A bit more on global debt issues, spurred by the @petersgoodman article.
As noted in the NYT, debt service deferral cannot be the only way to help low income countries, as not all low income countries are highly indebted.
Yet some countries really do have too much debt
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As the chart above shows, African countries borrowed heavily between 2010 and 2019 -- so external debt, net of reserves, rose from around $100b to over $400b ...
That's a problem now, as exports (needed to repay external debt) are down. External debt is now 2x exports
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And since most of the new debt has come from Chinese policy banks and the bond market not traditional bilateral lenders or the MDBs, it carries a fairly high (for Africa) interest rate. Interest payments are rising faster than total debt
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Focusing narrowly on public debt to GDP imo misses the real problem: project finance often is off the public balance sheet, and a lot of Africa's externa debt carries a relatively high interest rate. Interest payments relative to exports are back at pre-HIPC levels
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The G-20's DSSI tried to treat all low income debt countries debt uniformly, but it didn't really work.
The bulk of both China's debt and bonded debt is concentrated in 10 of the 70 countries. The distribution is not uniform ...
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For the heavily indebted countries (Angola, where the IMF continues to ignore the concerns about sustainability in its program; Zambia; Laos, Mozambique and probably others) the modest short-term payments deferral provided by the DSSI is simply insufficient.
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For others, deferring payments in 2020 and the first half of 2021 for 2-3 years only adds to the debt service spike created by the pattern of existing bond amortizations. It doesn't actually help much -- a broader restructuring is needed to give time for a real recovery
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And finally for the bulk of the DSSI countries, even with full Chinese policy bank participation, there just isn't that much bilateral debt coming due. Help needs to come through different channels
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That is why in my view it was a mistake to think of debt service suspension as the primary way of supporting low income countries in a pandemic.
the debt service deferral should serve a different purpose ...
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Namely, the deferral of debt service in is needed to assure that the necessary mobilization of international concessional resources to help fight the pandemic doesn't go to the repayment of Chinese or commercial debts (especially in countries with high debt levels).
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These points are discussed, tho perhaps more obliquely, the interim report of the Group of Thirty
The IMF's metric (without adjustments) suggested that Turkey had a slightly stronger reserve position that China going into 2020. Which is absurd.
(and yes, I do read the details of the IMF's ESR!)
The reason is simple: measures of reserve need based on broad money (m2) imply that countries with big domestic deposit bases (China, Korea and the like) need a ton of reserves, while countries with small banking systems (like Argentina) need far fewer
The New York Times (@petersgoodman) highlights how the global financial response to the pandemic, to date, has fallen short of providing the financial support low income countries need to cope effectively with the shock
Deferring debts owed to bilateral creditors was always going to only be a small part of the solution, but especially if China deemed key institutions like the CDB to be "private."
It was thus a mistake to make the DSSI the central mechanism for providing pandemic support
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Only about $5b of the $30b in non-MDB debt coming due in 2020 will be rescheduled; the initiative has failed even on its own terms.
And since debt burdens aren't uniformly distributed, even a broad DSSI limited to bilateral creditors would not have provided enough to most
... "currency traders sense the hand of the state, albeit more discreet than in the past. “My guess is that the central bank now has special trading accounts at the state banks" ...
I have long thought that you can get a more accurate picture of what China is really doing by adding the net foreign assets of the state banks to the PBOC's reported (CNY balance sheet) foreign exchange reserves -- which have indeed been a bit too steady for the last year +
Today's GDP data obviously has gotten its share of coverage -- but I did want to highlight now unusual the downturn in q2 and partial recovery in q3 are. The downturn was led by services (usually the most stable component), and services are lagging the broader recovery
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All this is looks totally crazy in the (annualized) contributions data, as, well, data wasn't designed for these kinds of swings.
But it is clear that goods consumption led the recovery
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I de-annualized the data to put it on a more reasonable scale over the last year. Goods consumption is now 1.8 pp of US GDP higher than in q4 2019. Services consumption is down 2.7 pp of GDP
Also please note that the numbers here are cumulative loans not current exposures. At the same time, the WB numbers on exposures miss a lot of project finance.
Another important point -- both China and bond holders have lent to a (subset) of African countries at higher rates than the MDBs/ the traditional bilateral creditors. So the interest bill for those countries that have borrowed has increased faster than the stock of debt
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A chart from a recent report by the Group of Thirty that (hopefully) highlights how not all low income countries are in the same position
(higher numbers on both the x and y axis are bad ... )
My (more modest) seasonal adjustment looks at the monthly data. The 'beans numbers were (as expected) solid. September basically made up for a weak start of the year. I hear the 'bean harvest came in early, and supplies in Brazil are by all accounts tight
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Bean exports should top the 2017 base given the orders data USTR highlighted and current bean prices. Topping 2016 may be harder ...
(But don't forget 2018 -- the empty bar there isn't an accident; China showed that its state import companies control the market)
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