🚨The problems with democracy coding and bias 🚨 Political scientists among you will know about the Polity IV score. This has been until recently the preferred measure of democracy for many scholars. So why, you may ask, does it not like democracy in US or UK? 1/n
Until quite recently - I'll let you guess the year - Britain and the US were coded as +10 on the Polity score. That's the max in a -10 to +10 scale. Same as Sweden, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary... 2/n
Polity is made up of 3 components: constraints on the executive, recruitment of the executive, and political competition. The former is checks & balances, middle is how leaders are chosen, and latter is about elections and party competition. Final index comprised of all 3. 3/n
Now how they are combined is hilarious - all kinds of odd configurations that would give you serious pause about ever using Polity. But basically if you have +10 on the Polity index it means you are maxing out on the three components. So what's happened recently? 4/n
In the last couple of years the Polity peeps have recoded the US and UK as +8 on the Polity score. They have become LESS democratic according to one of our most-used measures. And what's the year of infamy? 2016. Gosh, what could have happened then? 5/n
For reasons best known to the coders, the temerity of the British electorate to vote to leave the EU has knocked the UK's political competitiveness score down from 10 to 7 because the UK has become 'factional'. Because the main index is weird that pushes it down from 10 to 8. 6/n
The US was similarly punished for electing Trump (by electoral college not by popular vote, though I don't think that's the reasoning). Exact same pattern of downgrading. Now this means the US IS LESS DEMOCRATIC THAN IN 1845!!!. 7/n
The US was similarly punished by Polity during the Nixon administration. But not during FDR and court-curbing or indeed any period between 1871 and 1968. The UK for its part has not been this low since 1922. 8/n
Call me crazy but the entire era of Jim Crow in the US doesn't seem to me to be more democratic than 2017-19. The era in which British business people and Oxford grads were given 2 votes (or in which women under 30 couldn't vote) doesn't seem more democratic than last week. 9/n
Well maybe this is just the Polity score coming to terms with populism. Maybe democracy has really got noticeably worse (than 1845/1922...). So why are Poland and Hungary still coded as +10 in the Polity index?!? And is Mexico really just as democratic today as UK and US? 10/n
This type of coding is just plain off. And ultimately has to reflect coders downgrading the US and the UK because people voted in a way they didn't like but not doing the same for Poland, Hungary, Italy, etc. And it undermines trust in these indices in the first place 11/n
I understand why some political scientists want to look at 'red lines' in the US and elsewhere. But these kinds of decisions undermine scholars of democracy when we want to talk about objective indicators and make us look politically biased. 12/n
I have used the Polity score many times in my work. On education policy (amazon.co.uk/Ballot-Blackbo…) and indeed on the (positive!) effects of inequality on democratization amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B00… . I feel much less confident in doing so if this is what I have to work with. 13/n
So fellow scholars of democracy, I suggest we take a deep breath about announcing 'threats to democracy' everywhere, particularly if elections we don't like happen. Losing elections and losing democracy are not the same thing. n/n
Postscript - at least Polity has open data and you can look at their coding and justification at systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. Britain downrated because referendum "served to polarize politics in the UK (change POLCOMP to 7 "factional"). Uh huh...

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More from @benwansell

Feb 16
Quick thread response to this note by Matt. He's right that age divide is very large currently. And 2017 and 2019 had largest age gradient since 1960s. But... these elections don't look so different, when you adjust for income, home ownership and education 1/n
@jrgingrich and I have a chapter in the forthcoming IFS Deaton Review where we look at this. Here we show the relationship between age and voting Conservative between 1964 & 2019. Left is bivariate (just age), right is adjusting for income, education, homeownership and gender 2/n
The likely culprit is, you guessed it, education, which once drove people to the right but in the last couple of elections in particular has pushed people to the left. note though, this is a long run story. 3/n
Read 6 tweets
May 17, 2021
🚨💉🏡 NEW ARTICLE 🏡💉🚨
"Social Distancing, Politics and Wealth" out in Open Access in West European Politics, joint with @aslicansunar and @madselk through our @ERC_Research grant WEALTHPOL. Yes, we wrote a COVID article ;) What do we find? 1/n
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
The paper uses Google Community Mobility data at the local level in the 1st wave of COVID19 and looks at the correlates of workplace and residential activity. Who went to work more? Who stayed at home? We focus on the UK, Sweden and Denmark and then expand to European regions 2/n
Let's begin with a dragon. Our dragon here is workplace activity relative to the baseline of Jan3-Feb6 2020 in the UK. Each dot is 1 of 366 local authorities. We see the head in Feb/Mar, the neck as lockdown hits and the body low though rising in summer with weekend spikes! 3/n
Read 24 tweets
Feb 24, 2021
💉Who wants to take the vaccine? Together with @jrgingrich, @Jackstilgoe and Martin W Bauer, I've conducted a 2 wave panel study of how people in the UK feel about taking the vaccine. And it's pretty good news, though with some challenges left. 🧵1/n
ox.ac.uk/news/2021-02-2…
Here's the good news. Whereas only 50% of people were "very likely" to take the vaccine in early October, over 3/4 are now. Adding people who are "likely" that's moved to almost 90%. And many demographic gaps (gender, ethnicity) have closed. See rpubs.com/benwansell/729… 🎺🎉. 2/n
What are the challenges? There are still a group of people who are cautious. About 7% of our sample are "very unlikely" in both waves - that's the core anti-vac group. But we also find that young people, non-voters, poorer households, and Reform UK supporters (!) are unlikely 3/n
Read 29 tweets
Feb 4, 2021
I had a statistical conniption about the Aberdeen study published in BMJOpen earlier today. Let's see if I can explain my concerns in a less techie fashion. The gist of the article is that countries with more flights arriving had more deaths. That so? 1/n

bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotla…
The article, which you can read at bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjope… relies on the following scatterplot to make its point. Indeed, there does appear to be a relationship between arrivals and (logged) daily death rates. 2/n
That graphical presentation is supported by a multivariate statistical model, which shows that the result is robust to including lots of other confounds - (log) population, income, age profile, health status, density, etc. So far so good. 3/n
Read 15 tweets
Feb 4, 2021
Since the authors of this study kindly make their data available, we can see that their multivariate finding largely depends on using absolute deaths and flights not per capita. To wit, on the left their results replicated, on the right the per capita version 1/n
Now if we then log flights per capita we can recreate their 'finding' - see below. But I'm somewhat nervous about what that means about the role of outliers. Basically we have too few observations and too much instability of results for me to be comfortable with this. 2/n
The moral of this tale is single-shot cross-country regressions as policy guidance ain't the way to go. This is where we really need something with a stronger claim to causality. You can play with data yourself and see how I created these at github.com/benwansell/COV… 3/n
Read 5 tweets
Dec 9, 2020
🇬🇧🇪🇺 Who caused Hard Brexit? Some thoughts from the perspective of a social scientist. In the last few days we have seen an interminable debate on whether Remainers, Soft Brexiters, or Hard Brexiters are responsible for Hard Brexit. And it’s a false debate. Why? 1/n
People are confusing 'causes of effects' with 'effects of causes'. What this means is that we are all interested in - the former - why Hard Brexit happened - but using arguments about how one actor did something - the latter - as our explanation. These are different! 2/n
It is completely possible that Remainers not accepting a customs union increased the probability of Hard Brexit - that's an effect of a cause. But that does not imply responsibility. Because there are lots of other causes producing the same effect. 3/n
Read 13 tweets

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