On the one hand, the US recovery so far has been durably positive & modest
On the other hand, b/t the COVID surge, the cold winter weather, exhausted household savings, the end of moratoria on student loans/foreclosures/evictions, & UI expirations, we're piling on a lot of risks
And add on the risks of business closures & state/local cuts. There's a lot that can hurt us economically between now and wide vaccine distribution.
The wrong question to ask is whether the recovery is "self-sustaining" without further fiscal support. I am less confident in this assessment now, but it's still quite possible that if we got no fiscal package most economic data would continue coming in north of zero.
Instead...
...the better question is how can further economic assistance 1) sustain families going through hardship now, especially the ones on the cusp of losing *all* their jobless benefits after Dec 31, and 2) shorten the time it takes to recover by supporting demand & healing supply.
Illustratively, even if we kept up October's jobs pace, it'd take another year-and-a-half just to crawl back to February levels, and another two-and-a-half years to get to where we'd plausibly have been otherwise.
That's already a long recovery. Even longer if growth slows.
The recovery from the Great Recession was painfully long; we want to avoid that.
At this point, the risks of doing too much are far outweighed by the risks of doing too little.
The economy is dynamic: we might do a lot and discover later that we underestimated our economy's capacity for self-healing in the face of a pandemic shock.
I'd much rather us make that happy error than discover that we made matters worse by prematurely declaring victory.
In short, America going into the winter months without more economic support is like a young runner with a serious injury competing in a rugged 10K after a week of good therapy because she can't feel the pain.
*Maybe* she'll be fine. But the risks are alarming.
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Initial claims rise modestly week over week, were ~1.1 million last week.
The recent declines in regular UI recipients, properly including the extended PEUC and EB programs, may be slowing.
And to punctuate that point: ~230,000 workers looked like they left regular state UI at the end of October, but actually just exhausted their regular benefits and transferred to the federal extended PEUC program.
The good news is that the rate in which employed workers are going directly into *permanent* layoff has fallen, though is still elevated [left].
The bad news is that the rate at which already-nonemployed workers are *becoming* permanent layoffs is high and rising [right].
Meanwhile, hourly wage growth among workers keeping their jobs is stable [L], but weekly wage growth has fallen [R], a sign that employed workers are getting fewer hours.
The benefit cliff on December 31 is an economic setback when we least need one -- the winter months when businesses in many of the areas of the country will have a harder time staying open -- not to mention devastating for the affected workers.
Unlike the 7/31 expiration of the emergency $600/week FPUC, which was larger in aggregate dollar terms than this cliff, the 12/31 cliff will cut a deeper wound, because for many workers they won't get *any* aid after expiration; they still got base benefits when the FPUC expired.
It's less likely too that prior savings will be there to sustain the spending of unemployed workers; they've been drawing down their savings since the expiration of the $300/week LWA in mid-September. Many workers are likely to have exhausted their pandemic savings by New Year's.
We're past the point where the problem is liquidity -- muni market frictions appear to have subsided, & the Fed has a credit facility aimed at regional governments.
The problem is that state & local revenue bases are collapsing & they legally have to balance their budgets.
The risks we face now actually played out in 2009 & 2010: state & local governments had to make deep cuts (purple bar below in the @BrookingsEcon measure), which became a drag on the then-nascent economic recovery.
If anything, the moral hazard argument around state & local aid cuts the *other* way from how opponents often make it:
The states that did the *right* thing with COVID restrictions likely saw deeper revenue hits, & that may be making them more hesitant to do the right thing now.
Namely, look at what's happened to the number of married men and women reported in the household survey during the pandemic: a rapid rise in February, and then a fall after June. /2
So a great deal of the declines in employment *counts* for married men and women in the household survey is explained by the declines in just the number of married people the survey shows in the first place. /3
Jobs growth came in at +661K in Sept, but the labor market is losing momentum. We're still 10.7 mil jobs short of Feb employment, & 12.1 mil short of our pre-COVID trajectory. At Sept's pace, it will take us 17 mon to get back to Feb emp, & 26 mon to get back to pre-COVID trend.
That 10.7 million job loss since February means that overall employment is still down -7% since then. In the leisure & hospitality industry, it's still down **-23%**.