Has some interesting color on polysilicon (used in solar PVs) as well. Apparently the Chinese tariff on polysilicon wasn't lifted in the phase one deal.
And, well, China is hard market once China targets a given sector
2/x
There are some measures on the agricultural side that if sustained should raise US exports (approval of pork and beef exports, rolling back retaliatory tariffs on chicken parts). But always has a bit unclear (imo) how the phase one deal would raise exports of manufactures
3/x
And there are a couple of data angles that a story like this couldn't really get into --
For example, one surprise, at least to me, is that the tariffs on China didn't do more to help Mexico's exports
4/x
Another interesting story line is how the US and the Chinese bilateral trade data have diverged.
In the US data, the monthly trade deficit with China has been about at its 2016 level in the last 4ms (a bit higher in July, a bit lower in August) & well down from 2018
5/x
In the Chinese data, by contrast, the monthly surplus with the US has been equal to or above the 2018 peak levels in most recent months (September was a modest exception), and well over 2016 levels
6/x
So in the Chinese data, China's YTD surplus with the US is more or less back at all time highs (even with a weak q1 for obvious reasons, and even with the tariffs)
7/x
This is because China's reported exports to the US are now running about 10% above reported US imports from China, while historically Chinese exports to the US tended to be ~ 15% below US imports from China.
8/x
Tis of course far too technical for the WSJ story (which given that it was focused on the US needed to be based on US data). But increasingly estimates of the impact of the tariffs on bilateral trade do depend on whether or not you look at the US or the Chinese data ...
9/9
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Also please note that the numbers here are cumulative loans not current exposures. At the same time, the WB numbers on exposures miss a lot of project finance.
Another important point -- both China and bond holders have lent to a (subset) of African countries at higher rates than the MDBs/ the traditional bilateral creditors. So the interest bill for those countries that have borrowed has increased faster than the stock of debt
2/x
A chart from a recent report by the Group of Thirty that (hopefully) highlights how not all low income countries are in the same position
(higher numbers on both the x and y axis are bad ... )
My (more modest) seasonal adjustment looks at the monthly data. The 'beans numbers were (as expected) solid. September basically made up for a weak start of the year. I hear the 'bean harvest came in early, and supplies in Brazil are by all accounts tight
2/x
Bean exports should top the 2017 base given the orders data USTR highlighted and current bean prices. Topping 2016 may be harder ...
(But don't forget 2018 -- the empty bar there isn't an accident; China showed that its state import companies control the market)
3/x
The Government of Turkey stepped up its local foreign currency denominated debt issuance this summer --
And the banks have lent a ton of fx to the CBRT, which normally would be viewed as a safe exposure but, well, the CBRT itself doesn't have much fx left
For the historically minded, Turkey's increased domestic dollar and euro denominated borrowing has some parallels with Mexico's issuance of tesobonos way back in the mid 1990s ...
Cuts borrowing costs, but generates substantial rollover risk
The FT has looked into China's participation in the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative. Looks like China only rescheduled $1.9b of $13.4b coming due this year -- if that's true, there were large net payments back China amid the pandemic
The total could go up though, as China and Angola are apparently (still) negotiating over the rescheduling of $6.7b (that includes funds due in 2021) -- a rescheduling required under Angola's IMF program
(Angola was always going to be the main beneficiary of the DSSI)
2/x
The lack of accurate data is a function of Chinese policy not to be transparent: in almost every country, the same three Chinese institutions (China Exim, CDB and ICBC) account for the bulk of exposure (the Commerce Dept has some zero rate concessional loans)
Important story from the FT -- China accounts for $1.9b of the (very modest) $5.3b rescheduled through the G-20's DSSI. But $1.9b is modest v the (at least) $13.4b owed to China by DSSI countries ...
1/x
Of course, the benefits of the DSSI go mostly to the countries with the most debt -- and thus China's totals could go up if China's big three policy/commercial or hybrid lenders agreed to reschedule maturing claims on Angola
2/x
Discussion of Zambia is clearly hindered by a lack of good data -- I have been digging into this case, and a lot of China's exposure (China Exim and ICBC for example have a big hydropower loan) isn't directly too the government and thus isn't likely in the WB data
September's FX settlement data (settlement includes the PBOC and the state banks) provides the first obvious sign of renewed intervention -- settlement, adjusted for forwards, jumped $10b in September
1/x
A reminder -- China historically has needed to intervene more when the yuan is appreciating than when it is stable or falling (as controlling the pace of appreciation takes the PBOC's balance sheet)
2/x
To be sure the $10b in purchases in the settlement data in September is only visible purchase in the traditional intervention proxies in the last 3ms, and it remains is modest v the $150b plus trade and bond inflow -- there is more going on