Replying @ndrea_terzi The ECB cannot do yield curve control the Japanese way because it cannot hint at 19 10Y yields levels as objectives. To use the new EU Commission debt yields is not effective as maturities are longer, the amount is small (much below € 750bn) ..and 1/
..because it isn't (and cannot become) an equal benchmark to all countries' debt and the ECB has said to be committed to avoid fragmentation. The same applies to the use of OIS rates (that a few have advocated) besides the point that 10Y maturities are too thin a market. 2/
The only way the ECB could apply a sort of yield curve control approximately like Japan would be to concentrate purchases of countries' bonds on e.g. 10 years maturities without fixing any target for the 19 yields, hoping to attain some desired levels by calibrating well the ../3
.. amounts bought. The only advantage would be to decrease the total amount of purchases but at the cost of distorting the yield curve, thus eliminating the important information content of the curve's slope. The policy would not need any certificates issuing 4/4
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The US approved a new relief/stimulus package of almost 1 tr USD (4.5% GDP) on top of the 2.2 tr of last March. The commentariat said it would not be enough and more would be necessary next year. Big Government expenditures increasing more than in any other country 1/
Biden called it just “a down-payment” and (surprise) Trump called it an unsuitable “disgrace” and is threatening to veto it. He wants $2000 for each citizen (below $75000 annual income) instead of the law´s $600. The 5593 pages law (!) is full of “pork-barrel” measures 2/
e.g.” a $2.5 billion break for racecar tracks and..$6.3 billion write-off for business meals” or it “creates an independent commission to oversee horse racing, a priority of Senator Mitch McConnell” 3/nytimes.com/2020/12/22/us/…
As a package of measures had been promised, markets were able to anticipate the ECB´s decisions ± correctly. The longer horizon for the TLTROs was perhaps a bit of a surprise but is the more relevant measure supporting credit supply, despite no change in the tier multiplier. 1/
The increase and extension of PEPP (and APP) offer a way to avoid any future cliff-effect by allowing a gradual phase-out of the programme. QE, when sovereign yields are already so low, has per se diminishing returns in terms of its impact on the economic recovery 2/
Further QE can, however, be effective if fiscal policy continues to be suitably expansionary, leading to sizable new debt issuance.The ECB “presence for longer”, is, of course, reassuring in that perspective. An insufficient fiscal stimulus continues to be a big risk for 2021. 3/
The excellent ECB Financial Stability Review, ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/fsr/ec… illustrates well the 2 main risks I see for the EA economy next year: possible insufficient fiscal stimulus and weakening of bank credit supply. The FSR mentions “a slightly tighter fiscal stance" in 2021 1/
The FSR correct statement “fiscal tightening at a time when output gaps are still projected to be negative could exacerbate the current economic situation.”, caused some stir and many comments in social media. The same regarding the accompanying chart 2/
The FSR uses the Commission forecasts showing a slight increase of the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance from -3.2% this year to -2.9% in 2021. 0.3% is a small change not comparable with the mistake of 2012/13 when it went from -0.6% in 2011 to +0.5 & +1.4 in 2012/13 3/
Many papers have emerged analysing the March episode of price collapse and illiquidity in US treasuries, an unprecedented event in the “deepest and most liquid “ financial market in the world. Many things hinge on this analysis 1/n
Two days ago, at the ECB Monetary Conference, ecb.europa.eu/pub/conference… , A.V-J presented a comprehensive paper. It identified the main sellers after the severity of the virus came into the open: investment/mutual funds, hedge funds and non-residents.2/
On a panel with D. Duffie and Vice-Chair Quarles at a webinar organised by the Systemic Risk Council on 14th Oct. , I particularly underlined the role of hedge fund´s sales as they unwound Treasuries basis trades that crucially involve funding with repos 3/..
Amid the Trump shenanigans of last week, the relevant speech by the FED Chairman J. Powell was perhaps not much noticed. He clarified some aspects of the new monetary framework (that so far didn´t trigger any new measures) and made a very strong appeal for more fiscal stimulus /1
“The expansion is still far from complete. At this early stage, I would argue that the risks of policy intervention are still asymmetric. Too little support would lead to a weak recovery..By contrast, the risks of overdoing it, seem..to be smaller”/2 federalreserve.gov/newsevents/spe…
Basically, he implied that monetary policy is practically done:“ The Committee also left the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged . and it expects .. to maintain this target range.”. So, the additional effort has to be fiscal. The same approach applies to Europe. /3
Besides the increasing virus infections and the dangerous volatility coming from the US, two main points became more visible, augmenting downside risks for Europe: likely insufficiency of fiscal policy and possible credit supply deceleration due to a stressed banking sector !/7
The first stems from the delay of the Recovery Fund (NGEU) disbursements and the possible caution of national fiscal policies, after a year of big deficits in 2020. The regrettable protracted timetable for the NGEU payouts is in this ECB chart 2/7 ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ecbu/e…
The recovery depends mostly on fiscal policy staying expansionary, as consumers increase their savings and investment suffers from unused capacity and lack of demand. The suspension of the Stability Pact for 2021 was welcomed, but we need a deep revision of the Pact 3/7