As @JPSoucy points out in this excellent 🧵, we have a experienced a considerable drop in testing. The question we don't know is: how many should we be testing? @skepticalIDdoc and other super-smart people suggest keeping our eye on %+. I am going to try to reframe the problem.
I will start off by saying this:
"cases" are numerator
"tests performed" are denominator
"% positivity" are cases/tests performed
If you do 20 surveillance tests (i.e. in asymptomatics) in a school, or 200, the % positivity will remain the same, but the "cases" will increase.
Cases matter.
They theoretically matter to the case (so they can receive treatment if they need it).
They should matter to public health to identify contacts (who may be infected) #ContactTracing
They should matter to everyone if we are treating them as surveillance.
When we were testing everyone and their brother and sister, dog and cat, cases kinda reflected surveillance: CASES MATTERED.
But it overwhelmed the system. So the government (who failed to plan for surveillance) employed #behaviouraleconomics to change testing and reduce backlog
In BE, you either make things easier to do (sometimes referred to as "nudges") or more difficult to do (sometimes referred to as "sludge"). We already had some sludge built in (long lineups for testing; few testing locations; slow TAT).
This is a great read for those interested.
Such sludge will automatically reduce low-risk people from being tested (who asymp. will line up for 5 hours for a test?) and will, without any change in epi, increase test positivity. But govt. added sludge:
- change criteria for testing (this was a good sludge)
- appointments
The important thing about sludge is it is designed to be "equal" but it is not equitable. So reducing testing in, say, rural areas by 50% is probably a good thing. But reducing it in NW Toronto is not. At all.
So now we need nudges in places with high epi (e.g mobile testing)
But it won't fix our dichotomous prob: as we target testing to high risk, it still won't be surveillance and test positivity will likely be non-generizable outside of those communities.
Bottom line: we're flying without a fuel gauge & navigation system. Only reliable signpost:
So now we need to:
a) Figure out how to do some kind of surveillance (wastewater? 613covid.ca/wastewater/)
b) Reduce sludge to identify as many cases as possible
c) Get contact tracing back on track and up to speed
d) physically distance, mask, avoid indoors & crowds, wash hands
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This is a followup to my thread yesterday to help the public understand better what is going on in Toronto (and Ottawa, Peel, and the rest of Ontario). I am going to focus on what everyone needs to understand about the ON testing fiasco (which is being played out elsewhere too)
First: I get my data from @jkwan_md@imgrund@JPSoucy@ishaberry2 to support my understanding. They get it primarily from publicly available sources, and make the data easy to understand.
Second: our daily case # in ON are artificially low (by ~330) because of the backlog.
The backlog was entirely preventable. I was told months ago when I asked that the reason labs weren't able to increase capacity was $$ from govt. @bruce_arthur covers this accurately here
My biggest concern in Toronto at present: the public doesn't understand the acuity of the situation, and are therefore understandably upset at current developments. So I will try and outline my understanding of the current situation:
Testing: we have a 7-day average of about 240 cases/day. This is an underestimate of the number of tests, because of a) backlog, b) system challenges that are dissuading people from being tested, c) over-weighing of younger cases, which makes asymptomatic cases more likely.
Regardless, our testing system is overwhelmed, and so we have no gauge on our gas tank.
The number of cases has totally exhausted @TOPublicHealth capacity.
My bread-and-butter framework comes from @SusanMichie and colleagues: The behaviour change wheel: a new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions. doi: 10.1186/1748-5908-6-42 ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21513547
1. Education: this has a weak track record. But maybe universities/colleges—regardless of virtual or not—can make knowledge a criterion of ongoing assessment/performance.
1. It COULD just wait and see what happens. It SHOULDN'T do that, and SHOULD act NOW. 2. It COULD act in a province-wide manner. It SHOULDN'T do that, but rather focus regionally on the hot-spots, and minimize unnecessary hardship where benefit is minimal.
3. It SHOULD increase testing capacity, but it can't. (Media should ask why we haven't increased capacity over the summer, because I dunno.) 4. It SHOULDN'T continue the mantra of "everyone who wants can get a test". It SHOULD articulate a proper capacity-based testing strategy.
The public are rightly concerned about class sizes, ventilation, and personal protective equipment in classrooms. They are all important, and govt should act. But they have directed attention, IMHO, away from what is much more important: keeping infections out of the classrooms.
We’ve all done our part to keep infection rates low in the province—that buys us a bit of time and will have prevented US-like scenarios. But we won’t be getting numbers lower any time soon with current plans. Unless we go all @IrfanDhalla and truly aim for elimination.
The highest forms of disease control are those that eliminate disease and those that keep disease out. Everything else is mitigation. Teachers should be advocating better surveillance more than class size if they want to stay safe. @tdsb@TCDSB@board_peel@DurhamDSB
I don’t get why squeezing-the-balloon policing interventions still get published:
Post-Prescription Review with Threat of Infectious Disease Consultation and Sustained Reduction in Meropenem Use Over Four Years academic.oup.com/cid/cid/advanc…
1. We know that you can police your way out of using an antibiotic—but not all ABx 2. Reducing 1 class of ABx has been shown repeatedly to result in compensatory prescribing of other ABx (not adequately shown here—looking at 3 other drugs individually doesn’t exclude an effect
3. Most of us have worked tirelessly to avoid “policing” ABx: “threats” and “fear” are not the action/emotion we want paired with good clinical care.