September's FX settlement data (settlement includes the PBOC and the state banks) provides the first obvious sign of renewed intervention -- settlement, adjusted for forwards, jumped $10b in September
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A reminder -- China historically has needed to intervene more when the yuan is appreciating than when it is stable or falling (as controlling the pace of appreciation takes the PBOC's balance sheet)
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To be sure the $10b in purchases in the settlement data in September is only visible purchase in the traditional intervention proxies in the last 3ms, and it remains is modest v the $150b plus trade and bond inflow -- there is more going on
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As @M_C_Klein highlighted in Barrons there has been rapid growth in the net foreign assets of the state banks over the last 5ms of data (roughly $20b a month in q3).
Has some interesting color on polysilicon (used in solar PVs) as well. Apparently the Chinese tariff on polysilicon wasn't lifted in the phase one deal.
And, well, China is hard market once China targets a given sector
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There are some measures on the agricultural side that if sustained should raise US exports (approval of pork and beef exports, rolling back retaliatory tariffs on chicken parts). But always has a bit unclear (imo) how the phase one deal would raise exports of manufactures
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I continue to be surprised by the number of people who think the bulk of China's external bank lending has been funded out of China's reported reserves, and thus the reserves aren't liquid.
The balance of payments actually shows substantial non-reserve foreign assets.
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I guess the BoP could be a complete fabrication, but if it is at all accurate, the external loans of Chinese state banks (and their bond purchases) are additional assets that should be added on top of China's reserves (not subtractions from China's reserves)
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p.s. China does have liabilities too -
but the BoP implies that they are still much smaller than China's external assets
(as one would expect given China's long history of current account surpluses)
The enormous rise in the U.S. trade deficit, the deficit in August was over $200 billion larger than its 2019 average level, has made the U.S. the engine of global demand again ...
(the US current account is likely to be over a percentage point larger than the IMF's forecast)
Rather than shrinking, as the IMF argues, Asian imbalances are growing -- propelled by the rise in the U.S. deficit ...
In effect, strong U.S. demand allowed Asia to recover without doing all that much stimulus of its own (especially of household income)
China still has far more more visible fx reserves than it has fx denominated external debt (let alone short-term external debt), and the smart money (I hope) knows that China has some hidden non-reserve assets too
A high M2 ratio is correlated with a big domestic banking system with lots domestic deposits -- a strength, not a weakness as far as I am concerned.
It also tends to correlate with current account surpluses not deficits
The IMF has the U.S. current account deficit falling slightly in 2020 ...
Yet we know the deficit rose by almost 1.5 pp of GDP in the second quarter, and the third quarter looks like the second quarter not the first
And the U.S. trade deficit has increased at an incredibly rapid pace in the last few months, and, in dollar terms, is now (more or less) back at its pre-global financial crisis level
Even with the unusually strong (and unlikely to be sustained) September rise in imports, the y/y rise in China's manufacturing surplus in the third quarter looks to be around $150b (~1% of China's GDP)
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That's in line with biggest (in dollar terms) y/y rises before COVID-19 --
But it is striking because it comes at a time when overall trade is down
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I think with hindsight there is a case that China's manufacturing surplus has been on an upswing since 2016 (i.e. after the big CNY depreciation), though the impact of the tariffs masked that upswing in 2019
(and some will argue that 2020 is a one off ...)
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