Seeing a few people compare this China Daily video to Russian disinformation operations. The comparison is spot on.

Here are a five similarities to Russian coverage of the 2018 #Skripal poisonings that deserve your attention:
1. Step-by-step pseudo-refutation, attacking ethos, not substance.

The enumerated replies look like a bad high school debate flow chart. Take a look at this account, which constantly engaged in the same activity after the Skripal poisonings.
2. Specifically attacking one reporting team, ignoring the many other sources of information.

During the Skripal poisonings, the target was @bellingcat. For this Xinjiang reporting, it's @BBCNews; ASPI and @adrianzenz have likewise been scrutinized.
3. Refuting red herrings.

This video spends a lot of time establishing that Jiang Yong, a factory supervisor, doesn't speak English.

Who cares? This is barely relevant to the BBC reporting and ignores other interactions w/ security. Same as RU MFA: archive.vn/MiLlh Image
4. Presenting the refutation in a conversational narrative.

The format gives the illusion of audience buy-in, though the anchors here are obviously reading a script. Almost every broadcast about the Skripals I saw in Russia was similarly "narrativized."
Image
5. Implying that investigative journalists are not interested in uncovering the full story—by pointing to the state-imposed restrictions that preclude them from getting it.

Then, "Western journalists refused our calls for an 'official' investigation."
kommersant.ru/doc/4476138 ImageImage

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More from @RyanFedasiuk

3 Dec 20
Who goes to work for China’s defense industry? In our latest, @emily_sw1 and I mapped talent flows between 🇨🇳 universities and defense SOEs.

🚨 We found that U.S. tech companies are indirectly aiding China's military.

Thread: (1/10) cset.georgetown.edu/research/unive…
2/10 In our report for @CSETGeorgetown, we measured the relationships between elite 🇨🇳 universities and China's defense industry by looking at their Graduate Employment Quality Reports.

Kudos to @alexjoske @ASPI_org for highlighting these sources: aspi.org.au/report/china-d…
3/10 We looked at disaggregated employment data for 29 of 45 leading universities—China’s Double First Class universities + those administered by MIIT.

Our dataset reflects the career moves of 140,000 Chinese university graduates in 2019.

6,000 took jobs at defense SOEs.
Read 11 tweets
17 Sep 20
In my first article for @ChinaBriefJT, I mapped the budget of China's united front, the collection of organizations the CCP leverages to silence political opponents, persecute religious minorities, and acquire foreign tech.

Here is what I found (1/9): jamestown.org/program/puttin…
(2/9) For years, Chinese diplomats have insisted that the united front is nothing more than a benign administrative bureaucracy and accused Western analysts of overhyping its role.

But the CCP's own public budget documents belie its claims about the UF's importance and function.
(3/9) For @ChinaBriefJT, I analyzed 160 budget reports from organizations involved in China's central and provincial united front systems.

The central 🇨🇳 government's UF spending exceeds $1.4 billion USD each year—and probably even surpasses the budget of @MFA_China.
Read 9 tweets
7 Sep 20
This week @GeorgetownCSS we review foundational texts on Chinese strategic thinking -- Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, and others. But how heavily do these texts weigh on China's military, compared to, say, Clausewitz? Is there value in comparing 🇺🇸 and 🇨🇳 strategic culture in 2020? (1/6)
Eurocentrism in IR and security studies programs has penetrated global military thinking, in ways I don't think Western academics appreciate.

Why do we assume Sun Tzu matters more to China's (modern) strategic thought than Western military strategists? (2/6)
If you read through papers by Chinese military officers, it's clear Clausewitz is nearly as foundational for the PLA as he is for the U.S. services.

Still, these 123 academic papers might not be representative of broader Chinese military thinking (3/6):
Read 6 tweets
26 Aug 20
This summer, @CSETGeorgetown has been publishing a whirlwind of papers about #AI and China's efforts to acquire it. Some projects have been months or years in the making. In case you missed them, here's a roundup of data-driven analyses I'm proud to have contributed to:
2/ On the military side of things, we wanted to know how PLA officers and defense engineers envision using AI in future warfare. It turns out the PLA is facing major hurdles in AI development: limited access to data, workforce issues, and a dearth of GPUs:
cset.georgetown.edu/research/chine…
3/ That dovetails nicely with a more fundamental question: How is data used in military applications of AI, and can we measure whether 🇺🇸 or 🇨🇳 has a "data advantage"? With @HsjChahal and @carrickflynn, we uncovered the messy reality:
cset.georgetown.edu/research/messi…
Read 8 tweets

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