This take by @StateDeputySPOX draws on @CWIHP materials but makes a number of bizarre points, which amount to falsification of history. Let me take this apart.
Here, @StateDeputySPOX claims that Chinese textbooks still claim that the Korean War was a "civil war." First of all, historians (not just Chinese historians but historians of the Korean War in the West) still debate whether the Korean War was a civil war or an international war.
The answer of course is that it was both. But it is entirely possible to argue that a "civil war" (neizhan) broke out in Korea on June 25, 1950. Incidentally, Chinese forces were not involved in the Korean War until after US/UN forces intervened.
Also, the very textbook @StateDeputySPOX cites clearly implies in the next sentence that the North Koreans started the war, which is what happened (and this is at variance with the standard North Korean take that falsely claims that South Korea attacked).
Also, Shen Zhihua's best-selling book on the Korean War - hands down the most-read account in China - states plainly that the North attacked the South. It's not censored. In other words, this claim by @StateDeputySPOX is demonstrably false.
In the next tweet, @StateDeputySPOX quotes a @cwihp doc, a Russian report on Mao Zedong's meeting with Ri Ju-yeon, where Mao supposedly "encouraged DPRK invasion of the Republic of Korea".
As historians have long known, Stalin gave the green light to Kim's request for invasion in Jan. 1950, and later summoned him to Moscow for final approval. This was done *without* Mao's knowledge who was basically in the dark. But Stalin instructed Kim to seek Mao's okay.
This was Stalin's way of bringing the Chinese leader onboard (through sharing responsibility). Historians have long wondered why Stalin made this move. I determined (in my own work) that it was because of intelligence that the Soviets intercepted about likely US non-involvement.
Be it as it may, Mao could not say "no" to Stalin so soon after signing the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. But to argue that Mao was encouraging the North Koreans (who had long wanted to attack the South and just pleaded for permission from Stalin) is just completely off.
This here is actually correct. However, what burying of the truth is he talking about, when Shen Zhihua's book is freely available for purchase across China. I am no defender of Chinese propaganda but this is the wrong hill to die on.
By the way, ridiculous tweets like this will certainly backfire against Shen Zhihua back in China (he is already accused by foam-mouthed nationalists of being a "traitor to the Chinese nation"), and having @StateDeputySPOX incorrectly use his work for propaganda won't help.
To conclude: what accountability is he talking about? Accountability for repeatedly warning the Americans not to cross the 38th parallel when MacArthur fought back the North Korean onslaught, and entering the conflict when they did?
Maybe we should start drawing up the accountability list: the Chinese crimes, the Soviet crimes. We'll throw in Japanese war crimes for good measure. Add Hiroshima/Nagasaki. Someone will undoubtedly pick up the tab for bombing North Korea into the Stone Age. What's the point?
Let historians do history, @StateDeputySPOX: what you have here is not only false. It's damaging, and frankly unhelpful to real historians who study these documents and write these accounts.
To anyone interested in the Korean War, here's a recent book by Samuel Wells that is really quite good: whsmith.co.uk/products/feari….
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The speakers' call for personalised sanctions on corrupt Russian officials is very reasonable. I'd only add that any such sanctions must of course go beyond "Russia." Corruption is not a specifically Russian phenomenon.
So if Usmanov's or Abramovich's yachts are chased out of European ports (as by god, I am only happy that they are), it's important to see whose yachts remain, and on what grounds.
Trump's pardon of #MichaelFlynn reminds me to post bits and pieces of an interesting document I recently unearthed in the Russian archives, which tells a remarkable story of corruption and treason. The dramatis personae are Nikita Khrushchev and Cyrus S. Eaton.
Cyrus S. Eaton (1883-1979) was an American-Canadian businessman and philanthropist. He was known for critical views of the US posture in the Cold War, and helped organise the first Pugwash Conference. He even received the Lenin Prize from the USSR in 1960.
In February 1964 Eaton travelled to the USSR where, on February 16, he met Nikita Khrushchev. They had a lengthy discussion of world affairs - not unlike many other conversations Khrushchev would have with visiting politicians and public figures. Until all of a sudden...
Brezhnev and Castro discuss Qaddafi. Brezhnev: "I think Qaddafi is just a boy. ... They have no idea about Lenin or socialism. What they do have is a lot of money. ... At the same time Qaddafi is a fanatical Muslim."
Castro: "I am not too sure that they are fanatical Muslims. I think these are just rude, uncultured, impolite, and, I would say, ill-meaning people."
Castro on Qaddafi: "My general impression is that he is crazy or at least half-crazy."
Reflecting a little more here on @ARVershbow's comments today that it was wrong to see the USSR "as it was" under Brezhnev because by doing so you missed out on Gorbachev... I think this somewhat misconstrues what Gorbachev sought to accomplish.
There's an interesting perspective in the West that sees Gorbachev for someone who embraced Western values and turned the USSR away from a confrontation to a partnership with the United States. I think this is not exactly correct - indeed, probably mostly incorrect.
Gorbachev, like Soviet leaders before him, saw the US as an aggressive superpower, which sought to bankrupt Moscow in the arms race. His early arms control initiatives were all about seizing moral leadership from the United States through the advocacy of nuclear disarmament.
Enjoyed this presentation by @AmbDanFried, @ARVershbow and Celeste Wallander. Of course, as someone who has closely studied Russia's take on the "long 1990s," I will have a number of points of disagreement with the distinguished speakers, some of them major disagreements.
I've set out the evidence here: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…, and I am happy to say that there's going to be a sequel (on Kosovo). To sum up the argument with a Chinese proverb, "it takes two hands to clap."
At the same time, I can only endorse the authors' very reasonable recommendations, which call for engagement with Russia on issues like arms control, counterterrorism, proliferation, and climate change. The authors' argument in favour of people-to-people contacts is spot on.
Oh, didn't know that: apparently when the North Koreans and the South Koreans published their 4 July 1972 Joint Declaration (an epochal document for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula), the North Koreans didn't even bother to inform their ally, the USSR.
Check out Brezhnev and Kosygin complaining that they literally heard this on the radio. (Apparently, Kosygin tuned in to the BBC - what, he listened to the BBC?):
Brezhnev speculates that the South Koreans probably warned the Americans (this was true). But you have to feel for the Soviets who had such a useless ally as North Korea.