The theme here is wrongheaded. The guy quoted is looking at hospitalizations “every day.” That’s not enough. Lag and delay are hard concepts for people to understand, but future planning in this case is about mathematical forecasting (not modeling). We must look beyond our noses.
Every time we see a spike in new cases, it is followed by an increase in hospitalizations and deaths. But, there is a time delay between the two for several reasons.
At the individual level, a person takes time to get sick and die. At a macro level, the amount of virus in a given community and the type of people exposed can vary. Sometimes we see outbreak cohorts of young, healthy people without a lot of lagging hospitalizations and deaths.
But, probability is the key here. The more virus in the population, the greater the odds it spills over into every age group and demographic. Those odds translate into predictable, albeit delayed, increased hospitalizations and deaths.
As predicted several weeks ago (and in some sense months ago) hospitalizations are now up.
Probability is the key. The math is not linear, so it’s not intuitive. But, once you get how it works, this becomes clearer. In some counties today, if you had a gathering of 25 randomly selected people, there would be a 90% chance—or better—of one of them being infected.
In other counties, like the one my parents live in, the 25 person gathering would stand an 11% chance of including an infected person. Invite 50 people, and the chance becomes 21%.
Given the new case totals in the United States, if you have a gathering of 1,000 people or more, the odds are almost 100% that at least one person in attendance is infectious. Go to covid19risk.biosci.gatech.edu and see what your odds are based on different size events.
So, making concerted efforts now, to include locally targeted and temporally limited interventions and closures—not national shutdowns—will allow us to reduce the odds that our loved ones can gather safely on Thanksgiving day.
If we wait until the new hospitalization numbers are up on the day before Thanksgiving, there won’t be sufficient time to improve your odds. Let’s adopt a National approach with locally appropriate interventions. Now.
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On @ThisWeekABC today I shared some estimates on the number of infectious people in FL. Here are estimates for AZ, CA, GA, TX...
AZ: Cases as of 7/4 (94.6K); cases as of 6/20 (49.8K). Increase of 44.8K over 2 weeks. Assuming case ascertainment of 20%, true number of cases = 220K. Population of AZ = 7.3M, so roughly 3% of population is currently infectious.
CA: Cases as of 7/4 (254.7K); cases as of 6/20 (169.3K). Increase of 85.4K over 2 weeks. Assuming case ascertainment of 20%, true number of cases = 427K. Population of CA = 40M, so roughly 1% of population is currently infectious.
At the end of 2019, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) between the U.S. & South Korean expired. Now the money has run out and negotiations are at an impasse. This affects the future of the largest U.S. overseas military base and the U.S.-led security order in East Asia.
When the SMA expired, there was enough money to cover the base support needs until April 1, 2020—THAT’S TODAY. The ROK money has run out.
President Donald Trump wants President Moon to pay $5 billion for 2020, 5x more than South Korea paid in 2019. Amb. Bolton delivered President Trump's demand and the President hammered it home with Moon at the UNGA last September. Moon refused, viewing it as exorbitant.
Update on #Coronavirus response. Three days ago, I tweeted the U.S. was poised to take the lead in coronavirus cases, and noted it was reasonable to plan for the US to top the list of countries with the most cases in ~1 week. Today, it appears we have met that sad milestone.
As I said then, and will say again, this does NOT make social intervention futile. It makes it imperative. Don't give up.
Also today, @POTUS sent a letter to all Governors foreshadowing the federal government's plan for the period that follows the 15 day social distancing guidelines (which ends in 3 days, on March 30th). There are three operative sentences in the letter. They follow:
1/ So, what will we regret not doing today when we look back in two weeks? #coronavirus perspective.
2/ Cordon sanitaire of NYC and messaging and planning aggressively for the other hot spots about to jump into exponential growth (like it appears New Orleans might).
3/ Disaster mortuary response team mobilization. Testing capacity, serological blood tests, and clarifying that we do NOT seek to achieve one single standard or single, across-the-board deadline of an Easter return to work.
The economic impacts of social distancing are very difficult, to say the least. Understanding the alternative is instructive. Truly understanding being key. Also, explaining the concept of the strategy is important.
The strategy was developed carefully in 2005-2007. It considered economic and social costs and contemplated a targeted, layered mitigation approach that would be implemented in a staggered fashion where and when needed. That was the initial conception, and it remains sound.
In this outbreak, the time it took to recognize the threat, coupled with the lack of testing and therefore large scale case ascertainment, left us collectively with no other choice but to issue nationwide, blanket guidance for simultaneous implementation of NPI.
Example of the day: A colleague of mine has a family member who is a pediatric critical care nurse. The hospital has no PAPRS and a limited supply of N95 respirators.
The nurses are being told to use surgical masks 😱 in the ICU to care for COVID patients and only use N95s when doing aerosol generating procedures.
My colleague had some N95s at home and gave them to his daughter-in-law to use and gave her the CDC guidance on reuse and extended use. He also stressed that they NEED a spotter to observe them donning and doffing their PPE—the most dangerous part is when they remove the PPE.