Thread by @WaelAlzayat

A Recent, but Forgotten History: Syria

1. The Syrian crisis began in 2011 when a government decided that the only way to deal with peaceful protesters was to squash them militarily. It did not begin with the Turkish intervention.

2. The United States and plenty of other nations decided that it was too risky to fully support the protesters, and the political and armed opposition they morphed into because of the uncertainty regarding how they would govern after that government fell.

3. Reasonable people can disagree about that policy. I am one of those people who argued that it was better to bet on the unknown rather than put up with the known...

...500K killed, 12 million displaced, 100K disappeared, CW used, terrorists/IRGC/Russia empowered, NATO and EU weakened, Lebanon & Turkey destabilized, Sunnis and Shi'a fractured, Brexit approved, Trump elected. The list goes on.

4. The war was not started by the U.S., Israel, Saudi, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, or Russia. It was by people tired of living under dictatorship. The longer the war dragged on, those countries got involved to protect their interests, whether we agree with those interests or not.

5. A side effect of the war was the emergence of ISIS and other terrorist groups. They had operatives in Syria long before the war began whom the Syrian regime cynically released from jail in order to cast the revolution as a terrorist conspiracy.

6. I know because I used to track "Foreign Fighters" whom the Syrian regime would allow to enter Iraq to attack Shi'a pilgrims and U.S. soldiers post-Iraq invasion. The Bush Administration threatened to bomb Syria until Assad stopped the practice.

7. The Syrian opposition was fractured and desperate. Absent unified international support, it accepted assistance from whomever, including countries that had agendas that went beyond, and at times were at odds with, a truly democratic Syria.

8. Despite their issues, they were winning against Assad until Russia intervened. After that, they needed direct military intervention on their behalf. No other options would have helped them.

9. In their desperation facing a conventional Syrian Army and its allies, they went into battle against the regime with terrorist groups such as al-Nusra Front, which is al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate.

10. As the war dragged on, which saw the regime and Russia purposely targeting non-terrorist fighters and the towns they were defending (Aleppo, Homs, Rastan, Daraya, Mouadhamiya, etc), the moderate opposition (referred to as the Free Syria Army), weakened vis-a-vis terrorists.

11. Many moderate fighters were also killed by these groups. Some even joined them because they saw no other alternative to defeating Assad, receiving a salary, or both.

12. Long before the U.S. decided to partner with the YPG, the FSA (between 70,000-80,000 fighters at its height) was engaged against ISIS after it emerged. They alone expelled ISIS from Aleppo and other Syrian towns while they were fighting Assad and his allies.

13. The international community refused to provide them with the needed air support because it did not want to risk getting into conflict with the Syrian regime or its allies, mainly Russia. See preferring the known vs. unknown.

14.When U.S. policymakers finally awoke to the ISIS danger after Mosul fell, they did not want to commit ground troops in Syria or Iraq. They wanted local allies to fight on the ground while they fought from above. In Syria, there were only two options: Either the FSA or the YPG.

15. From the beginning, senior U.S. officials hesitated to fully support the FSA because of the reasons I outlined above. So they chose the YPG.

16. The YPG is a Marxist guerrilla group dedicated to the establishment of an independent Kurdish homeland. They do not consider themselves Muslim. This is perfectly fine, but important to note given some of the characterization that is happening.

17. Most Syrian Kurds do not belong to the YPG and anti-YPG Kurdish dissidents have been detained, killed, or exiled. Still, the YPG provided protection to many Kurdish, Arabs, and Syriac living under its control.

18. This was made possible mainly because the YPG, caring more about an independent Kurdistan, made the decision not to fight he Syrian regime. So the regime spared their cities the barrel bombs it reserved for those who opposed it.

19.The YPG and its political branch the PYD are affiliated with the PKK in Turkey, which is a designated terror group in Turkey and the United States. Yes, labels can be politicized sometimes and one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighters. See PLO, Hezbollah, etc.

20. Turkey is a NATO ally that was a cornerstone against Soviets expansion after WWII. It is also a democracy with a history of mil intervention in civilian affairs and attacks against civ society/journos& repression against Kurds seeking self-determination or cultural rights.

