1. @EricSchmittNYT, @adamgoldmanNYT, @farnazfassihi and @ronenbergman report that intelligence officials confirm Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a senior al Qaeda leader in the line of succession, was killed by Israeli operatives on Aug. 7 in Iran. Some notes...
nytimes.com/2020/11/13/wor…
2. Abu Muhammmad's death was first reported on al-Qaeda-linked social media sites. One of the first write-ups of this report came from @MEMRIReports, @memrijttm. See their report here:
memri.org/jttm/pro-al-qa…
3. Abu Muhammad was killed on Aug. 7 - the anniversary of the Aug. 7, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya & Tanzania. That's significant for a few reasons. First, Abu Muhammad was long wanted by the U.S. for his role in those bombings - AQ's deadliest attacks prior to 9/11.
4. Second, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, U.S. district court testimony & other evidence, Iran and Hezbollah gave al Qaeda the "tactical expertise" needed for the 1998 embassy bombings. See 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 61 and 68):
5. So, a senior AQ leader was killed in Iran 22 years after AQ operatives used expertise from Iran & Hezbollah to attack US embassies. For more, see the bottom of my piece here ("Al Qaeda modeled 1998 US Embassy bombings on Hezbollah’s 1983 attacks"):
longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/…
6. The status of senior AQ leaders inside Iran has often been murky. Abu Muhammad and others were under some form of detention, but released as part of an exchange between Iran and AQ in 2015:
longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/…
7. Some of the AQ figures released made their way to Syria, where they were killed in the U.S. drone campaign. But Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Saif al-Adel ultimately stayed in Iran, where they thought they were safe.
8. In Aug. 2018, the U.S. State Department increased the rewards offered for information on Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Saif al-Adel. State didn't say at the time that they were in Iran, but intelligence officials and the UN knew it:
longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/…
9. Abu al Qassam al-Urduni, an al Qaeda operative in Syria who was subsequently killed, but worked with Abu Muhammad and Saif al-Adel, also confirmed that the two were in Iran after they were all released in 2015:
longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/…
10. Saif al-Adel and Abu Muhammad became involved in the controversy over the jihadists' efforts in Syria. It was in that context that their continued presence in Iran became widely known. For more, see:
longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/…
11. Given the renewed attention paid to Abu Muhammad al-Masri & Saif al-Adel by the State Department in 2018 (see above), it makes sense that the U.S. had continued to track their movements inside Iran. It also makes sense that the U.S. would work with the Israelis to get them.
12. There is no indication that Saif al-Adel, who is right up there with Abu Muhammad al-Masri in terms of seniority within AQ, has perished thus far. Al-Adel is also wanted for his role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and is presumably still inside Iran.
13. Abu Muhammad's daughter, Miriam, was also killed in the operation inside Iran. She was the widow of Hamza bin Laden, who lived/was detained inside Iran for years. Hamza's wedding video was found in his father's Abbottabad compound:
longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/…
14. Hamza was ultimately killed as well. His marriage to Miriam took place inside Iran. We got the U.S. government to release that video and other files recovered in Osama bin Laden's compound in 2017.
15. Iran and al Qaeda have been at odds in a number of ways. You can find evidence of that in the OBL files, for sure. We've reported on it. For example, OBL worried about Iran's growing influence. Some want their points of conflicts to be the whole story. But there's more to it.
16. Beginning in July 2011, the Obama administration's Treasury and State Departments began exposing the Iranian regime's "secret deal" with al Qaeda. This deal allows for AQ to maintain its "core facilitation pipeline" inside Iran. See timeline here:
longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/…
17. In 2011, the U.S. Treasury and State Departments identified the leader of AQ's network inside Iran as an operative known as Yasin al-Suri. I found al-Suri's personnel file while looking through Osama bin Laden's papers. The file noted that Yasin al-Suri was based in Iran.
18. We've suspected that the U.S. increased its efforts to take out senior al-Qaeda leaders across multiple countries this year. Abu Muhammad al-Masri is one in a string of operatives to perish in recent months, but he was the most senior.
19. On 9/17, Christopher Miller (then NCTC director, now acting SecDef) told Congress that "several" of al-Qaeda's "remaining senior leaders continue to find safe haven in Iran, and will likely play a key role in the group’s efforts to reconstitute its leadership."
20. So, U.S. officials have made it known that they are keeping tabs on senior al Qaeda leaders inside Iran.

