THREAD
As @Huawei releases Harmony OS today, this @washingtonpost story provides important insights on how embattled 🇨🇳 tech giant uses 🇷🇺 talent to diminish impact of 🇺🇸 sanctions. It also highlights some overlooked aspects of Beijing-Moscow ties. 1/ washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
2/ In this well-researched piece, @evadou, @ikhurshudyan & Pei Lin Wu describe how after 🇺🇸 sanctions @Huawei has beefed up its partnership with 🇷🇺 research institution and went on hiring spree for Russian IT talents, mostly mathematicians and specialists in algorithms.
3/ Huawei has a history of significant reliance on 🇷🇺 IT talents going back many years, as company's founder Ren Zhengfei confessed back in 2019: guancha.cn/politics/2019_…
4/ With breakdown of partnership with research institutions in the U.S. and 🇺🇸 allies, @Huawei had to double down on this link with 🇷🇺. The company has tripled its research staff in the country and raised the salaries in order to attract best talent (annoying local players too).
5/ Russia can't help Huawei on hardware, chips, semiconductors etc., but can offset some losses on software development front. A significant contribution of 🇷🇺 IT specialists to development of Harmony OS is the most recent example to date.
6/ Expanded partnership with 🇷🇺 research institutions and hiring of local talent is only a fraction of @Huawei's sophisticated and multifaceted Russia strategy. I've described some other crucial elements in this @FT piece: ft.com/content/f36a55…
7/ They include cultivation of powerful local players like @sberbank (@Huawei became backbone of SberCloud and for that has dropped HuaweiCloud brand in 🇷🇺); help with buildup of SafeCity surveillance programs; and efforts to become the main foreign vendor for 5G technology.
9/ I agree with my colleagues' conclusion that for 5G and other critical infrastructure the Kremlin will fully trust only homemade hardware, so @Huawei will not dominate 🇷🇺 market by default. But since we know that @RostecRussia is unable to produce 5G equipment on its own...
10/... the game will be about localization of 5G technology in partnership with Rostec. I wouldn't bet my money on @nokia or @ericsson being ready to go as deep on localization as @Huawei. SberCloud is just one example, here is the most recent one: kommersant.ru/doc/4783658
11/ Bottom line is that @Huawei is becoming an important and a very representative player in relationship between Moscow&Beijing, and is emblematic in 🇨🇳🇷🇺 joint pushback against 🇺🇸. In Russia Huawei provides hardware that Moscow is unable to build on its own...
12/ ... and gets not only $$$ and a compelling story to tell other clients in developing countries, but also access to 🇷🇺 brainpower in return - brainpower it needs to withstand U.S. pressure.
13/ This symbiotical relationship also debunks the myth of Russia being a mere raw material colony to China. Indeed, bulk of 🇷🇺 exports to 🇨🇳 are commodities (and bulk of imports are tech products), but the economic relationship is more complex and multifaceted than that.
14/ @Huawei is one of the major topics of @CarnegieEndow's #PaxSinica project that documents 🇨🇳 attempts to establish Beijing-centered geoeconomic and tech order in Eurasia. More research on this coming out soon. Follow our works on PaxSinica here 👇 carnegie.ru/specialproject…
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THREAD
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
2/ For this paper @LeonidKovachich and I have interviewed officials, journalists, editors and experts in both Russia and China. Here is what we've found. carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…
3/ Chinese online behavior is increasingly marked by tactics that were first utilized by Russian actors, as smart colleagues @niubi, @MariaRepnikova and many others have noticed before. Yet this is not the product of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 cooperation in the global information space.
THREAD
Thanks to @ischinger and MSC team's efforts, the @MunSecConf discussion on Russia-West relations last week was clear-eyed and sobering. Couple of quick observations and thoughts. 1/
2/ By now Western diplomats & experts know 🇷🇺 official talking points so well that they are able to draft perfect statements for @mfa_russia or the Kremlin. Of course, the opposite is true as well: people in Moscow are sick and tired of predictable Western arguments too.
3/ The root of🇷🇺 desire to use conversations for lecturing Western counterparts is clear: it's a deplorable state of foreign policy debate, and the goal is to please the listener in the Kremlin. Unfortunately, this desire is most of the times reciprocated. carnegie.ru/commentary/590…
Putin and Xi have launched construction of 4 new blocs on 2 Chinese nuclear power plants built by @rosatom. A reminder that 🇨🇳🇷🇺 energy cooperation is not just about hydrocarbons, and that there are areas beyond arms where Russia still is a source of high-tech for China. 1/
2/ This @business piece provides a good background of the $3.1b deal (signed during Putin's 2018 state visit to 🇨🇳) that involves construction of 2 blocks of Tianwan (田湾) in Jiangsu & 2 blocs of Xudapu (徐大堡) in Liaoning bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ For @rosatom, the 2018 deal was important in competition against @EDFofficiel & @WECNuclear in 🇨🇳 market. No less important was the 2019 contract to supply nuclear fuel (took a painful year to negotiate it after the main contract was signed) rosatom.ru/en/press-centr…
THREAD 🧵
Tectonic shifts in Russia's trade and exposure to global centers of economic gravity are happening quietly, but surely. In 2013, before Crimea and Western sanctions, 🇷🇺🇪🇺trade volume was 5x of 🇷🇺🇨🇳. Just 7 years after, trade with EU is only 2x bigger than with China. 1/
THREAD
It's hard to predict how many people will show up to January 31 rallies in Russia to support @navalny. But the risk of violent incidents has gone up significantly, and one of the key factors here is choice of location for Moscow protest. Let me explain it quickly 👇
2/ Team Navalny has chosen Lubyanskaya and Old Squares in Moscow. That's where HQ of FSB and the Presidential Administration (PA) are located. According to organizers, the logic is that @navalny was poisoned by FSB squad, and the decision was likely taken by the Kremlin.
3/ Why does this choice of location create additional risk of violence and incidents compared to Pushkinskaya Square a week ago? There are three main reasons.