21. While Turkish society is deeply divided between secular-Kamalists and political Islamists, it is in agreement in its rejection of an independent Kurdish state that includes a piece of Turkish territory.

22. When the U.S. decided to support the YPG, some of us in gov't warned that it would anger Turkey (our actual ally) at a time when we needed allies to help us contain the Syrian crisis and prevent Russia (led by someone who wants to return to Soviet glory) from benefiting.

23. Fr officials who favored working with the YPG now say there were no viable alternatives. There were, but riskier in the near-term even if better in the long term. It would have entailed supporting the FSA to fight ISIS, but also defending it against the Sy regime.

24. We argued that it was worth it because the FSA was representative of the majority of Syrians (at least those who opposed Assad) rather than the YPG which was a minority within a minority, not to mention, an enemy of Turkey.

25. We were overruled and the U.S. promised TY that the support for the YPG would be "transactional and temporary." Senior WH and Pentagon officials also helped the YPG repackage as the @sdf and recruit non-YPG fighters to join them to make them appear less problematic.

26. We convinced ourselves, but never managed to convince the Turks.

27. The YPG fought valiantly and helped liberate large areas from ISIS. They empowered women and allowed non-YPG groups to join the local governance structures established in the areas. But they maintained ultimate decision-making in those areas.

28. They undoubtedly began to see the realization of their long-held dream of an independent or at least a semi-autonomous entity that protected them and their people. They thought the U.S. would be there for them. They thought wrong.

29. It was “transactional and temporary”. This was problematic from the beginning not only because it was destined to lead us to what we are seeing now, but also because it would inevitably make liars out of us.

30. To see the same policymakers who took us down this path now breathlessly denounce what is happening as a great betrayal is unfortunate, but expected. They are engaged in a re-write of a recent history that they themselves wrote only a few years ago.

31. They frame the crisis as another example of Trump’s erratic and callous nature. Trump is indeed both and one who will go down as the worst president in modern U.S. history. But he did not get us here.

32. Fr officials, pundits and politicians are now screaming that ISIS and Russia would benefit. They might, but ISIS and Russia would have never been in a position to benefit had we taken the difficult yet necessary step of ending Assad’s genocidal campaign against his people.

33. ISIS is the symptom; Assad is the disease. We chose a medicine (YPG) to hide the symptom (ISIS) knowing fully well that the patient (Syria) was still dying.

34. What’s needed? Honesty. Self-reflection. Decency.

35. Turkey is our ally. The YPG are our partners. ISIS is our enemy. The Russian mil/government (not the Russian people) and the IRGC (not the Iranian people) are regional and strategic challengers. Civilians in Syria (Kurdish and Arab) are victims.

36. We can deploy assistance to SDF-held areas south of the buffer zone Turkey is seeking to establish. We can send military, diplomatic, and assistance advisers there to credibly deter anyone from encroaching on those areas and to ensure that ISIS does not reemerge there.

37. We can augment SDF personnel watching over 70,000 ISIS prisoners and their families. We can repatriate foreigners among them to be prosecuted or released in their home countries.

38. Any U.S. official crying wolf now yet opposes the above is faking it. They have other motives.

39. We should spend less time bashing Turkey and more time stressing the importance of the Transatlantic Alliance of which Turkey is a crucial member irrespective of who rules it.

40. We should engage in quiet (not Twitter) diplomacy with Turkey to ensure that the buffer zone does not extend beyond the 30 km depth they seek to establish, and that no Syrian refugees are forcefully repatriated to that zone

41. We should even send personnel into the buffer zone (post operations) to keep an eye on any human rights violations or forced displacement of Kurds.

42. We should support efforts aimed at helping Turkey resolve its long-running war with the PKK. A peace agreement with the PKK means a peace agreement with the YPG. The alternative is before us. Fighting among allies & partners, civilians harmed, adversaries empowered.

43. Finally, deny #Assad outright victory in #Syria. Protect and invest in areas currently under #SDF, #Turkish and opposition control. Help them prevent ISIS from returning and kick terrorists out of #Idlib. But we cannot do that if Assad and Russia are allowed to bomb them.

In short, we have to be there to matter.