Thread by @MetrorailSafety

Today’s WMSC meeting includes presentations and votes on final #WMATA safety event investigation reports, audit and other oversight updates & more
Join live starting at 12:30 wmsc.gov/meetings/

We are proud to offer closed captioning to make this meeting more accessible. If you want the option to turn the captions on/off, please join us through Zoom.
Also join through Zoom webinar link here if you would like to participate with public comment wmsc.gov/meetings/

If you have any issues accessing our meeting live, the full recording will be available on YouTube youtube.com/channel/UCD83x…

Join us on YouTube now for our public meeting on our #WMATA oversight work:

Today’s safety message: We must continue to do our part in keeping ourselves and others safe in this ongoing pandemic.

Stay vigilant about following basic safety measures.

#MaskUp, social distance and wash hands often.

It takes all of us to combat this pandemic.

Chair Hart: Full agenda today highlights just some of what the WMSC’s hardworking, dedicated staff is accomplishing even in these challenging times:

- final investigation reports
- Metrorail’s development & implementation of corrective action plans
- Other oversight updates

Chair Hart: The WMSC released a detailed audit report on Metrorail’s Elevated Structure Maintenance, Inspection and Repair that identifies some significant progress, but also areas where follow-through or new safety improvements are needed wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

Among the findings, Metrorail does not have weight ratings for its elevated structures, a lengthy new manual went into effect without any training for employees, and different departments are not fully working together wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

Chair Hart: We look forward to working with Metrorail as they work to develop and propose Corrective Action Plans to address our new elevated structures findings.

Chair Hart congratulates Alternate Commissioner Victoria Wassmer on her selection to be USDOT Deputy Assistant Secretary for Finance and Budget. "This is their gain and our loss", wish her great success

CEO David Mayer: WMSC operations, emergency preparedness and communications team closely monitored Metrorail’s preparations for and operations during the Inauguration period

The Elevated Structures Audit we just released includes 12 findings that require WMATA to propose Corrective Action Plans and one recommendation that WMATA must consider wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

Mayer: The audit finds Metro departments are operating in unacceptable silos that create safety risks. Metro does not have load ratings for bridges and aerial structures. A new inspection manual was made effective without any training for the employees who have to implement it.

Mayer: We moved this audit up on our schedule due to safety issues we identified in a special review of inspections related to the D&G Junction where the Blue and Orange Lines meet near Stadium-Armory

Encourages everyone to read the full report for the specific details.

CEO Mayer: Regarding the two 6000 Series train pull-aparts in October and November: The 6000 Series fleet remains out of revenue service.
Metrorail has started moving 6000 Series railcars to Greenbelt Yard overnight at reduced speeds after specific inspections are conducted.

CEO Mayer: All 6000 Series cars should be in the Greenbelt Yard within the next few weeks, which will allow for Metrorail to work on the cars in a single location when a path forward is confirmed for any necessary replacements and repairs.

CEO Mayer: In addition to investigations into specific safety events, the WMSC also identifies trends and conducts analysis in order to drive safety change.

CEO Mayer: Following a lengthy period with little substantive progress from Metrorail, we conducted a detailed review of a number of station overrun events and presented findings to WMATA last month.

CEO Mayer: WMATA’s Safety Dpt has now done its own review and is working with other departments to reduce the risk of these dangerous events as required by CAP C-0015. C-0015 is past due based on the schedule WMATA committed to, and we are paying careful attention to this work

CEO Mayer: Metrorail is also in the process of completing a safety stand down related to Red Signal overruns, some of which can have similar underlying causes to station overruns.
This follows recent overruns and the Silver Spring derailment this summer.

CEO Mayer: This stand down includes a reminder to Metrorail personnel about the importance of adhering to speed commands, which are used as a layer of protection to reduce the risk of collisions, derailments or other safety events.

CEO Mayer: As I noted in early fall, the WMSC required more information from Metrorail regarding the safety basis for Metrorail’s decision to move forward with a return to automatic door operation.

