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IMPLEMENTATION THUS FAR OF THE US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT AS PER @DoD_IG'S NEW QUATERLY REPORT

The quarterly report covers many issues. Here is a general overview of the topics covered in the report.

media.defense.gov/2020/May/19/20…
2/n: Thread only looks at it's findings in terms of compliance with the various commitments undertaken by US & #Taliban per their agreement.

Report covers all 4 components of Agreement: 1) Withdrawal 2) Prevention of terrorist sanctuaries 3) Intra-Afghan talks & 4) Ceasefire.
3/n: WITHDRAWAL

The report covers the withdrawal component very briefly simply restating US commitments under Part One of Agreement. Such facile treatment is understandable given that US is ahead of its withdrawal schedule.
4/n: Yet the report, in my opinion misrepresents the undertaking to remove sanctions. According to its understanding, agreement requires US to 'review sanctions… at the start of intra-AFG negotiations'.
5/n: That is not the wording of agreement. While agreement states that process will begin with start of talks, it also sets specific deadlines for removing UN sanctions by 29 May and removing US sanctions & rewards by 27 August.
6/n: What happens when UN sanctions are not removed by 29 May?

Will US rely on first leg (start of talks) and Taliban rely on second leg (deadline dates) when meeting removal commitments? Interpretation issues? Mechanisms to resolve?

Will this derail the process?
7/n: CEASEFIRE & RiV

This section is barely mentioned & no detailed treatment is offered. Report does mention RiV stating that despite 'significantly' decreasing its attacks, TB continued attacks against ANDSF.

Also hints at the increasing violence in the last few weeks.
8/n: Why did RiV not hold?

Report offers two main reasons: One was that Taliban is actively pursuing a 'Talk & Fight' Strategy. Apparently TB are utilize this strategy to gain leverage in talks and to maintain a viable (military) alternative should talks fail.
9/n: The other main reason was Taliban 'frustration' accusing US of 'violating' agreement & AFG govt of delaying prisoner releases. TB has in response 'threatened an increase in violence' if it was not satisfied with US and AFG govt compliance.
10/n: An obvious Q to ask is: how much military tension will the US tolerate before they respond?

Report quotes DoS in simply saying US 'has will and capacity' to respond to violations of Agreement. This 'will & capacity' will be severely tested as violence has started surging.
11/n: INTRA-AFGHAN TALKS

Report highlights three reasons for delay in talks: a) delay in prisoner release process; b) slow development of govt negotiation team; & c) ongoing violence in country.
12/n: Report does not allocate blame for three components. But I suppose we can argue that c) can be attributed to TB; b) to AFG govt & a) can be shared between both parties.
13/n: Elsewhere reports also mentions the impact of post-election political impasse in Kabul as another major contribution. This is mentioned in executive summary & a dedicated overview at p 38. I will not offer more on this as thread already too long.
14/n: In the process of explaining the delay leading up to formation of govt negotiation team, report offers insights into TB's reaction to that team.
15/n: It states that although TB protested against the composition of govt team, it did not 'categorically' reject the team or make the 'changing of team a condition for starting' talks.
16/n: In another place, report subtly reminds the Taliban that nothing in agreement gives Taliban a say in terms of who represents the other side. Whereas, in the corresponding US-AFG govt agreement, the AFG govt is defined to be in charge of composition of their team.
17/n: This notion is supported by Para 3 of US-Taliban agreement that simply refers to 'Afghan sides'. Hence TB cannot rely on that agreement to dictate composition of opposite team.
18/n: Before moving to next segment, I wanted to share this one paragraph. It is surprising in that it reveals how much US has become content with the idea that a post-negotiations AFG govt will look nothing like current structure and most likely will not even be 'Republic'.
19/n: US indifference to makeup of future Afghan govt is even more startling when we recall the insistence of then SoS Hillary on maintaining integrity of AFG constitution. This new indifference is a startling reminder of how fickle & unpredictable US foreign policy can be.
20/n: TERRORIST SANCTUARIES

The report pays considerable attention to this section of the Agreement.
21/n: Report expresses frustration with TB's 'reluctance to publicly break with AQ'. It cites UN report stating that TB & AQ continue to enjoy beneficial relations, but this can be misleading as the report was published a month BEFORE the agreement was signed.
22/n: However, immediately after above statements, report mentions Haqqani's @nytimes opinion piece where he cautions US against 'warmongers' who might exaggerate such ties. I am not sure why report immediately mentions this after expressing above frustrations with TB inaction.
23/n: As if to further undermine its initial statement, elsewhere in the report, it notes that agreement does not 'explicitly require Taliban to renounce or sever ties' with AQ.

Instead requirement is to stop hosting such groups & prevent them from threatening US & allies.
24/n: The report cites below article stating that although AQ has stated it will honor the agreement, it has encouraged 'Muslims to join the training camps under the leadership of the Islamic Emirate'.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/…
25/n: I have since reviewed the original AQ statement and found it quite fascinating. Before exploring that, it is worthwhile that AQ was in a very difficult situation with the US-TB agreement.
26/n: One the one hand they could utilise the agreement as a key achievement in its quest to regain leadership of the 'global jihad'. On the other hand, they could not afford to be in an open conflict with the TB.
27/n: To overcome this, they have adopted a number of tactics. Firstly, they have lauded the agreement as a great victory for the 'global jihad' against the 'Crusading armies'.
28/n: Above AQ calls on 'scholars, philanthropists & thinkers' to support the IEA in order to 'ensure the embroyic Islamic state project' survives.

Also calls on 'all our Muslims brothers to follow the Mujahideen of IEA'.
29/n: At another place, in the context of advising their own fighters, AQ warns its fighters 'not to let their guard down' as the 'enemy will surprise you in your hour of neglect'.

After this warning, AQ asks its fighters to 'hasten to the military camps of the IEA'.
30/n: Taken in this context, I would argue that AQ has come up with quick a clever ruse to avoid direct confrontation with the Taliban. Essentially, I am reading as an allusion to its fighters that in order to secure their long-term survival...
31/n: AQ is asking its fighters to disown the organization and join the ranks of the TB. This way TB leadership would not be able to take any action against them as it could be seen as a 'war on itself' and would risk triggering mass desertion from its ranks.
32/n: As its fighters are mostly ideologues, should AQ find a future opportunity, it could always ask those same fighters to leave TB and return to their fold.
33/n: In the AQ context, the report claims that AQ in Indian Subcontinent was 'concerned about the peace talks'.

The source cited for this claim is the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team's twenty fifth report published in January: undocs.org/S/2020/53
34/n: Yet, interestingly, this report makes no such claim. Not sure if I missed this bit but I could not find this claim anywhere in the UN report.
35/n: I will finished off on a less somber note, the report seems to have come up with a creative new first name for Mullah Berader 😊.
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