The FT has looked into China's participation in the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative. Looks like China only rescheduled $1.9b of $13.4b coming due this year -- if that's true, there were large net payments back China amid the pandemic
1/x
ft.com/content/bd73a1…
1/x
ft.com/content/bd73a1…
The total could go up though, as China and Angola are apparently (still) negotiating over the rescheduling of $6.7b (that includes funds due in 2021) -- a rescheduling required under Angola's IMF program
(Angola was always going to be the main beneficiary of the DSSI)
2/x
(Angola was always going to be the main beneficiary of the DSSI)
2/x
The lack of accurate data is a function of Chinese policy not to be transparent: in almost every country, the same three Chinese institutions (China Exim, CDB and ICBC) account for the bulk of exposure (the Commerce Dept has some zero rate concessional loans)
3/x
3/x
The World Bank and the G-20 also erred in focusing on public and publicly guaranteed debt -- when a lot of China's project finance has been kept off the public balance sheet.
Zambia owes far more than the $12b the FT reported
4/x
Zambia owes far more than the $12b the FT reported
4/x
The World Bank's broader measure of Zambia's total external debt (in the World Development Indicators) shows $27b in outstanding debt, with about $15b of that "private non-guaranteed) -- a lot Chinese lending to big power projects is likely in this bucket
5/x
5/x
Broader issue of course is that Africa's external debt has soared over the last 10 years, while Africa's exports have stalled since 2014 --
Not all countries are in the same boat, but there are important pockets of real debt distress (to new creditors)
6/6
Not all countries are in the same boat, but there are important pockets of real debt distress (to new creditors)
6/6
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