CEO Mayer: The WMSC requested and received a number of documents and responses related to Metrorail's current Auto Doors work

The WMSC is continuing discussions with Metro regarding any outstanding potential safety concerns as WMATA determines what its plans are moving forward

CEO Mayer: Auto doors briefly returned on the Red Line this month, before being suspended again due to what WMATA described as system issues at several stations and the operational changes surrounding the inauguration.

CEO Mayer: WMATA is scheduled to provide the WMSC with additional insight this week into any plans for automatic train operation and their future plans for automation and signaling. The WMSC will evaluate that and take appropriate steps to carry out our oversight responsibilities

CEO Mayer: On the safety event investigations front, the WMSC has ensured a new WMATA practice of collaborating with local first responders to hold emergency response debriefs for events involving a large-scale response

CEO Mayer: Working with Metro’s Chief Safety Officer, we have ensured that these debriefs cover what worked well during the emergency response from the perspective of Metrorail departments and first responders, and what can be improved in the future

CEO Mayer: These debriefs have now occurred following the 2019 Farragut West collision, the Silver Spring derailment this summer, and the two train pull-aparts this fall.

CEO Mayer: I would like to highlight another job that our team takes quite seriously. That is providing an additional opportunity for Metrorail employees, contractors, riders and members of the public to report safety concerns related to the Metrorail system.

WMSC’s Lahiru Karunaratne: WMSC staff respond to and follow up as necessary on every safety concern that is provided to the WMSC wmsc.gov/report/

This action can include immediately contacting WMATA to address specific concerns, or it can include engaging with the person who submitted the concern to more fully understand the best course of action moving forward.

When we do share the concerns with WMATA, we anonymize them if necessary and possible.
In 2020, the WMSC received 15 safety concerns via our safety concerns email --- SafetyConcerns [at] WMSC.gov --- or through our online safety concern form wmsc.gov/report/

Karunaratne: Each of these concerns has now been tracked, documented, acted upon, resolved and closed.

Some examples: Customer ID’d incorrect emergency exit signage on the platform at DCA. WMSC reviewed, confirmed that a fix was needed, raised to WMATA fire marshal, and fire marshal corrected within 24 hours

CEO Mayer: We look forward to continuing this important safety function.

CEO Mayer: WMSC staff have reviewed goals, plans and expectations for 2021 and continue to be involved in important training programs through agencies like @NTSB & @FTA_DOT

@NTSB @FTA_DOT CEO Mayer’s WMSC staff announcements:
Adam Quigley promoted to Investigations program manager
Richard David's title is now emergency management specialist
WMSC also has an IT manager position open wmsc.gov/opportunities/…

Chair Hart asks follow up questions related to the Elevated Structures Audit finding regarding load ratings, and the status of the 6000 Series fleet

The 6000 Series is out of service following pull-aparts this fall. Being inspected before move to Greenbelt, a few have moved

Quigley: 8 investigation reports on the agenda today; work continues on other notable investigations including the Silver Spring derailment and train pull-aparts.

Quigley: WMATA Safety Department has committed to improvements to its investigation report process and internal safety recommendation tracking, and I look forward to working closely with their new deputy chief for investigations

First investigation report, presented by WMSC vehicles expert Manuel Lopez involves an improper door operation at Largo Town Center on Aug. 25, 2020 around 7:44 a.m.

The “door open” button was stuck in the “on” position in what had been the trailing car as the train entered the station. When a new train operator boarded that end of the train to take it back to New Carrollton Yard, keying up led to the doors opening on the wrong side

Lopez: This investigation is based on interviews, CCTV, radio, data recordings, and other sources. Because this was a 3000 Series train, there was no in-cab video

A different train operator who had brought the train out of the yard had reported difficulty closing the doors before going into service about two hours earlier.

The Terminal Supervisor directed the train operator to go into service, and warned the train was going to leave late

Lopez: The door control panel was further damaged as the train serviced the first few stations on the line. The train operator reported this damage to the Rail Operations Control Center, and a car maintenance road mechanic boarded the train at Stadium-Armory.

