Q: Why is rent so high? (median US renter paid 14% of income for rent in 1960, 24% by 2017.)
That’s the topic of my new paper with @evansuw alum Alanna Williams, presented this morning @nberpubs#NBERSI2020.
Want the answer (or at least a partial one)? Follow along! (1/11)
First some clues to the mystery: this is more a story of rents rising fast, rather than incomes falling. Renter incomes track inflation well, but sometime around 1970 rents started accelerating ahead of inflation. Had rents just tracked inflation they’d be about 50% lower today.
It’s a story of rents for older apartments rising, in particular. Long ago, affordable housing was created through depreciation, not construction. Older units rented at a significant discount – 25% off for a 10-20 year old unit. There’s still a discount, but it is smaller.
Think this is a story of coastal cities failing to build fast enough to meet demand? To some extent, but there’s actually surprisingly little difference in affordability between successful coastal Boston and rust-beltier B cities like Buffalo or Bridgeport.
So what’s going on? In the mid-1970s, most states passed reforms to landlord-tenant law.
Before these reforms, apartments were rented “as-is.”
After, landlords had to guarantee "habitability." Tenants had the legal right to withhold rent if units were not kept up to code.
These reforms coincided with a period where substandard housing units were removed from the housing stock.
In the 1960 census, 21% of rental housing units didn’t have complete indoor plumbing.
By 1990, that was down to 1%.
Up until the 1970s, the stock of rental units built in a given decade tended to increase over time. Owners leaving their homes would often rent them out rather than sell them.
This graph shows that pattern stopped after 1980. Fewer people are deciding to become landlords.
Here’s the main result. States reformed tenant law at varying points in time, and some still haven’t. So you do the classic diff-in-diff regression and discover that “warranty of habitability” laws lowered rents on brand new units but raised them on older ones.
The effect is pretty big: A 1950-built unit, according to the preferred specification (3rd one in above table), rents for about *53% more* in 2020 as a consequence of the reform.
(It’s also likely to be of higher quality, and comes with an implied warranty.)
In the end, it’s a good news/bad news story.
Landlord-tenant law reforms appear to have been successful in making housing safe and decent, but they’ve also made housing less affordable.
If you want safe, decent, AND affordable, the solution appears to be public subsidy.
Bonus tweet: What’s behind the more recent decline in affordability? Regression evidence shows it’s concentrated among larger, older apartments where lead paint is a risk factor for children.
Landlord liability for lead paint emerges after final EPA regulations in 2001. (11/11)
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Here, #econtwitter, is a photo (replete with San Diego Marriott poolside lounge chair backdrop) of the AEA budget for FY 2020. I picked it up at the sparsely attended business meeting at #ASSA2020.
Although printed in black, there's some serious red ink. Let's explore.
The AEA operating budget was in the black five years ago. This year, they expect to spend $1.23 for every $1 in operating revenue. What gives?
Revenues (+7% in nominal terms 2015-2020) are not keeping up with expenses (+35.5%).
You know how the AEA is actually doing important stuff, like the RCT registry, @LetoC's ombuds office, workshops, and so forth?
"Program and activity" expenses are up 85% over five years. The association is dipping into its bank account to pay for them.
In light of the recent suicides of Alan Krueger and Martin Weitzman, economists & other professionals at risk of aging might find insight in this recent letter penned by Princeton professor emeritus Avinash Dixit.
@arthurbrooks@TheAtlantic There's a mental trap to be wary of. We might call it the life=work trap. Not exclusively a risk for economists or academics more broadly, but a significant one.
There's the old joke: "academics are the only people who retire so they can get some work done."
ICYMI @NickKristof found "reason for hope" in a groundbreaking experimental study by @OppInsights. Go read if you haven't, then come back here for a contrarian thread: in broader context, this is a desert island of hope in a rising sea of despair. nytimes.com/2019/08/03/opi…
@NickKristof@OppInsights The @OppInsights study showed that offering assistance to Seattle-area housing voucher recipients made them about 40 percentage points more likely to use their vouchers to rent an apartment in "high opportunity" neighborhoods.
@NickKristof@OppInsights "High opportunity" in this case is defined as neighborhoods where low-income kids born 36-41 years ago wound up earning more money as adults. This matters critically. I'm going to refer to these as "neighborhoods historically associated with upward mobility" (NHAWUMs).
Six weeks ago, I invited the 9 candidates for AEA leadership positions to offer statements on pressing issues in the economics profession, including diversity/inclusion & the publication process.
Response rate, as of today: zero.
There is, of course, an economic explanation...
Economics teaches us that producers profit from imposing scarcity of their product, restricting output and imposing barriers to entry. They gain, would-be competitors and consumers lose.
This is what economists preach. It is also what they practice.
Fourcade, Ollion and Algan (2015) document the peculiar economic practice of restricting professional leadership to the top departments. Our leaders are nominated by a committee, themselves drawn predominantly from top departments. Our peer institutions behave very differently.
My thoughts on academic publishing are heavily influenced by the four years I spent co-editing the Berkeley Electronic Journal in Economic Analysis & Policy (BEJEAP).
Theoretically it still exists today, but it bears little resemblance to what it once was. A brief tale.
One of several journals established as a brainchild of @ProfAaronEdlin about 20 years ago, I signed on in 2008 to work alongside some great colleagues including @orianabandiera, @deanyang, @ProfFionasm, @stevepuller, Gary Solon, Don Fullerton, Eric Zitzewitz, Nolan Miller...
Helmut Cremer, Michael Baker, Nuno Limao, Tom Buchmueller, Albert Ma, John Morgan, and Thierry Verdier.
I learned a great deal by reading their thoughtful decision letters to authors.
Here's what BEJEAP and its sibling journals did that was innovative for the time.
A few (more) thoughts on the evolution of scholarly publishing, abetted by the metrics computed by the @eigenfactor project.
Authors supply content, journals demand it. Journals publish when quality exceeds a certain threshold.
What happens when supply increases?
Journals can respond by holding the threshold constant and publishing more, or raising the bar for publication. Or somewhere on the continuum between the two.
In economics over the past half-century, the dominant choice has been to raise the bar. Why?
Two words: impact factor.
Impact factor is a measure of average article quality. In a world where there is competition among journals, and the "winner" is the one with highest impact factor, expanding capacity when supply increases is a losing strategy.