This is a great post by @ADimitrovs on new but not adopted yet #RuleofLaw conditionality mechanism & EU budget. Have just finished myself reading the 20,372 words of trilogue "4-column" doc re this latest likely addition to EU's toolbox. My first reaction assessment in 🧵 below
Title of not yet adopted Regulation (at @EUCouncil's insistence) no longer mentions #ruleoflaw & concept of "generalised deficiencies" with reference instead to "a general regime of conditionality". Cosmetic rebranding to assuage autocrats or bad omen? Let’s continue to find out
Article 1 (subject matter): surprise! the rule of law is back BUT “breaches” have replaced “generalised deficiencies” (again at Council’s insistence) = deliberate attempt to force Commission to not see the wood for the trees…
Silver lining: thanks to EP, potential damage from Council’s deliberately narrow focus has been salvaged by making clear that “widespread” breaches + breaches due to “recurrent practice or omissions” can also be caught by new tool YET this is to be found in non-binding recital
Article 2 (definitions): Commission’s definition of the rule of law which codifies the ECJ’s case law is maintained with some improvements (not however 1st time we see rule of law defined in EU secondary law despite nonsense you hear from autocrats & would be autocrats)
Miscellaneous but also positive: references in recitals to the need to assess judicial independence not only on the books but also in practice + @VeniceComm’s rule of law checklist (1st ever mention in an instrument of EU secondary law TBOMK), importance of the rule of law, etc.
Article 2a (examples): Yet another area of EP’s very good work as EP forced reintroduction of non-exhaustive list of examples which “may be indicative of breaches" of the rule of law BUT NB this is *not* enough to i.a. suspend funding in itself as additional test to satisfy
Article 3 (test): moved from “affects or risks affecting” EU budget/EU financial interests to “affect in a sufficiently direct way” to “affect or seriously risk affecting … *in a sufficiently direct way*”. Crucial aspect I will return to but first let's check Article 4
Article 4 (measures to be adopted): Plenty of positive improvements thanks to EP re protection of final recipients + clarification re measures to be adopted must reflect nature/gravity/scope of breaches + duration (new). Only “cumulative effect” is missing IMO
Article 5 (sources/procedure): Positive inclusion of different deadlines imposed on key actors to avoid procrastination
Negative side: reverse QMV is gone + European Council’s emergency brake is maintained YET not impossible to obtain QMV + brake = time limited discussion
Bottom line: most negative aspect/crux of matter is Art 3 test = previous probatio diabolica been made less “diabolical” by EP’s introd of “seriously risk” (= potential negative impact enough) BUT “sufficiently direct way” remains + “breaches” must concern specific authorities
Notions of "proper functioning" & "sufficiently direct way", if interpreted narrowly, will seriously limit scope of new tool. Yet, Poland's disciplinary regime for judges & Hungarian authorities' failure to investigate/sanction high level corruption cases should pass the test IMO
Also, on positive side, complementary nature of new conditionality tool has been made clear by EP = Commission can/must use infringement actions re breaches of rule of law not caught by new tool + ask ECJ for financial sanctions re non compliance with ECJ rulings under 260 TFEU
Overall verdict: Not as bad as I feared thanks to EP with Art 3 test still workable *if not made unworkable* by narrow interpretation + first explicit linkage linkage between RoL/Art 2 TEU & EU budget the lack of which has been used by Commission to justify inaction in the past
Main short term possible positive impact: EU might finally refocus on enforcement rather than focusing on nuts & bolts of this tool which arguably was not technically needed: verfassungsblog.de/how-to-stop-fu… That said I understand Comm’s (political) need for explicit/transversal Reg here
Personal prediction (hope to be wrong): Will VDL Commission make any use of new tool? Don’t hold your breath… & instead expect HU and PL govs to bring annulment action with VDL Comm to use legal action as a convenient excuse not to use mechanism until ECJ ruling on the merits...
In the meantime let’s hope Comm rediscover Art 260 TFEU to financially sanction e.g. Orban’s lack of compliance with ECJ rulings & use Art 258 procedure *proactively* instead of seemingly focusing on reporting violations of #ruleoflaw over enforcing rule of law requirements (end)
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When will the @EU_Commission learn that time is autocrat's best friend & that more reporting will do nothing to prevent creation of irreversible facts on the grounds...
@ceu@EU_Commission But Comm is not only institution which deserves criticism
+3 years to issue ruling on this crucial pressing issue is not serious
#RuleofLaw breakdown in #Poland: Just finished reading this meticulous, compelling and unprecedented ruling by the Amsterdam District Court whose potential ramifications for the functioning of EU legal order could be extremely significant. Thread ⬇️
1/ Historical significance: 1st time in legal history of EU (TBOMK) that a national court of EUMS has found judicial system of another EUMS as a whole to have been structurally disabled = judicial independence structurally gone in Poland = we have black hole in EU’s Area of FSJ
2/ 🇳🇱 Court’s (correct) diagnosis: no independent/effective Const Tribunal left; ENCJ-suspended NCJ not impartial/independent; Disciplinary Ch not a court; independence of SC & ordinary courts no longer guaranteed with disciplinary proceedings possible for applying ECJ case law
2/ Different takes you can read, including from most eminent experts, suggest ambiguous EUCO conclusions and this is indeed the case but contrary to noise originating from kleptocrats/autocrats in Budapest/Warsaw, EUCO conclusions contain several positive #ruleoflaw aspects
3/ respect for the rule of law is explicitly mentioned twice with same para appearing in main text in MFF section (para A24) and in horizontal section of Annex (para 22) and there are 2 additional mentions to Article 2 TEU values, which include of course the rule of law
European Court of Human Rights has now notified a total of 12 complaints to Polish government regarding ruling party's judicial deforms in the past 11 months. This shows increasing external costs of #Poland's #ruleoflaw breakdown. In any case, updated ECHR diagram available ⬇️
Reminder: In addition to EU's Article 7 procedure, Polish authorities are also subject to CoE's special monitoring procedure coe.int/en/web/portal/….
Due to ever increasing no of legally tainted judicial appointments and downright unlawful appointments of usurpers to the Supreme Court and Constitution Court, ECtHR could find itself faced in time with hundreds if not thousands of applications from Poland on Art 6 ECHR grounds
Some good news on #ruleoflaw front with significant ruling from European Court of Human Rights which unanimously held Romanian authorities violated applicant's right to a fair trial & right to freedom of expression of applicant now the EU's first European Public Prosecutor
Two particularly remarkable features. 1/ Court held Romania to have impaired *very essence* of applicant’s right of access to a court owing to specific boundaries for a review of her case set down in ruling of Const Court (another "const court" whose independence is questionable)
2/ Very rare instance where ECtHR has found interference complained of did *not* pursue legitimate aim for purposes of Article 10 ECHR. Corrupt autocrats then in charge in ROM had audacity to claim they were protecting #ruleoflaw while in effect seeking to destroy it...
Must-read analysis by Profs Halmai & Scheppele on Orban’s #EnablingAct
Hopefully @vonderleyen Commission will take note & stop embarrassing itself by giving any credit to deliberately misleading nonsense spread by HU MoJ who specialises in this particular trade
@vonderleyen 1/ Reminder first: Hungary was *already* no longer a democracy *prior* to the adoption Orban’s enabling act and the evidence in this respect is just overwhelming for all but seemingly @vonderleyen Commission and of course Orban's regime itself...
@vonderleyen 2/ Bottom line: “Orbán’s emergency regime gives him unlimited legal power for as long as he wants to use it, and all apparent checks on his power are illusory”
As previously noted Orban had before virtually no checks on his power in practice. Now he has none