That mechanic was relieved by another & the train operated to Franconia-Springfield.
The mechanic on board at F-S reported the parts were not available to fix the broken panel & buttons. Supervisors directed the train operate back to Largo
(w/broken panel in trailing car)

No mechanic was on board the train as it made its way back to Largo Town Center, and it is not clear what if any communication occurred regarding the specifics of the damage. It was clear the train would go out of service at Largo Town Center then be taken to a yard

A Rail Supervisor took over operating the train before it reached Largo, a different yard operator conducted a walkthrough to ensure the train was clear of passengers, and another operator who had been directed only to take the train to the yard is the one who keyed up the train

That operator and a supervisor only identified the damaged door control panel after the doors opened on the wrong side.

Lopez: In response to this event, Metrorail will review opportunities to improve procedures for removing trains from service that have door-related problems.
Rail Transportation personnel also reviewed a 2019 operations notice on reporting and communicating safety issues

Next investigation is being presented by WMSC Track and Structures expert JeMayne Walker. This relates to a derailment in the Greenbelt Yard on July 30, 2020 around 10:12 p.m.

Walker: This derailment of a flat car occurred at a hand-thrown switch that had been added to the storage tracks in the yard. The investigation found safety issues with the switch

Walker: The equipment operator on a prime mover successfully pulled the flat car in a straight-through move through the switch that the flagman had just adjusted

About two minutes later, the equipment operator on the prime mover pushed the flat car back through the switch area. As the flat car moved back through the switch area, the flat car derailed.

Walker: There were a number of delays associated with reporting the derailment.

The equipment operator notified a departmental supervisor of the derailment, but Metrorail rules do not currently require a derailment in this area of a yard to be reported to the interlocking operator or RWIC.

The derailment was reported to MOC in the ROCC approximately 20 minutes after it occurred.
The interlocking operator, responsible for yard operations, only learned of i approx. 26 minutes after it occurred when a ROCC Assistant Superintendent called to ask for more info

The interlocking operator did not reach the work crew on the radio, so the interlocking operator had to leave the tower to determine what happened. A Roadway Worker In Charge was also unaware of the derailment.

Walker: The investigation into this event identified problems with the hand-thrown switch involved in this event, and two similar switches nearby.

These switches were installed about four years ago on storage tracks, which are not integrated into the electronic signaling system, to create more storage space for rail maintenance vehicles.

The investigation uncovered that the switches did not have appropriate switch stands, were not included in regular preventive maintenance or inspections, and were not shown on yard maps.

Other issues that could have potentially contributed to this derailment include the work crew not properly placing lights on the flat car for night work.

Walker: Key concerns raised in this derailment are related to the switches. Corrective actions address the inappropriate switch stands, a lack of preventive maintenance and inspection, and a lack of awareness that the switches even existed.

Metrorail says it has now accounted for all of the switches in its regular maintenance and inspection schedule, and has replaced the switch stands on the three switches identified in the Greenbelt Yard.

Metrorail indicates that all hand thrown switches are part of the preventative maintenance inspection schedule.

WMATA’s Safety Department is conducting its own verification to ensure that all such switches in all rail yards have been inspected quarterly.

Vehicles expert Manuel Lopez next up presenting an investigation into improper operation in the New Carrollton Yard on Aug. 11, 2020 that resulted in an unintended coupling when one train rolled backward into another

Car Maintenance Technician conducting a Daily Inspection on a four-car 7000 Series consist placed the master controller in coast during two brake pressure tests

During each “brakes off” test, the consist rolled backward about 6 inches due to the slight grade of the track

Lopez: Daily inspection procedures state the master controller may not be placed in coast or a point of power during brakes off tests on older cars, but do not state the same for the 7000 Series. This demonstrates that the procedure is insufficient and must be revised.

Metrorail did not effectively communicate with or train employees on these procedures

The second time the consist rolled back, it hit and coupled with a 3000 Series consist that was stored near the bump post.

Following this improper operation and unintended coupling, Car Maintenance employees requested, and the Interlocking Operator directed, that a Train Operator uncouple and move the trains.

