Thread by @TrentTelenko

1/ This is another thread on the Azeri Drone War on Armenia.

I've seen a recent open source analysis of what the Azeri drones are doing to Russian air defense equipment in the hands of Armenia.

2/ The Azeris, with or w/o the assistance of Turk instructors, have killed a number of 9K33 Osa AKM / SA-8 GECKO systems, a number of S-300PS / SA-10B GRUMBLE battery components, and a 9K331 Tor M2KM / SA-15D GAUNTLET.

3/ 1st, there is a claimed GPS/inertial configuration for the larger MAM-L munition that allows it to glide to 14 km range from an unspecified altitude, likely the typical operating altitude for the TB2 of ~18 kft.

This is stand off range for Osa.

See:
roketsan.com.tr/en/product/mam…

4/ 2nd, The TB2's are flying a 100kt figure eight or race track orbit that is putting it's doppler shift speed to something lower than that.

Russian radar computers are filtering out those low speed tracks.

5/ This is not a new problem.

The USS Callaghan (DD-792), a Fletcher-class destroyer, was sunk 29 July 1945 by a 62 kt wood-and-fabric Yokosuka K5Y bi-plane kamikaze at night.

It's Mk37 fire control director/computer for it's radar directed 5" guns were set for 350 kts.

Opps

6/ 3rd, the Turks built TB2 from carbon-fiber composite (CFC) materials that are "lossy"** in the S-band where the SA-8, SA-15 and SA-22 acquisition radars operate.

AKA TB2's have a low but not stealthy radar return.

7/ ** Lossy = "Dielectrics that exhibit electromagnetic loss at microwave frequencies are used extensively in coupled-cavity traveling-wave tubes."

8/ 4th, The Turks are using low power jammers in the S-band to take advantage of #2 & #3 above in both the TB2 & their loitering munitions.

A single block like a 5X Small Size Jamming Transmitter Set was found in a downed Azeri loitering munition.

shoghicom.com/jamming-transm…

9/ It had four stub antenna that may have been 1/2 wavelength for S-band.

This is an example of one of the Azeri loitering munitions.

https://twitter.com/blueboy1969/status/1314141356684718082

10/ 5th, One of two S-300 kills was by a Harop loitering munition and a TBM or MLRS

A TB2 video showed long distance from the 2nd S-300's & either a MLRS or short range ballistic missiles with a large warhead killing it.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1314278652545298434

11/ What the TB2 footage shows is a standing off from a significant distance with significant atmospheric turbulence distortion & slight jitter.

There was some speculation the TBM was an Israeli supplied LORA TBM.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LORA_(mis…

12/ For US Army SHORAD, there are several issues.

The 14km range at 18K feet of the MAM-L makes the M-SHORAD obsolete before it is deployed, even if it gets a AIM-9X.

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1312884916762411010

13/ The US Army needs ground launched AMRAAM at the brigade level in the worst way to deal with medium altitude UAV systems with MAM-C or JDAMS 14 km stand off ranges.

14/14 Loitering munitions with jammers are a 2nd tier military power capability. That is not in the US Army ADA systems design, as far as the open sources I've read.

Why? I don't know.

A small jammer like the US Army's Hexjam can be put in a drone.

prc68.com/I/HEXJAM.shtml

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