A short refresher thread on the legacy Russian NC3.
First, there was a supporting system for the NCA, which allowed the President (and the MoD) to communicate with the military and to release the unlocker codes for the launches.
Unlocker codes are then pushed down to launchers.
Proprietary ownership by civilians was/is important because it ensured that only the relevant civilian authorities can order the launches, military authority would not have the unlocker codes.
My understanding is that Perimeter also receives them as a part of pre-delegation.
Then the orders would go through the service specific NC3 systems, Signal-A and Vyuga for the SMFs, the former was a hierarchical system to support the standard chain of command from the Central CP of SMFs onwards mainly.
Then from the division level and below (ie division CP or any of the regimental CPs) can launch the division's missiles.
This redundancy makes de-capitation harder.
Higher CPs can act as mere comm nodes on the pathway to the regimental (or divisional) CPs, that launch.
Then there is Vyuga system, which allows one way (instead of two wat communications of Signal-A) transmission of orders (and codes) to all the levels from say an IL-80 or IL-82 command aircraft.
Airforce and Navy had a separate proprietary system - KBSU, which relied more on radio and sat comms, for obvious reasons.
And then there was the perimeter, which backed up the primary (above ground and underground hardened) command posts, circuits for the NCA, back up airborne (IL-80/IL-82 aircraft) circuit by creating a system of superhardened command posts, with underground VLF emitters...
And ofcourse command missiles, though those today are not based in silos but are on mobile launchers.
Courtesy of Yarunuch's excellent book.
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Food for thought, over 2020s we may see a trend of existing S400 regiments (30+ of them) being reinforced with S500 divizions, which would lead to addition of ~180+ engagement channels focussed on MRBMs, IRBMs and possibly with some ICBM capability. 1/6
This force may provide not only a system for strategic defence against sub-ICBM BMs (ie from Middle East and elsewhere, as those proliferate), but also some capability against the potential HGV and other similar threats.
But I would expect this to be overshadowed... 2/6
In the discussions by their potential to form a second echelon in terms of strategic defence against ICBM threats, together with new EW means and exo-atmospheric interceptors.
But all three would probably be one of the drivers behind marketing it as an S400 upgrade package. 3/6
On the topic of arms control, de-alerting and the like.
As we prepare for possible extension of NST specifically and some sort of future arms control in general I would caution against mirror immaging and copypasting exact approaches across the board. 1/7
This is not only true due to different concerns the parties may have and thus seek to adress but also due to technical, doctrinal and geographical differences between the parties.
So lets look at the de-alerting as one of the common ideas floating around. 2/7
The main argument seems to be that the (US) silo based ICBM force is non survivable and must be used in a LoW style strike, which can lead to launches on false warning, etc.
This leads to the conclusion that SSBNs and other mobile platforms are inherently better 3/7
In the light of the soon demise of the NST, some long term trends for the Russian triad, in a short thread.
Overall the triad seems to be stable in terms of numbers, with modernisation being focussed on the like for like replacements and development of new capabilities. 1/10
First of all, what kinds of new technical capabilities can we expect? In addition to the Avanguard HGV that sort of went through IOC already there is a smaller HGV for the Sarmat (for MIRV) and what appears to likely be a powered HGV (Anchar-RV), most likely on light ICBMs. 2/10
There is also the concept of parallel staging comming about in the form of likely parallel RV dispersal on Yars and possibly other ICBMs (ie Sarmat).
This is there in anticipation of space based weapons systems as allows faster (earlier?) deployement. 3/10
This graphic of #JL2 may be of interest, especially if it is accurate. Found on the internet.
While the depiction of the SSBN with the WAA style sonar set up is not surprising, the depiction of the SLBM is, note the large discardable launch fairing used, with what appears to be classical sequential RV/third stage set up under it.