Thread by @PaliwalAvi

Some thoughts on the M. Yusuf interview by K. Thapar. It's timing, content esp. re Af & secret wars, style, reactions & implications. I agree with @iamthedrifter that this will strengthen his credentials in Pak estb., even if there's much to disagree from an Indian perspective.

1. Timing: Excellent! In the middle of the intra-Afghan process in Doha, Sino-Indian standoff, continuing violence at LoC, a never-ending pandemic, IK's domestic travails, & Modi's internal/regional eco., & mil. challenges.

In substance, the interview doesn't complicate India's approach towards China & Pak. The battle-lines are v. clear & hardening over time at a global level. But it does raise q. about India's silent outreach to Pindi. Who did it, why, why now, on what conditions/assumptions?

The answers to these q. are likely to be more complex than the usual: 'coz of increased pressure from China'. True, the E. Ladakh standoff must have played its part. But going by N. Delhi's perception of its move in J&K (A370), the starting assumption of such outreach ...

... is likely to be v. different from what Pakistan, or others, might think. For N. Delhi, abrogation of A370 is a masterstroke still (& is being silently copied by Pak in GB!). Any outreach to Islamabad would build on this status-quo-nuovo, & not revert to status-quo-ante.

The mention of Afghanistan (& India's Jalalabad consulate in particular), helps Pakistan focus on the future of India's presence in Af. As the Taliban & Kabul talk in Doha, & the former launches a psychological campaign in/around Lashkar Gah, its time to q. India's role therein.

2. Content re covert warfare: To maintain operational secrecy in the best of circumstances is difficult. To do so when the adversary is bent on exposing you, & the conflict landscape is as complex & troubled as in Af & FATA-KP-Balochistan, it is doubly difficult.

Having worked on these issues for some years now, I can safely say that the ISI has been working v. hard to expose R&AW's imprint in Pakistan's domestic turmoil. The K. Jadhav case, in that context, was not a surprise. That it didn't happen before, was somewhat surprising.

This doesn't mean that I buy Islamabad's narrative on K. Jadhav & R&AW. But there are too many loopholes for India's comfort in this case. ICJ ruling or no-ruling, it 'looks like' espionage, even if it might not be the case (& perceptions often matter more in this space).

If Pakistan has evidence of Indian intel handlers sitting in J'bad/elsewhere directing attacks in Gwadar, Peshawar, Karachi etc., it will have to present it (& soon!). In the past, ISI fudged intel to pin blame on Indian ops in Balochistan (remember Sharm-el-Sheikh '09?).

But, there has been substantial desire in N. Delhi to increase pressure on Pak, incl. using covert means. Now, one runs the risk of exposure w/ such ops, & expecting India to succeed in this space indefinitely is to fool oneself.

The question is what Pakistan does w/ evidence. It can dump all forensics in public domain (if such ops truly occurred) or use a slow-drip method. Both would have their costs & benefits (plz read @carsonaust top work on secrecy in International Relations)

Mass dump of evidence may help Pak limit India's presence in Af by influencing Kabul's decision-making under a part-Taliban regime in near future (?). A slow-drip will dent India's image/moral high-ground (if any) over time; & can also be used to limit its presence in Af.

But there are costs of doing the same. (a) Barring the usual suspects (China, Turkey, & maybe Malaysia?) who will take Pak complains seriously, even if true? To cry foul about neighbours targeting w/ means that you've deployed against them for decades may not yield results.

... (b) It is an effective way to signal India about its improved counter-intel capabilities, but ineffective to deter N. Delhi from undertaking such activities. Esp. not when India is under mil. pressure from China, & is building an effective global coalition against the same.

3. Style: Unlike his usual self, K. Thapar seemed to be struggling vis-a-vis a relatively composed Yusuf. Partly, this is 'coz Yusuf stole the initiative by making new claims which caught Thapar off-guard. But there is more to it in my view.

Thapar, who has a difficult relationship with the BJP, also seemed to be (a) trying too hard to go hard on Yusuf for good reason & for his credibility's sake & (b) struggling to do so given that India has indeed ratcheted up overt/covert action against Pakistan in recent years.

4. Reactions & Implications: India Tweeps blame Yusuf for being 'venomous', making 'baseless claims', & 'lying' outrightly. I understand this reaction & partly agree. But let's be clear, in this age of polarisation, he played to the gallery that matters most to him, & succeeded.

He was speaking to an Indian audience, but in doing so, was ultimately sending a signal to his home audience: as is often the case in most such situations. To that effect, he stuck to the script w/o much trouble.

India's umbrage over the interview only amplifies his message. It strengthens his credentials within Pakistan as a forceful communicator that took on an aggressive, if somewhat off-balance, Indian interviewer at a an imp. (geo)political moment.

Now, it is imp. to remember that when you play the 'exposure' game in covert wars, it is essential to remain/be-seen-as-being 'clean' if you want the adversary to feel the international diplomatic/legal pinch. Scope for that has reduced for India since 15 Aug '16 Modi speech.

The best way out for N. Delhi then is to either (a) not bother w/ 'image/moral high ground' when it comes to countering Pak overtly/covertly (easier said than done, I acknowledge), or (b) reconsider the q. of internal balance that A. Tellis recently spoke about (they're linked).

Either way, N. Delhi will have to work hard to maintain op. secrecy (if Pak claims are indeed true), esp. when it involves regional allies such as Afghanistan. There must be a reason why Amrullah Saleh has been targeted multiple time recently, regardless of the Doha talks?

The worst we can do is blame K. Thapar & @thewire_in for offering a platform to Yusuf. That would strengthen Yusuf's credentials even further (don't forget his take on The Dawn's "democratic" criticism of GoP, ground realities notwithstanding).

Thapar wasn't at his professional best, & could have done better to expect & counter Yusuf's claims (not being made for the first time tbh). But, ultimately, he was doing his job, & I am not minded to shoot the messenger. It's always a bad idea. End.

Sorry, I should have added a link to the interview itself. Here it is:

Excellent piece by @iamthedrifter on this interview, & its implications for MY, IK, & Pak mil. Easy to undervalue the interview 'coz he was an analyst & now SAPM masquerading as NSA who got details wrong. It's the effect it has created that counts.
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