has every incentive to work toward a resolution to the Ukraine conflict, and the new Ukrainian government creates a favorable context for peace efforts.
7/8 As host of the upcoming G7 summit, Macron wants to bring some exclusive content to it, and his meeting with could provide just that. Russia’s return to the G7 is impossible, but it’s also impossible for the group to solve many problems important to it without Russia.
8/8 France’s relationship of trust with the Russian leadership, and the opportunity to represent Russia behind the scenes at the G7 gatherings, are an important diplomatic asset that France would hate to lose. carnegie.ru/commentary/797…
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"Lately, Putin has been described as unhinged and reckless... This article argues that his record suggests otherwise: he is calculating and deliberate, and he has pursued a long-term, consistent strategy at home and abroad."
2/10
(all photos from Kremlin site)
"He has pursued twin overarching goals: to secure the political regime he has built at home and to provide maximum security—as he understands it—for the Russian state by establishing a sphere of influence around it to shield it from external threats."
3/10
THREAD New piece by longtime Russian foreign policy practitioner/expert Vladimir Frolov (@vfroloff) abt why Putin is resorting to nuclear brinksmanship at the very moment he faces humiliating setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine. 1/7
“[…] massive bombardments of Ukrainian cities & the allusion to the use of nuclear weapons are intended to motivate Kyiv &, in Putin’s words, its ‘true masters in the West’ to [agree to a] ceasefire & resume negotiations on Russia’s terms.” 2/7
“The biggest challenge to resuming negotiations today is the territorial question, which could take decades to resolve. […] If Zelensky does not want to stop his counteroffensive & resume talks, then the Kremlin believes it must convince his Western partners to force him.” 3/7
THREAD 1/ Like Brezhnev’s aging Politburo’s decision to invade Afghanistan, the decision by Putin & his gerontocratic inner circle to launch a war in #Ukraine has become a disaster for Russia, writes Carnegie's @AndrKolesnikov in @ForeignAffairstinyurl.com/283hjn8z
2/ The Putin regime seems to regard the Russia people with nearly the same attitude that it does their Ukrainian counterparts, hence the closure of independent media outlets & research organizations, & the persecution of anyone who protests or even merely disagrees.
3/ Ukrainians are depicted as a faceless, homogenous mass that must be subjugated to the Kremlin by means of “denazification.” But Russians are also considered by their leaders as an unthinking mass that must blindly follow their leader or face charges & social ostracism.
2/ It’s the phenomenon of self-justification: that part of Russian society doesn’t want to see itself as being on the side of evil. It wants to be on the good side, and that’s the one that is "liberating Ukraine from Nazism."
3/ What does this self-justification look like? “We are the good guys, we’re doing the right thing, the West is attacking us, if we’d waited one more day, they’d have attacked us.” It has nothing in common with reality, but it still works.
🧵 Central Asia has been wary of endorsing Russia's war in #Ukraine, but geographic isolation and continued dependence on Russia for export routes, security assistance, and labor markets make leaders reluctant to condemn Putin’s actions, @pstronski writes. carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/30/com…
Fearful Moscow might turn on Central Asia next, the region’s leaders have tried to hedge in ways Moscow may find irritating. For example, no Central Asian country sided with Moscow on UNGA resolutions condemning the invasion, by either abstaining or simply not voting at all.
Many analysts believed the Kazakh President would be beholden to Russia after January's civil unrest resulted in a Russian-led CSTO deployment, but Tokayev has declared 🇰🇿 will not recognize the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Republics—much to Russia's chagrin.
Instead, Putin has learned from his previous foreign interventions—in Crimea and Syria—that boldness, surprise, and playing on his opponents' fears of wider conflict are key to achieving what he wants. It is dangerous to assume Putin's future actions will mirror his past ones.
Putin learned a similar lesson from Georgia in 2008, when NATO forces declined to confront Russian troops. Following Russia's victory, NATO sailed a flotilla of naval ships to Georgia's Black Sea coast in support...