THREAD
It's hard to predict how many people will show up to January 31 rallies in Russia to support @navalny. But the risk of violent incidents has gone up significantly, and one of the key factors here is choice of location for Moscow protest. Let me explain it quickly 👇
2/ Team Navalny has chosen Lubyanskaya and Old Squares in Moscow. That's where HQ of FSB and the Presidential Administration (PA) are located. According to organizers, the logic is that @navalny was poisoned by FSB squad, and the decision was likely taken by the Kremlin.
3/ Why does this choice of location create additional risk of violence and incidents compared to Pushkinskaya Square a week ago? There are three main reasons.
4/ First, the place is tiny. Except for a small park in front of PA building, it's just couple of sidewalks. If many people will come, it will look beautiful on camera and reult in dramatic shots, but some participants are likely to be forced to stay on the roadway...
5/ ... and risk up to one year in jail for "obstruction of traffic," according to the article 267 of the Russian Penal Code that has been amended by the Duma in late 2020. The police has already launched such case after Jan 23 protest, as @lizafoht reports bbc.com/russian/news-5…
6/ Then, if police violence starts like it did last week, there are very few directions to run. The area is full of misleading side streets that lead to dead-end streets. Not surprisingly, that's where bulk of beatings and arrests happened during 2019 summer protests.
7/ Lastly, both FSB HQ and PA are heavily protected facilities with armed guards. An attempt to enter them can be met with gunfire. Particularly worrying is a parking lot in front of PA building protected by a fence. A lot of dangerous stuff can happen is someone walks in...
8/ It's important to understand that opposition has few realistic options for numerous reason, as I've argued in @ForeignPolicy recently. Escalating by putting protesters in danger isn't a good option to address the problem - quite the opposite. foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/26/put…
9/ Finally, I hope that everyone going to Lubyanka will read & follow instructions on safe participation in protest and risks to watch out compiled by @ru_thebell, @OvdInfo, Ekaterina Shulman and others. Surprisingly, Team @navalny never attaches them to calls for protests 🙆♂️
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THREAD
What is overlooked in analysis of #RussiaProtest after @navalny's arrest? It's sophistication that the Kremlin has developed in addressing such threats, and lack of realistic strategy by Putin's opponents. Let's put together some unpleasant facts 👇 foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/26/put…
3/ @navalny's investigation about Putin's palace (>96 million views now!) and street protests are seen as a serious challenge by the Kremlin, which is visible in heavy-handed crackdown on Navalny's team&family, as @HenryJFoy & @maxseddon document here: ft.com/content/45be9f…
A great read by @AbrahmL in @nytimes on how Russia might win from climate change, and how it can handle potential migration from China. The story has lots of interesting facts, and features Sergey Karaganov's bear skin. Couple of additional points... 1/ nytimes.com/interactive/20…
2/ The article describes 🇷🇺government attitude towards climate change as overwhelmingly positive due to new farming potential in Siberia/FarEast, and cites @RodSchoonover who describes potential "🇷🇺 agricultural dominance" as an "underappreciated geopolitical threat"
3/ Of course, I'm not a climate expert, but based on my limited knowledge talking to 🇷🇺 officials, Moscow's view on climate change is much more nuanced and increasingly focused on risks. Good starting point is President Putin's speech at Valdai: en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…
THREAD
Today's agreement may turn another bloody page in the tragedy that is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Setting emotions aside, here are couple of quick points on Russian calculus and handling of the issue - and some possible implications for 🇷🇺 standing in the Caucasus.
2/ For many Russian decision-makers, resumption of hostilities in NK was a matter of "when" rather than "if." The Kremlin took note of 2016 war, and the conclusion was that time is on Azerbaijan's side if Baku becomes determined to use force.
3/ This is why Russia had encouraged Yerevan to become more flexible, and has always been clear that the 🇷🇺🇦🇲military alliance covers only internationally recognized Armenian territory, but not NK - a point reinstated very clearly by @MID_RF on 10/31 mid.ru/en/foreign_pol…
2/ Before the election, the prevailing view in the Kremlin was that a victory for @JoeBiden would be bad for Russia, because a Democratic administration might impose new economic sanctions on Moscow as punishment for its bad behavior
3/ See this great dispatch from September by @meyerhenry4 & @world_reporter. My own conversations with some 🇷🇺 officials and executives mostly resonate with @bpolitics story (although nobody's sample of GOR contacts is fully representative, of course). bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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There is yet another high profile 🇨🇳🇷🇺 spy case. Alexander Lukanin (64), a researcher from Tomsk, has been arrested by the FSB for transferring sensitive technology to China, according to @MBKhMedia. Here is some context 👇 1/ mbk-news.appspot.com/news/v-tomske-…
2/ Alexander Lukanin was a researcher at Tomsk polytechnic university, and later on he worked at Institute of physics of strength & material science, a highly reputed research institution in Siberia. His research was focused on high-voltage power supply that has military use
3/ After retirement Lukanin was invited to work at Shenyang in North-East China. According to @MBKhMedia, his employer was Shenyang University (沈阳大学), but the city hosts some PLA-tied research institutions. Good background in this @ASPI_ICPC report aspi.org.au/report/china-d…
THREAD. Chinese customs data is out. It shows that 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade is gradually going back to pre-COVID levels. Key driver for Sino-Russian economic relationship in the near&mid-term will be politics rather than markets: fallout of @navalny's poisoning, crisis over #Belarus, US-China.
2/ China's Customs has released its August data. 🇨🇳🇷🇺trade in Jan-Aug was $68.63b, -3.2% compared to 2019. Decline in trade is slowing down (in Jan-Jul it was -4.5%), and trade volumes are growing for a second month in a row: +4.2% in Jul, +4.1% in Aug. customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ Key factor of growth is rise in 🇷🇺 imports from 🇨🇳 for the fifth month in a row. In Aug alone it added 17.8% ($5.23b). This is a reflection of a far better state of 🇷🇺 economy than many have feared in spring, as @AndrianovaAnna explains in @businessbloomberg.com/news/articles/…