India’s decision to invite U.K. PM Boris Johnson as chief guest for Republic Day 2021 is incredibly well timed & strategically smart. Four, among other, issues to watch out for:
1. Brexit & FTA: This will be tough sell for London (easy capital flows but restricted labour flows?), but GoI is likely to be welcoming of such agreements, esp. having said no to RCEP. Still a long way to go, but both countries have an economic incentive to get serious.
2. China & IOR: With a strategic shift in London’s position on China since HK situation, & it’s articulation of an Indo-Pacific strategy coupled w/ defence logistics pact w/ India, there are new synergies here.
3. Pakistan: Unlikely to be a problem anymore. The Tories owe Modi & the BJP machinery on this count for mobilising — to some extent — Indian diaspora in the U.K. in the 2019 elections. London is likely to get v. lukewarm on Pakistan, if not burn bridges (as it shouldn’t).
4. New areas of strategic convergence: Tech & medicine; esp w/ India’s importance as exporter of key chemicals & related materials imp. to develop the vaccine on a large scale. This pandemic has given these two countries a powerful plank to seriously work together.
5. Of course there are many more issues, & miles more to go. But, this invitation, despite BoJo’s domestic troubles is a v. smart move. With Corbyn gone, in fact, India-U.K. relations has become increasingly poll-proof akin to the India-US one.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Avinash Paliwal

Avinash Paliwal Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @PaliwalAvi

2 Dec
This @SKalyvas interview is brilliant. Apart from delving into the field of pol. violence & it’s development over the years, it unpacks imp. dilemmas that academics face on a routine basis. 1/n

journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11…
As someone who is deeply wedded to specificities (instead of generalisations), & who puts a premium on high-quality empirics & deep historical inquiry, I’ve struggled w/ the systemic push for theory building & w/ quantitative methods. 2/n
Though I value quant research, for now I’ve decided not to open that box. This could change. But over the last year or so, I’ve pushed myself to diversify my research agenda & climb up the ladder of abstraction w/ support from excellent colleagues. 3/n
Read 6 tweets
14 Oct
Some thoughts on the M. Yusuf interview by K. Thapar. It's timing, content esp. re Af & secret wars, style, reactions & implications. I agree with @iamthedrifter that this will strengthen his credentials in Pak estb., even if there's much to disagree from an Indian perspective.
1. Timing: Excellent! In the middle of the intra-Afghan process in Doha, Sino-Indian standoff, continuing violence at LoC, a never-ending pandemic, IK's domestic travails, & Modi's internal/regional eco., & mil. challenges.
In substance, the interview doesn't complicate India's approach towards China & Pak. The battle-lines are v. clear & hardening over time at a global level. But it does raise q. about India's silent outreach to Pindi. Who did it, why, why now, on what conditions/assumptions?
Read 27 tweets
22 Aug
Couple of quick thoughts, @pstanpolitics a) China has offered shelter to various NE insurgents for some time, w/o letting them operate kinetically. b) P. Baruah is one, but H Tangkhul, T R Calvin, and some other N-IM cadre still operate from Yunnan 1/n
c) There has been an (expected) uptick in violence in Manipur recently, & acc. to some Indian officials there is indeed a "link to China". But, it is unclear whether this link is to Beijing, or to the illegal arms bazaar wherefrom Chinese-made weapons can easily be bought. 2/n
d) R&AW & MSS have been playing hide-&-seek on Baruah/Calvin/Tangkhul (among others) for long. N. Delhi has been worried about Beijing's potential re-activation of these groups; & the E. Ladakh crisis has *seemingly* given a good reason to Beijing (explains timing?). 3/n
Read 10 tweets
18 Aug
This is indeed a great piece by @MohanCRaja that offers imp. policy advise. And like most good pieces, its raises questions about contemporary Middle East & India's engagement therein. 1/n
indianexpress.com/article/opinio…
Do people in the region identify with a "moderate (& sovereign?) Arab centre"? Unlike 1950s when Arab nationalism was on an upswing, today we see little hope for pol. movements of that sort, esp. with SA & UAE (or even Egypt) at its centre. Can MBS be considered moderate? 2/n
Aren't Turkey & Iran's visions of (sectarian!) leadership as much at odd w/ each other as has been the case b/w Riyadh & Tehran? They may accommodate each other for now, but not forever. It's a cursed alliance, if one can term it as such at all. 3/n
Read 6 tweets
29 Jul
Random thoughts on India’s East: It’s astounding how Burma’s self-imposed isolation & discriminatory citizenship laws dislocated India’s eastward thrust and outreach. Even more astonishing is how little this is acknowledged in existing literature. 1/n
From being critical to India’s Non-Aligned strategy, & economic connectivity w/ SE Asia —& long before Look/Act East were coined— Burma’s (erroneously, if understandably) strategic value in N. Delhi was vastly reduced. Isolation cost Burma much, but it cost India a lot too. 2/n
Reading Parliamentary debates on how India wanted to settle returnees from Burma makes v. grim reading. Again, understandable why N. Delhi took the decisions it did, but amazing how little the long-term consequences of the same were discussed. 3/n
Read 6 tweets
6 Jul
China, India, & McMahon Line: I am not a IMINT specialist, & don't have access to latest satellite imagery, but here are some images & thoughts on the McMahon Line near the Myanmar trijunction at Walong. Things can get ugly, & quickly, despite de-escalation at Galwan 1/n
Kibithoo is the last major mil. outpost of the Indian army w/ another small helipad just up north, before the official (sense of) McMahon Line line (acc. to Google). Unlike '62, IA can reach these positions via newly built roads & have been patrolling aggressively. 2/n
But so has the PLA. Acc. to A. Shukla's report, the PLA is patrolling till this point where 10Sikh Li has visible presence. This is troubling enough. But another look at the forward helipad shows that another jungle road connects it to the Chinese side? 3/n
Read 12 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!