1/ I don't think the EU assumes the UK will come begging them for an FTA in early 2021.
I think SOME in the EU think the UK will revert to something like its No-Deal tariffs from 2019, which would significantly lessen the tariff blow on EU producers.
2/ As I've written before, the current slate of UK tariffs seems designed around assuming tariff-eliminating deal with the EU.
Without one, UK tariffs fall on a huge range of products like food which UK consumers want and currently source from the EU.
Bad for prices.
3/ In time, the UK might find non-EU suppliers either domestically, from developing countries it grants preferences to, or from FTA partners.
Alternatively, consumer preferences might shift.
That's long term though.
In the short term: price hikes. Unpopular ones.
4/ Note: This doesn't eliminate the cost for the EU of failing to reach an FTA.
Some tariffs would remain in place, and tariff elimination by the UK would open up EU producers to competition in the UK they were previously shielded from.
Plus, the cuts would be temporary.
5/ In summary, the hopes of the EU of weathering a failure to reach a deal with the UK likely rest more on their market size, what they currently sell to the UK, and the UK's ability to readily replace them, than on any illusion Boris will be begging for new talks by February.
6/ Addendum for nerds:
If you want to take a look at the EU tariffs, the UK's new tariffs and the UK's No-Deal tariffs side by side, I made this a while ago:
1/ When your least favorite uncle hits the sherry this holiday season and starts lecturing the family WhatsApp group about the EU trade surplus signaling their imminent surrender, I humbly suggest you counter... with phone books (Google what those are, Generation Z).
2/ Imagine you have in front of you two phone books.
The one on the left contains the names of every business in the UK that exports anything overseas.
The on the right contains the same for but for European Union firms.
3/ Now your sweaty uncle is right, the EU has about a 30% trade surplus with the United Kingdom.
That means we can (very crudely and purely illustratively) assume 30% more of the businesses in their book sell to the United Kingdom, than the other way around.
2/ Just like the EU-UK FTA has right now, trade negotiation typically get to a point where they are 95% completed but stuck on the last 5%.
That's because the last 5% contains the issues on which the Chief Negotiators have instructions from leaders not to compromise. At all.
3/ This is always incredibly obvious in the negotiating room, and is often pretty bloody clear outside it.
Michel Barnier clearly doesn't have a mandate to say, "You know what, forget the fish let's just sign" and Frost isn't allowed to just OK the EU's LPF.
I know how fragile digital records can be so I have saved the IEA's "UK Ports No-Deal Fear Checker" where they assured everyone we were all just hysterical remonaers over-blowing the problem.
You know, just in case a mysterious bug deletes it on Jan 1.
I especially enjoy the part where one of the most influential think tanks in the United Kingdom fundamentally misunderstands what causes delays at borders and builds an entire thesis around the idea France doesn't have enough staff to physically inspect every truck.
Though the part where they rely on an Economists for Free Trade fantasy that non-tariff-barriers would somehow be illegal is a close second.
Drivers should carry a copy of this fear-buster with them and present it at the border to French Customs. That'll learn em.
Right and wrong aside, if you're a political advisor to the Prime Minister what's your advice on Patel?
Likely to circle the wagons.
The only people whose opinion matters right now are fellow Tory MPs, and the public won't remember a bullying scandal when voting 3 year later.
Sure, Tory MPs could turn on him if the bottom completely drops out of his polls (and hence probably theirs), but is this going to be the issue that does it?
Doubtful.
The usual suspects are already running defense and pivoting this toward being yet another culture war.
The UK conservatives have enjoyed considerable success politically by framing every issue as a battle between their democratically elected ministers and some other force that's thwarting or undermining them.
Judiciary, the Lords, activist lawyers, Remainers, the civil service.
My deeply unsexy takes on @pmdfoster's amazing story:
1. Looks bad but We won't know what this is until the bill is out.
2. If this is a negotiating tactic, it's a bad one.
3. Those implying this will sink future UK FTA's with 3rd countries are (in my view) overstating a bit.
1/ Expanding on (3) because people will yell at me:
In my view, 3rd countries like Canada and Japan will consider the WA distinct enough from regular FTA practice not to begin questioning whether the UK will live up to tariff bindings or other FTA commitments over this.
2/ "What about Pelosi and Congress?"
Yeah, that might be a problem but:
a) The test for Pelosi and Irish-American Congressfolk is going to be if the border descends into chaos and violence again. Not clear this does that.