To be clear, I have a vested interest in this term. It played a key role in research @jurpelai and I conducted on how International Organizations assist democracies. That research appeared in @World_Pol...
A key part of that research was looking at how @NATO assisted new democracies in Eastern Europe following the Cold War (see my paper with @AlexCecylia).
They write that "consolidation" means democratic processes are accepted as "The only game in town"
Fun fact: In the footnote, they acknowledge that the phrase "only game in town" was given to them by Giuseppe di palma
So what does it mean for democracy to be "the only game in town"? Linz and Stepan elaborate in the next paragraph. The punchline is that it's really based on everyone behaving appropriately.
So when does a country reach this condition? This is where the work of Milan Svolik is really useful, especially his 2008 @apsrjournal paper
He points out that becoming "consolidated" is largely unobservable: there is no point where you can say, "yes, that democracy is fully consolidated because of X, Y, and Z!"
BUT it is fair to say that the longer a country has been a democracy, the more likely it is to have become "consolidated"
Hence, older democracies are likely consolidated, or that the threat of "autocratic reversal" is virtually nil:
Focusing on duration is a completely sensible assumption*: countries that have been a democracy for a long time are likely to exhibit and internalize the "things" that make democracy consolidated.
* that's why it was core to the analysis in my work with @jurpelai!
But I've always had a bit of unease about it. I mean, it's hard to be feel solid about a concept that is, by and large, unobservable 🤔
Such unease is not new and is not just from me. Consider the argument of Guillermo O’Donnell back in the 1990s
In the article, he writes: "I see little analytical gain in attaching the term “consolidated” to something that will probably though not certainly endure—`democracy' and `consolidation' are terms too polysemic to make a good pair."
In other words, the concepts are each too vague
Think about it another way: in the Svolik piece, one of the "consolidated democracy" examples is the United States.
Is the US consolidated? Umm...while they may not be using the word, a lot of folks are asking that question right now! 🚨🚨
But even if those don't come to pass right now, the fact that the idea is being bandied around leads one to wonder if democracy in the US is truly "the only game in town" (h/t @ProfSaunders & @henryfarrell)
Of course, we could further complicate using the term to describe the US by questioning how long the US has ACTUALLY been a functioning democracy (h/t @robmickey)
In sum, if "time as democracy" is our best indicator of being "consolidated", but one of our oldest democracy is in danger of experiencing elements of "autocratic reversal", then I'm not sure if "consolidated democracy" is a useful concept.
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(1) Staunch rivalries (and territorial disputes) in the region
(2) Region marred by conflict
(3) Alliance ties to outside powers
First, there are indeed two staunch rivals in the Caucasus: Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, the war currently unfolding between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the second between the two countries since the end of the Cold War
Are such distinctions useful and do any of the terms accurately describe 🇺🇸-🇨🇳 relations?
Let's break it down.
[THREAD]
To start, notice what were NOT options given by Page:
"friends, partners, allies"
(though Page did acknowledge that 🇨🇳 could be a "potential partner" for addressing 🇰🇵 and climate change)
So we're starting with the presumption of a "confrontational" relationship.
From the standpoint of foreign policy discourse, there can be value in saying that someone is a "competitor" (competition is "healthy") rather than an "enemy" (who is "evil"). @EdwardGoldberg makes this distinction in a piece for @Salon
To be clear: I am NOT offering a story about how the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the "Cold War Consensus" and this collapse brought us to today.
Start with one of international relations primary models for war: bargaining theory
The idea is the following: since war is costly (think of all the millions of people Mattis feared would die in a 🇰🇵🇺🇸 war), states have an incentive to "strike a bargain" that avoids war.