The train operator correctly refused to manipulate the scene of a safety event

The WMSC finding issued on October 20th, after the October 9th Red Line pull-apart, requires Metrorail to implement a Corrective Action Plan that will ensure the integrity of all investigations by ensuring the scene of an event and all evidence is preserved.

Prior to the start of the daily inspection, the same Train Operator had stored the 7000 Series consist approximately 13 inches from the 3000 Series, rather than the two feet that are required by rule. That contributed to this improper operation leading to an unintended coupling.

In response to this event, Car Maintenance conducted a safety briefing for the New Carrollton Yard on September 9th that specifically focused on the importance of following written procedures.

WMATA also identified the need for broader Lessons Learned documents for Car Maintenance and Rail Operations.

Rail Operations’ is meant to focus on rail car storage rules, safety briefings for Train Operators, and the need to identify and be aware of track grade.

WMSC Operations Expert Bruce Walker is presenting the next report. This is one of four today related to improper roadway worker protection.

Walker: On Aug. 22, 2020, a construction inspector reported to Fort Totten to meet a work crew replacing standpipes on the Green/Yellow Line tracks. Inspector used cell phone rather than radio to contact crew, get directions, and to attempt to get permission to access the roadway

Walker: The inspector – despite holding the highest level of Roadway Worker Protection training – stated they did not know that Fort Totten is a transfer station.

Walker: The work crew was near the lower-level platform, but the inspector went to the upper-level (Red Line) platform.
The inspector then left the platform and entered the Red Line roadway and walked for approximately 200 feet without any protection in place.

The inspector did not use their radio, did not conduct a radio check, and then used a cell phone to contact the work crew after noticing that a chain marker showed them on the B Line, or Red Line, rather than the E Line, or Green Line.

The inspector identified this around the time that a train approached from behind. The inspector gave a proceed signal to the train operator, but the train operator correctly identified that the inspector did not have permission to be on the roadway, and radioed ROCC

Walker: In interviews conducted as part of the investigation, the inspector stated that this was not the only time they had used a cell phone to communicate with a work crew, which is contrary to Metrorail rules.

The Roadway Worker In Charge also indicated that instructions provided over the cell phone, apparently by another employee, were not clear.

Walker: This event was the result of communications breakdowns, insufficient system familiarization, and non-adherence to written rules, procedures or processes.

WMATA should consider providing sufficient territory familiarization and needs to ensure that its culture supports following written procedures.

Q for additional detail regarding cell phone rules
Walker: To use a cell phone, must be in a place of safety and otherwise following safety rules
CEO Mayer: Prevent distraction, encourage proper communications

Operations Expert Bruce Walker continues with an improper RWP event investigation on the Red Line between Fort Totten and Takoma on Aug. 27, 2020 just after 11 a.m.

A track inspection team made up of a Metrorail employee and a contractor traversed a hot spot without Foul Time protection.

Foul Time is when the ROCC Controller stops train traffic in a particular area, establishes red signals and takes other steps in the train control system to provide additional layers of protection for workers.

A hot spot is a segment of track with no clearance, limited view or other condition that makes it unsafe to occupy without Foul Time or a higher level of protection.

The track inspection team had first properly requested and were granted Foul Time for a hot spot Then, before reaching the next hot spot about 1400 feet farther down the tracks, they requested Foul Time for that area

The ROCC directed the inspection team to stand clear as a revenue train passed that location.
There was no further radio communication, but the inspection crew later said that they assumed that they had Foul Time protection after the train passed their location.

The crew entered the roadway and began walking through the hot spot.
Before they reached the end of the hot spot, a train approached their location. At that time, they attempted to move to a place of safety, but had not reached the end of the hot spot.

The inspection crew reported over the radio that they were relinquishing Foul Time at B1-308+00. However, they never had foul time, and that location is 300 feet short of the end of the hot spot.

At that point, the ROCC identified that the inspection team had moved into the hot spot without any protection in place, and the inspection team was removed from service.