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More from @thomasjoscelyn

21 Aug
1. Here's a good example of the disconnect between the political rhetoric regarding "endless wars," which @realDonaldTrump & @JoeBiden regularly denounce, and the president's own actions. Yesterday, Trump defended the "low level" American presence in Iraq:
2. There's an obvious problem here. On the one hand, Trump & Biden blast the "endless wars" & say America has to "end" them. (Wars don't typically "end" - they are won or lost, or are fought indefinitely as insurgencies.) But on the other hand, Trump doesn't withdraw all forces.
3. No one has more power to "end" America's presence in the post-9/11 conflicts than the president. If the "endless wars" can be unilaterally ended by the U.S., as the rhetoric implies, then who is at fault for keeping them going?
Read 4 tweets
5 Apr
1. The Taliban released a statement accusing the Afghan government & U.S. of violating the Feb. withdrawal agreement. The Taliban notes (correctly) that nothing in the accord prohibited them from continuing to launch attacks, but the group says it's focused mainly on rural areas.
2. U.S. military and diplomatic officials claimed in a series of statements that the agreement called for a "reduction of violence," but that phrase isn't in the accord, nor is there anything similar. It is an example of wishcasting:

longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/…
3. @billroggio has been collating the Taliban's claimed attacks since the Feb. 29 withdrawal agreement went into effect. The Taliban claimed 405 attacks in the first 24 days. See here:

longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/…
Read 9 tweets
2 Apr
1. Omar Saeed Sheikh planned the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, who was then murdered by al-Qaeda. Now his convictions were overturned.

One can only hope the U.S. is tracking this story (even with everything else going on) and making a determination on the proper response.
2. According to media reports, the Pakistani court didn't find that Omar Saeed Sheikh was innocent or wrongly convicted of kidnapping Pearl. Instead, related charges were dropped and the kidnapping charge was reduced.
3. This story always had ramifications for our understanding of al-Qaeda, its close relations with other jihadist groups inside Pakistan, and the role played by (elements of) the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.
Read 9 tweets
2 Mar
1. There’s a lot more to say about the State Department’s deal with the Taliban. But I’ll say this: If the Taliban does what @SecPompeo says they’ll do - “work alongside of us to destroy, deny resources to and have al-Qaida depart from that place” - we will hear about it from AQ.
2. But the text of the agreement doesn’t call for what Pompeo told @CBSNews this AM. It says the Taliban won’t allow Al Qaeda to threaten the US from Afghan soil. This isn’t new, contrary to Pompeo’s claim, they’ve long made similar statements - and they were lies.
3. Keep in mind that al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and other AQ-affiliated groups are embedded throughout the Taliban insurgency. So to do what Pompeo says, the Taliban would really have to betray AQ in a way that would be noticeable.
Read 8 tweets
27 Oct 19
1. If Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is in fact dead, it's a good time to reflect on the fact that the ISIS caliphate declaration didn't come out of nowhere. Al Qaeda & its branches have long said they are fighting for a new caliphate. Bin Laden & Zawahiri stated this in the 1990s.
2. Baghdadi & his followers claimed to have achieved this goal in 2014, but the ISIS caliphate crumbled in the face of a US-led coalition. AQ's leaders repeatedly warned this would happen - which is why they've preached patience with respect to declaring emirates & governance.
3. Over the past year-plus, I've reviewed (again) hundreds of al Qaeda messages going back to the 1990s. Resurrecting the caliphate has been a dominant theme. It is even a key part of the contextual narrative in publications such as AQAP's Inspire. ISIS claimed to deliver.
Read 9 tweets
16 Jan 19
1. Shabaab (Al Qaeda's branch in East Africa) has released a statement on yesterday's attack in #Nairobi, #Kenya. It was published along with an English-language translation. Some points to follow.
2. First, Shabaab says the attacked was carried out by its Saleh An-Nabhan Battalion. This is significant. This same unit -- named for an al Qaeda veteran who was embedded within Shabaab early on -- has carried out a number of high-profile attacks.
3. Nabhan first publicly swore allegiance *on behalf of Shabaab* to al Qaeda's senior leadership in Sept. 2008. Al Qaeda told Shabaab that it didn't want to make the relationship widely known, which some *incorrectly* interpreted as AQ rejecting Shabaab's request for a merger.
Read 8 tweets

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