A few thoughts on Boris and Brexit, and where we might be heading in terms of the future relationship 1/n
On the one hand there are several factors that suggest a Harder or even a No Deal Brexit 2/n
He has promised to get a deal done by Dec 2020, which is almost impossible, and even if there is an extension until Dec 2022, that could be too tight, and there is no possible extension after that 3/n
The influence of Cummings and other hard Brexiteers will make it difficult for Boris to compromise 4/n
While, the EU will play hardball, eg. insisting on “dynamic realignment”, which will be very hard for Boris to accept 5/n
And, with a big majority in the Commons, he can take a hard/no deal Brexit now, knowing that he had 5 years to repair the damage 6/n
On the other hand, that big majority gives him some freedom to ignore the ERG and go for a “softer” Brexit if he wants 7/n
And if he is serious about delivering for those new Conservative constituencies in the Midlands and North, he needs to deliver a Brexit which minimises the damage on manufacturing, the agrofoods industry, and public services 8/n
And the only way to do that is to move quickly to a comprehensive FTA++, which the EU would only agree to if the UK accepts regulatory alignment 9/n
So, if he wants to “Get Brexit Done” by Dec 2020, he could just accept an EU FTA+alignment deal, as he had a large enough majority in the Commons to get it through 10/n
My worry, though, is that both sides will overplay their hands and we will end up with No Deal exit at the end of Dec 2022 11/n
In the meantime, I guess we all want to ask: “will the real Boris stand up please”, so we know where we are heading! 12/12
One final thought: the Conservative manifesto promises to maintain “high social and environment standards”; is that a route into regulatory alignment with the EU?
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Just reading through the chapter on "Europe and the World" in the new German government coalition agreement. Hugely ambitious and potentially transformative for Europe. Here are a few highlights 1/n
Emphasis throughout on a more democratic EU, with greater decision capacity, and more sovereignty in the world: "A democratically stronger, more capable and strategically sovereign EU is the basis for peace, prosperity and freedom". 2/n
Wants a "constitutional convention" to "the further development of a federal European state", with a stronger European Parliament (with a right of initiative), and a uniform EP election law, with transnational lists and "lead candidates". 3/n
On the debate about class in Red Wall seats, the BES data suggest that income was MORE steeply related to voting Con in 2019 in Red Wall seats than anywhere else (cf. @PME_Politics@chrishanretty@p_surridge@drjennings@hopkin) 1/3
This suggests that Labour mainly lost wealthier voters in these areas, who used to vote Lab and now vote Con (nb. researchers on US elections would not surprised by this) 2/3
Nb. Wasn't sure what to count as "Red Wall", so took the 41 seats listed in this blog: brightoncafe.com/2020/05/defini…. Happy to use a different list 3/3
A few thoughts about Ursula vdL, the crisis the EU Commission is facing, and the Spitzenkandidat process ... bear with me 1/n
When a chief executive messes up badly in a democratic system, there is usually a debate about whether/how to replace them (well, except in the UK these days!) 2/n
In a parliamentary system, either the party considers replacing them, or there is a push for a no-confidence vote in the parliament 3/n
Here are the peaks in size of the groups:
S&D 38.2% in May94
EPP 37.4% in May04
ALDE 14.8% in Jul19
EAPN 10.5% in Jul19 (but might go higher in next few weeks)
ECR 10.0% in Ma19 (but might go higher in next few weeks)
G/EFA 9.7% in Jul19
GUE 6.9% in Jul14
EFDD 5.5% in May19
And here's a figure showing the fragmentation of the party system in the EP. The numbers above the line are the "Effective Number of Parties" (ENP) at the start of an EP, and the numbers below are the ENP at the end of an EP.
After the rejection of the Cooper and Reeves amendments, and the acceptance of the Brady amendment, it looks like we're down to 2 options: May's Deal vs. No Deal, as delay of Brexit has been taken off the table.
1/
But, I think it is unlikely the EU27 will budge on the backstop, as Tusk and others have stated, which will mean the ERG and other Tory Brexiteers will prefer No Deal to May's Deal
2/
In which case, we will be heading for a No Deal Brexit unless Labour are willing to support May's Deal
3/