The RWIC and the contractor track inspector both stated in interviews that they were not paying attention while on the roadway. The track inspector specifically noted that they weren't paying attention to the radio

Walker: The investigation suggests WMATA has allowed procedures to be ignored. This is dangerous and suggests WMATA must place renewed focus on safety promotion and safety assurance efforts to ensure workers understand and properly implement safety rules

Walker: The RWIC was sent for re-training on RWP Level IV, and TRST developed a Lessons Learned based on this event.

Operations Expert Bruce Walker continues with an investigation into improper RWP outside Silver Spring Tie Breaker Station 2 on Aug. 29, 2020.

A Traction Power Maintenance Technician executing an overnight red tag outage entered the roadway without any protection in place to hot stick and confirm that third rail power had been de-energized.

During a red tag outage, a circuit breaker is physically removed from the circuit, and a red tag is issued to implement lock out/tag out procedures

Once the circuit breaker is removed workers must get permission to enter the roadway to use a hot stick to verify power is down

The crew had racked out the breaker, but the technician did not request Foul Time from the Rail Controller. The technician had spoken to the Maintenance Operations Center on the phone, which had directed the technician to go to the tracks.

Proper procedure requires a separate communication with the Rail Operations Control Center to request and be granted foul time.

The technician said in an interview that they assumed that they had Foul Time, because that is the normal nightly procedure
The Roadway Worker In Charge was not aware that the technician had gone to the roadway. The RWIC was still in the Tie Breaker Station briefing contractors

Part of the communication issues relate to the fact that the technician’s radio was on a different channel than the RWIC’s radio

This safety event was identified because the Rail Controller called the MOC desk to inform them that the crew had not hot sticked the scheduled red tag outage. The MOC provided the chain markers of the hot sticking that had been provided by the technician on scene.

In response to this event, TRPM developed a Lessons Learned document focused on requesting Foul Time and roadway access. The TRPM technician was also assigned to RWP refresher training.

Operations expert Bruce Walker’s final improper RWP investigation presentation today involves an event at Tysons Corner on Sept. 3, 2020

Walker: This event includes a worker who stated afterward that they are scared to use the good faith challenge processes due to fear of retaliation.

A crew assigned to work on platform edge lights improperly downgraded their planned form of protection with the approval of the Rail Operations Control Center.
This put the work crew at risk.

Work was originally scheduled with proper protections: Exclusive Track Occupancy and a supervisory power outage
When the Rail Controller asked the work crew to hot stick and confirm power was down, the RWIC downgraded the protection request to Foul Time with no power outage

Walker: The investigation suggests the crew did not have the proper work zone setup equipment. Two members of the crew also did not wear their hard hats, which are required

The certified controller operating as an on-the-job trainer and the student radio controller allowed the reduced form of protection.

Walker: In an interview, the RWIC said that there was not much work to do and there was no potential for the workers to contact the third rail, so the reduced protection was acceptable. This is not accurate.

Walker: Roadway Worker Protection rules exist because there are risks anytime workers access the roadway.

One aspect of the RWP rules is the good faith challenge.
This states that Metrorail will guarantee each worker the right to challenge, in good faith, the effectiveness of roadway worker protection at their location.

Walker: In a post-event interview, an electrician stated that they are scared to raise a good faith challenge due to fear of retaliation. The electrician stated that they just accept the risk and do not put their job on the line by making a good faith challenge.

Walker: The entire point of the good faith challenge is to save lives through a non-punitive safety reporting culture.

Walker: Even as the PTASP’s safety promotion practices are enhanced and rolled out, existing plans must be followed and strengthened to ensure that safety comes first.

Final safety event investigation being presented today by Investigations Program Manager Adam Quigley

Investigation W-0060 involves a June 6, 2020 smoke event linked to an arcing insulator near Capitol Heights Station.

Quigley: In this event, there were multiple instances where WMATA personnel across multiple departments did not follow emergency procedures, an emergency response team initiated a conflict with firefighters, and there were a number of communications lapses.

At 6:07 p.m., the Station Manager reported smoke at Capitol Heights to the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC). A ROIC specialist directed the station manager to investigate further. Neither that specialist nor another contacted via radio called the fire department

Quigley: the station manager was asked several times for more than 10 minutes whether it really was smoke or might instead be brake dust, and trains were allowed to continue running.

