Facebook’s @ngleicher was right about linking #APT32 to CyberOne and here is why:
As per Group-IB #ThreatIntelligence & #Attribution the domain cbo[.]group had an IP 45[.]61[.]136[.]214 in the A-record. On this IP address, we detected a unique SSH 4b390f0b7125c0d01fe938eb57d24051
According to Group-IB Graph Network Analysis, this fingerprint was also seen on 30 other hosts including on 45[.]61[.]136[.]166 and 45[.]61[.]136[.]65. Both were used to deploy a uniquely configured #CobaltStrike framework, used exclusively by #APT32 aka #OceanLotus
All the listed IPs belong to the autonomous network - AS53667 within the range of 45.61[.]128[.]0 to 45[.]61[.]191[.]255. We've also seen #APT32 hosting #CobaltStrike on the 45[.]61[.]139[.]211, which was indicated in the A-record of feeder[.]blogdns[.]com
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Hello @Uber! We know breaches suck. Wanted to reach out and support with some interesting information on the #uberhack. If you need any more details, feel free to contact us.
On September 16, vx-underground posted screenshots with evidence of access to #Uber internal systems, including #SentinelOne, #Slack and #AWS. The screenshots have been attributed to the threat actor teapots2022.
During Group-IB’s analysis of the screenshots, interesting artifacts have been found in the recently downloaded files tray. First 2 files are zip archives and have the same format: "LOGID-\d{7} with names LOGID-4952307" and "LOGID-4953756".
Crypto giveaway scams continue to soar: Group-IB has noted a fivefold increase in the number of domains used for #crypto giveaway #scams that involve fake #YouTube streams in the first half of 2022: bit.ly/3eWN0eL
According to Group-IB, 63% of the new fraudulent domain names were registered with Russian registrars, but the #fake websites are primarily designed to target English and Spanish-speaking #crypto investors in the US and other countries: bit.ly/3eWN0eL
In the first six months of 2022, @CERTGIB identified more than 2,000 domains registered explicitly to be used as #fake promotion websites. This figure increased almost five-fold compared to the second half of 2021 and 53-fold in comparison with H1 2021: bit.ly/3eWN0eL
About a week ago, @TalosSecurity team shared some insights related to a recent cyber attack on @Cisco. According to Indicators of compromise, mentioned in this article (bit.ly/3K76lFJ), we have known this group of attackers since the beginning of 2022.
Group-IB's researchers has discovered their TTPs in a series of attacks using #CobaltStrike, #Sliver and #Covenant tools. Our internal name of this group is #TridentCrow.
One of the domains that was published by @Cisco (ciscovpn2[.]com) has a self-signed SSL certificate with unique values. According to Group-IB Threat Intelligence database, out of more than 2 billion certificates, only 39 have similar values and mimic well-known IT companies.