Mosaddeq was an ardent nationalist determined to free Iran from foreign control. Yet he was also a secular constitutionalist who believed in the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, and reducing Iran’s monarch, the shah, to a strictly limited constitutional role. 2/ 
Mosaddeq became prime minister on April 29, 1951. He assumed power on the condition that Iran’s parliament vote on his bill to nationalize the country’s British-owned oil industry. This bill passed the house and was signed by the shah on May 1. 3/
The nationalization infuriated the UK govt. Britain’s precarious postwar finances were based on maintaining a strong currency, and the earnings of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later renamed BP) were crucial in supporting sterling. 4/
Moreover, the British viewed Mosaddeq as an unpredictable radical. They distrusted him and worried that his nationalization would trigger similar nationalist movements against other British assets, such as the Suez Canal. They worked to have him removed from power. 5/
But the US govt was more wary. While US officials viewed him as a “dramatic demagogue” and an “impractical visionary and poor administrator,” the US was conscious of his political appeal inside Iran. They also worried the British were taking risks in trying to unseat him. 6/
The US concern was preventing Iran’s “fall to communism,” imagined in terms of a USSR invasion or (more likely) a take-over from within by Iran’s well-organized communist Tudeh Party, a la Czechoslovakia in 1948. Mosaddeq was a nationalist, but he was also anti-communist. 7/
The US did not support Mosaddeq. But they did not believe there were any viable alternatives. In July 1952, following a political crisis where Mosaddeq resigned from office only to return to power, the US and UK examined the possibility of removing him via military coup. 8/
FYI these discussions (as well as other elements referenced in this thread) can be read in the FRUS volume released in 2017 (a second edition was released with a few additional docs) 9/ history.state.gov/historicaldocu…
While the US Ambassador concluded Mosaddeq’s “disturbed mental condition” had “greatly enhanced” the threat of a communist takeover, the CIA concluded that there were no suitable figures “around whom a coup could be engineered.” 10/
The US felt the shah possessed “weak character,” and believed him indecisive. Other elements, like the aristocracy and military, were viewed as disorganized and unreliable. “The army’s capabilities for taking positive action,” wrote one CIA official, “are wholly unclear.” 11/
While there were those in the CIA, including Allen Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt, who seemed keen on taking covert action against Mosaddeq, the Agency did not possess the means to take such action in 1952. 12/
A CIA assessment concluded the agency “is not in a position to influence the Iranian govt” and could do little inside Iran “until the emergency actually arises.” The Agency planned "stay behind" ops in case Iran fell to communism, but could not move against Mosaddeq directly. 13/
Despite British pressure in late 1952, the US concluded that Mosaddeq was the only leader who could preserve Iran from communism. The US continued to negotiate with Mosaddeq’s government until February 1953. 14/
Yet this was chiefly due to a lack of alternatives and an unwillingness to take action which could prove too risky. “You may be able to throw out Moṣaddeq,” he told the British, “but you will never get your own man to stick in his place.” 15/
This all changes in early 1953. The Eisenhower Admin initially opts to continue negots to resolve Iran’s dispute with the British. But a political crisis in late February reveals a major break between Mosaddeq, the shah, and a number of Mosaddeq’s former supporters. 16/
It is clear to them that the situation in Iran has become more unstable. CIA director Allen Dulles suggests the shah “might have more popular backing” than was believed. He also notes that the CIA had built up “a considerable amount of cash” and weapons to use within Iran. 17/
It was not until March 11, at a second meeting of the NSC, that the President appears to abandon the idea of talking to Mosaddeq. Policy thereafter focused on cultivating “assets which could be rallied to support a replacement.” The coup plan receives funding in April. 18/
The CIA and UK designed a plan that would have Mosaddeq’s opponents rally around the shah, who would then use his constitutional powers to remove Mosaddeq as prime minister; military forces would be used as a backup. 19/
Yet the chance of success seemed slim. As I note in a recent piece for War on the Rocks, the plan displayed a rather loose interpretation of Iran’s constitution. 20/ warontherocks.com/2020/07/penny-…
The US ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson, was an ardent foe of Mosaddeq. Yet he did not think the operation would further US goals: “I do not believe,” he wrote in May 1953, “the problem can be solved merely by attempts to unseat Moṣaddeq.” 21/
Groupthink took hold in Washington. Dulles leaned on advice from folks like Max Thornburg, an oil-man and former advisor to the shah’s government. Thornburg unabashedly believed Iran, as a “backwards” country, needed a firm authoritarian govt. 22/
According to an internal CIA history, Dulles ignored advice from analysts who suggested Mosaddeq was not turning towards communism, the coup’s essential justification: “[anything] incompatible with the planned covert political action" was disregarded. 23/
nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/…
nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/…
Political scientist Mark Gasiorowski has concluded that no intelligence estimates believed a communist takeover in Iran was imminent at any time in 1953. While there was certainly a risk of this occurring, the risk probably didn't warrant the coup. 24/ mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.116…
Still, the coup planning went ahead. Roosevelt and others used considerable pressure to convince the extremely reticent shah to take part. An initial attempt was made on August 16, but it backfired. 25/
A second attempt was made on August 19, after considerable back-and-forth between Roosevelt and DC (again, see my WOTR piece for more). Mosaddeq fell from power, and a new govt backed by the US and led by the shah and the military assumed power. 26/ warontherocks.com/2020/07/penny-…
In the end, the coup succeeded for a variety of reasons. Some were tied to Roosevelt’s work in Iran and his tireless efforts to continue plotting despite the failure of the August 16 attempt. Others lay with Mosaddeq’s failure to anticipate the second coup attempt. 27/
The coup was not preordained. It resulted from complex discussions that went on for months, even years, in DC, London, and Tehran. From this twisting course came a moment that would define modern Iran, US-Iran relations, global oil, and the future of the Middle East. End/
PS be sure to check out #Coup53, the new film from @tagz23 that is available for streaming today. It promises to shed new light on the British side of things (which, owing to space, I did not cover here). Cheers! coup53.com