A rail controller asked a train operator whether the operator had seen “brake dust”

The ROIC specialist who interacted with the Station Manager on the radio said in post-event interviews that they are taught to avoid the use of the word smoke.

For clear safety reasons, if there is smoke, Metrorail is required to implement its emergency procedures, which put safety first.

In this case, the ROCC only called first responders when the Utility Assistant Superintendent on duty overheard the radio conversation between the ROIC and the Station Manager. This call was made seven minutes after the station manager first reported smoke.

Another Train Operator was directed to use an out of service train to conduct an inspection, but that train operator did not follow speed restriction rules for such inspections and could not stop at the correct location.

Just after the train overshot the location about 1,250 feet outside of the station, the station manager reported dark smoke entering the station.

The fire department entered the station a minute later, and the station manager only then evacuated customers from the station.

WMATA did not properly communicate with the fire department on scene

At Capitol Heights Station, WMATA employees including Metro Transit Police officers and the rail emergency response team (ERT) did not establish unified command with the fire department’s Incident Commander and entered the station without approval from the incident commander.

The first ERT member on the platform initiated a conflict with the firefighters who were on the roadway. Specifically, ERT moved toward restoring power without coordination with the incident commander.

The incident commander reported over the fire department radio that ERT put them in a “bad position.”

This conflict also extended the emergency by at least 20 minutes due to additional time required to verify that it was safe to restore power.

In the Rail Operations Control Center, a Superintendent was required to provide frequent updates to upper-level management on the phone, which detracted from the Superintendent’s ability to perform their other duties.

The Superintendent did not provide all information, including information provided by the fire liaison, to the utility assistant superintendent or ROCC Controller.

Quigley: A utility assistant superintendent is a controller who sometimes fills in as an assistant superintendent. This particular utility assistant superintendent was very new to that role, and had no formal, documented training on it.

The ROCC also did not assign an on-scene commander at Capitol Heights for more than an hour.

Although it was clear at the time of the event that several ROCC employees may have played a role, none were removed from service for post-incident testing as required.

After the first arcing insulator was identified and removed, a second arcing insulator was identified that also had to be removed.

This event demonstrates the importance of taking additional steps to keep water out of tunnels to prevent smoke and fire events like arcing insulators and to prevent rapid infrastructure deterioration

This event occurred in June, prior to the conclusion of our ROCC Audit work. Some aspects of this event were incorporated into the audit findings released in September wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

The audit findings require changes including improved: training, emergency exercise experience, fire and smoke procedures, checklists, communication between the fire liaison and controllers, proper staffing, and proper removal from service of ROCC personnel for post-event testing

The ROCC Audit also identified staffing, leadership and workload concerns in the ROCC. Metrorail has proposed addressing this in part by establishing an emergency management team to handle emergency events.

Quigley: We have not seen anything like this smoke wording concern since June 6th

Commissioner Lauby: Even "brake dust" is burning brake pads; you're talking about smoke either way

(If you're watching live, yes, that was a cat; No, that cat is not on the payroll)

Next up: Corrective Action Plan (CAP) updates from COO Sharmila Samarasinghe

On ROCC Audit, following significant feedback and many conversations, the WMSC has approved 20 of 21 CAPs proposed by WMATA for implementation.

Samarasinghe: As the audit detailed, WMATA had not made substantive progress in many of these areas over several years, so recovering through these CAPs will not be a quick task either. Several of these ROCC CAPs are scheduled to take years to fully implement.

Samarasinghe: Most of the ROCC CAPs are integrated and interconnected to each other – the success of one CAP inherently tied to the success of several others.
There are specific interim steps that Metrorail has proposed to reach each of those goals and verify implementation.

Samarasinghe: The one remaining proposed ROCC CAP is undergoing what may be the final revisions from WMATA now.

Regarding the separate finding issued in October relating to the integrity of safety event investigations, the WMSC has approved Metrorail’s Corrective Action Plan for implementation.

