Chinese customs statistics for May is out. Trade with Russia has finally taken a blow by COVID-19, and dropped by 19.5% last month. Key factor here is collapse of Russian exports by whopping 33.5%. Of course, drop in global oil was the major driver. Some key figures 👇 1/
2/ Data released by General Administration of Customs shows that 🇨🇳 exports decreased 3.3%, while imports plunged 16.7% in May. The resulting trade surplus amounted to $62.93 billion customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ As @sharonchenhm, @byzhulin & Zhao Yinan point out in this @business piece, the record surplus comes as the price of commodities China buys such as crude oil, natural gas and soy beans declined. Exports were helped by sale of masks & other med supplies bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
4/ Trade with Russia is reflective of this trend. While in the first four months of 2020 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade was doing comparatively better, in May it has finally taken a big blow by COVID-19 and slump in oil prices, @kommersant explains kommersant.ru/doc/4372698?fr…
5/ May-20 🇷🇺exports to 🇨🇳 is down 33.5% to May-19 (to $3.57 billion), 🇷🇺 imports from 🇨🇳 is slightly up by 0.3% (to $3.8 billion).
6/ Silver lining for Russia is continuous growth of crude exports to China in physical volumes. As @Florence_Tan notes in @Reuters, in May China's oil imports hit all time high. 🇷🇺 oil exports to 🇨🇳 grew 19.2% to May-19 reuters.com/article/us-glo…
7/ We shall watch whether Russian oil producers will be able to maintain these record volumes, as China stops buying oil into reserves. Much will depend on pace of econ recovery. Good news for 🇷🇺 - reopening of PetroChina Dalian refinery later this month reuters.com/article/petroc…
8/ Also, it remains to be seen whether China will continue to grow it's share in Russia's trade (we'll know only after 🇷🇺 posts its figures), a trend at display throughout previous decade and January-April of 2020 so far. END
THREAD @CIA director Bill Burns' visit to Moscow provides a glimpse into how Team Biden tries to stabilize relations with Russia. Bottomline: let's talk to hard men in the Kremlin who are the real players in 🇷🇺 foreign policy. Ambassador Burns is a perfect man for that mission.
2/ With an overall goal to stabilize the current confrontation with 🇷🇺 so that "Russia problem" wouldn't absorb too much time of @POTUS and his senior officials, Team U.S., among other things, seeks to establish multiple channels of communication to the Russian leadership.
3/ During Trump presidency, the only functional 🇺🇸🇷🇺 channel was mil-to-mil, with chief of @thejointstaff & General Valery Gerasimov playing a leading role. Thanks to their professionalism, we are still in a relatively safe place - given the bitterness of confrontation.
3/ Analysts have long predicted that Russia cannot single-handedly balance sudden spikes in European gas demand. Read this September piece by Vitaly Ermakov for @OxfordEnergy: oxfordenergy.org/publications/b…
🧵 THREAD 🧵 @jensstoltenberg interview in @FT marks a shift in @NATO's approach to China-Russia axis. Waking up to the issue is welcome compared to years of ignorance. Yet conclusions based on flawed analysis that overstates 🇨🇳🇷🇺 rapport may lead to some grave mistakes 1/
3/ @jensstoltenberg to @FT exhibit 1: "This whole idea of in a way distinguishing so much between China, Russia, either Asia-Pacific or Europe, it’s one big security environment and we have to address it all together" ft.com/content/cf8c6d…
THREAD
Joint exercise is a milestone in deepening 🇨🇳🇷🇺 military cooperation. But is it a step towards a Sino-Russian alliance? Hardly. Is it a sign of deepening across-the-board security partnership aimed at the U.S.? Well, it’s complicated. Let me add some nuance below 👇
2/ “Xibu/Interaction-2021” (西部|联合) is the latest in a string of joint military exercises that are growing in size and complexity since 2005 – the year when full delimitation of 🇷🇺🇨🇳 border was finally in sight. mod.gov.cn/action/2021-08…
3/ 🇷🇺🇨🇳 military activity now includes annual ground forces drills (frequently with SCO ☔️), annual naval drills (since 2015), table-top missile defense exercise, annual air patrols by strategic bombers. A good summary in @FT by @HenryJFoy & @KathrinHille: ft.com/content/8ba51d…
THREAD
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
2/ For this paper @LeonidKovachich and I have interviewed officials, journalists, editors and experts in both Russia and China. Here is what we've found. carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…
3/ Chinese online behavior is increasingly marked by tactics that were first utilized by Russian actors, as smart colleagues @niubi, @MariaRepnikova and many others have noticed before. Yet this is not the product of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 cooperation in the global information space.
THREAD
As @Huawei releases Harmony OS today, this @washingtonpost story provides important insights on how embattled 🇨🇳 tech giant uses 🇷🇺 talent to diminish impact of 🇺🇸 sanctions. It also highlights some overlooked aspects of Beijing-Moscow ties. 1/ washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
2/ In this well-researched piece, @evadou, @ikhurshudyan & Pei Lin Wu describe how after 🇺🇸 sanctions @Huawei has beefed up its partnership with 🇷🇺 research institution and went on hiring spree for Russian IT talents, mostly mathematicians and specialists in algorithms.
3/ Huawei has a history of significant reliance on 🇷🇺 IT talents going back many years, as company's founder Ren Zhengfei confessed back in 2019: guancha.cn/politics/2019_…