The October finding was issued as a result of Metrorail’s actions following the October train pull apart near Union Station that did not follow the steps required for evidentiary chain of custody and testing.

Initial steps are underway now to improve the integrity of the investigative process by improving WMATA’s investigations SOP and by informing employees and contractors about their responsibilities. Additional training is planned in the future once the procedure has been revised.

Samarasinghe: The WMSC has recently closed five CAPs. This includes changes to the approach Metrorail takes to collecting, synthesizing, analyzing and acting upon performance data tied to its assets and systems such as track infrastructure and train control systems.

Samarasinghe: The closed CAPs also include Metrorail meeting the requirement of updating the Track Inspection and Maintenance Instructions which was a deficiency identified during the 2020 WMSC Track Maintenance and Associated Training audit.

We have also now closed a CAP replacing visors in 7000 series train operator cabs. Metrorail has replaced these visors so that they can still properly assist operators while not improperly blocking the inward facing cameras.

COO Samarasinghe with audit updates, beginning with the Elevated Structure Maintenance, Inspection and Training Audit released this week

It contains 12 findings requiring corrective action and one recommendation
wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

Although Metrorail has taken some positive steps toward improving a structural maintenance and inspection program that faced significant challenges over the past decade, work remains for WMATA to fully implement these steps, and other improvements are needed.

Metrorail does not have basic load ratings for its elevated structures to confirm the number or type of trains or size of equipment that can safely traverse the bridges or stations, which creates a risk that the structures could be inadvertently overloaded.

Combined with unduly complex data systems and the long lead time for major structural rehabilitation projects, the lack of load ratings also creates the risk of a significant delay in determining whether a structure is safe for train traffic if an inspector identifies a concern

Metrorail recently developed and published its first Structural Inspection Manual, but issued it without any standardized training on the revised policies and procedures for the employees who have to implement the manual

Concerns quickly identified by different departments and frontline employees demonstrate a separate significant, ongoing problem facing Metrorail: siloed departments that do not fully coordinate on work instructions, materials or procedures.

Elevated structures inspection, maintenance and repair is further complicated by the disparate IT systems used to store inspection, repair and design data that only some individuals, groups or departments have full access to

Metrorail also does not have important structural steel inspection tools available that are listed in its Structural Inspection Manual. D-meters are needed to assess section loss in steel structures and dye penetrant kits should be used to check potential cracks in structures.

Other issues identified include the time available for supervisors to spend in the field overseeing inspectors who are relatively new to WMATA, a lack of documentation of some engineering practices, and the need to review the credentials of contractors who conduct inspections

This report also includes a repeat recommendation to Metrorail to assess the need to incorporate replacement or mitigation plans for rocker bearings on 10 structures into long-term capital projects on those bridges

Samarasinghe encourages anyone watching (reading) to read the full report to understand the detailed supporting evidence for each of these conclusions and additional background wmsc.gov/wp-content/upl…

Metrorail has 45 days from yesterday’s issuance of this report to propose corrective action plans to address each of the 12 findings. Under the WMSC Program Standard, Metrorail is required to consider the recommendation to determine whether a Corrective Action Plan is necessary.

On other audits, the WMSC has transmitted the draft Roadway Maintenance Machine Audit to WMATA for their 30-day technical review. Roadway Maintenance Machines (RMMs) are the vehicles that move on the rails but that do not carry customers.

Our Automatic Train Control and Signaling Audit team is in the final stages of its audit work now, after concluding interviews this month.

Our next audit, with interviews scheduled next month, relates to WMATA’s Fitness for Duty Programs. This includes drug and alcohol testing, fatigue, medical and physical requirements.

Our audits and other oversight work are part of a continuous process to identify ways to improve safety at Metrorail. We audit all aspects of Metrorail’s agency safety plan over the course of a three-year period.

Last item today is a procurement resolution relating to IT and HR – Commissioners adopt it

That concludes today’s meeting. You can always reach out to us here, on Instagram instagram.com/metrorailsafet…, on Facebook facebook.com/MetrorailSafet…, through our website wmsc.gov/report/ or via email